AMBASSADOR MEETS DEFENSE MINISTER - SOREN GADE IN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 COPENHAGEN 000369 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/NB, EUR/RPM E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL MARR DA SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS DEFENSE MINISTER - SOREN GADE IN AN EXPANSIVE MOOD REF: KAO - BELL EMAIL 8/27/2009 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: On August 26, Ambassador paid an introductory call on Minister of Defense Soeren Gade. The Minister was in a talkative mood, and conducted a very cordial meeting in which no contentious issues were raised. He did, however, drop a few surprise hints concerning the possibility of relocating the Danish military's Greenland Command to Thule, about creating some sort of NATO Arctic Forum, and about the prospect for Denmark to eventually drop its ESDP opt-out with the EU (but not any time soon). End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) Ambassador, accompanied by the Defense Attache, met with Minister Gade for nearly an hour. The Minister was accompanied by his number two, Permanent Secretary of State for Defense Lars Findsen, as well as Deputy Permanent Secretary of State for Defense (Strategy and Policy) Kristian Fischer. Minister Gade frequently consulted a one-page list of talking points, but as frequently digressed into tangential points and anecdotes. ¶3. (SBU) The Minister began by expressing his overall satisfaction with U.S.-Danish defense relations. He indicated he had been an admirer of President Reagan; applauded the initiative of Secretary Rumsfeld in transforming NATO structures; and is deeply appreciative of his close relationship with Secretary Gates. Minister Gade expressed satisfaction for the positive way in which any U.S.-Danish military issues are speedily resolved, as well as for the rapid progress being made bilaterally on developing technical countermeasures against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). ¶4. (SBU) Minister Gade was especially pleased to have been able to obtain Danish agreement on the need to upgrade the radar facilities at Thule. He acknowledged that maintaining Thule was expensive for the U.S., but believes that Thule will only become more important as time passes and the Arctic shipping lanes open up. He then made a surprising mention that, eventually, Denmark might wish to relocate all or part of Greenland Command to either Thule, or Nuuk, or perhaps both. He also said that, as the Arctic becomes more important, it might be useful for NATO to create a framework for dealing with Arctic issues, perhaps similar to the NATO-Ukraine Forum. ¶5. (SBU) The Ambassador picked up the reference to NATO to ask about the Strategic Concept development. The Minister asked Kristian Fischer to respond. Fischer briefed that a meeting of the "Eminent Persons Group," which he said included former Secretaries of State Albright, and perhaps Powell, was scheduled to take place in Copenhagen on November ¶5. The work of this group is supposed to lead to a new Strategic Concept in time for the NATO Lisbon summit in autumn 2010. (NOTE: We checked with USNATO which was unaware of any such meeting in Copenhagen (ref). END NOTE.) ¶6. (SBU) In response to the Ambassador's congratulations on the near-unanimous party support for new 5-year Danish Defense Agreement, Minister Gade said that he "took advantage" of the current high level of respect which Danish soldiers enjoy throughout the country, to get almost all political parties to agree to the plan. He was especially pleased to have been able to increase the defense budget, a first in many years (and virtually unique in Europe this year). ¶7. (SBU) The Minister then turned to the subject of the Baltic states ("our Eastern partners and Allies"). He claimed to share their view that some sort of more "visible" support for their sovereignty was needed. He indicated that some kind of NATO "footprint," such as ) but not limited to ) Air Policing, was vital to reassure these nations of Allied support. He made it clear that he was not suggesting "stupid structural" additions, such as NATO headquarters or bases; but exactly what he had in mind was left unmentioned (as was the Russia-Georgia war). He did claim that the NATO Secretary-General would soon be launching a discussion of this topic. ¶8. (SBU) In response to the Ambassador on the Danish "opt-out" for security and defense matters within the EU, Minister Gade reiterated that the original Danish position had been based both on a dislike for duplicating NATO structures, and on an instinctive fear that Eurocrats might become in a position to order Danish forces to deploy COPENHAGEN 00000369 002 OF 002 overseas. However, after several years of being "out," the Minister was coming to a different perspective. Now, it was possible to see a variety of positive aspects to the EU missions abroad, includnig to be able to influence the discussion. It has become clear that Denmark currently has zero influence within the EU on defense matters; and Danish forces are losing some valuable opportunities to train with EU battle groups. Nonetheless, Minister Gade volunteered that a referendum ) required to change the Danish opt-out ) would not be called anytime soon, as there is no political constituency for doing so. He also expressed skepticism about EU defense ambitions, claiming they were much too large for current economic realities. ¶9. (SBU) Finally, in discussing the Ambassador's recent trip to Greenland's capital Nuuk, Minister Gade expressed some exasperation about what he termed the Greenlanders' "victim mentality." He seemed resigned to the fact that even a recent report by the Danish Institute for Military Studies into the 1968 crash of a B-52 (concluding that there never was a "lost H-bomb") had failed to achieve closure on the subject. In this connection, the Ambassador asked about a report that the Danish Ministry of Health is preparing to release about radioactivity in Greenland. While he did not know the contents of the report, he gloomily predicted that whatever it might say, it would inevitably feed the "victim mentality." FULTON