Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09CONAKRY829
2009-01-05 14:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Conakry
Cable title:
CHARGE MEETS WITH GUINEA'S NEW PRIME MINISTER
VZCZCXRO9843 PP RUEHPA DE RUEHRY #0829/01 0051455 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 051455Z JAN 09 FM AMEMBASSY CONAKRY TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3302 INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CONAKRY 000829
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM ASEC GV
SUBJECT: CHARGE MEETS WITH GUINEA'S NEW PRIME MINISTER
REF: 08 CONAKRY 0823
Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF SHANNON CAZEAU FOR REASON 1.4 B AND D
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CONAKRY 000829
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM ASEC GV
SUBJECT: CHARGE MEETS WITH GUINEA'S NEW PRIME MINISTER
REF: 08 CONAKRY 0823
Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF SHANNON CAZEAU FOR REASON 1.4 B AND D
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. After describing how he unexpectedly
landed the position of prime minister, Kabine Komara
assured Charge that he expects to have "complete autonomy"
as Guinea's new head of government. He said that he will
be free to appoint his own cabinet, although he expects to
appoint two or three military officials to some of the
remaining cabinet positions. Komara's most pressing
concerns include managing popular expectations for quick
fixes to endemic problems, maintaining eligibility for debt
relief under HIPC, and avoiding suspension of bilateral
assistance programs. Komara gave a positive first
impression. Guineans and foreign observers alike will be
watching him closely in the coming weeks in order to
ascertain how effective a civilian leader he might be. END
SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) Charge Raspolic met with Guinea's new prime
minister, Kabine Komara, the evening of January 3, the day
after Komara arrived in Guinea to assume office. Switching
back and forth between English and French, often in
mid-sentence, Komara was a charming and animated
interlocutor.
--------------
BECOMING PRIME MINISTER
--------------
3. (SBU) Relating how he became prime minister, Komara
told Charge that President Moussa Dadis Camara had called
him while he was in Paris, asking him to be part of
Guinea's new government. Komara said that he went home to
his three adult children in Cairo and discussed whether it
was a good move to become part of the government now, or to
wait a few years until a newly elected government is in
power. His children reportedly encouraged him to take the
job because he would best be able to influence events in
the immediate term. Komara said that he called the
president and told him he was interested in working for the
new government. Assuming that he was coming to discuss his
potential role further with the president, Komara received
a text message from his wife in Conakry after he had
already started his trip to Guinea. His wife reportedly
texted that Komara had been named prime minister and that
she would meet him at the airport with a clean boubou so
that he could address the press gathered there.
--------------
COMPLETE AUTONOMY
--------------
4. (C) Komara said that he has a good relationship with
President Camara. When asked about forthcoming cabinet
appointments, Komara said that he would "absolutely" be
able to name his own ministers, and that he recognized the
need for wider ethnic participation. However, he told
Charge that he expected that two or three of the remaining
ministerial positions would be filled by military
officers. He said, for example, that the Minister of
Justice could easily be filled by a military officer if
that officer had experience with the military justice
system. Again emphasizing that President Camara would not
influence cabinet appointments, Komara related how Camara
had passed him a piece of paper with the name of the
president's choice for Minister of Finance written down.
Describing the nominee as a poor choice, Komara said he
went back to the president and told him that he would not
name this person as his minister. Camara reportedly told
him "fine, pick who you want."
5. (SBU) As prime minister, Komara said that he strongly
believes that he will enjoy complete autonomy. He told
Charge that he expects to coordinate decisions with the
president, but that he would be empowered to run the
government as needed. Komara said that he had already
talked to the president about the frequent communiques
coming out of the CNDD, and requested that he have an
opportunity to clear all further communiques before they
are issued. The president reportedly agreed.
--------------
MANAGING EXPECTATIONS
--------------
6. (SBU) At the same time, Komara was concerned about
managing both public and military expectations. He noted
that the CNDD had made a lot of promises and may be
CONAKRY 00000829 002 OF 002
expecting Komara to come in and quickly solve problems
perpetuated by decades of corruption. Describing previous
government officials as a bunch of "crooks," Komara said
that the government cannot fix everything all at once. He
drew the Charge's attention to the new-looking black
leather furniture in his office. Komara said that former
Prime Minister Souare had handed him a stack of unpaid
invoices upon leaving office, including an invoice for the
new office furniture. "Most of this stuff has not even
been paid for," he said. Komara added that many of the
invoices listed "ridiculous" charges, sometimes as much as
five times what something should have been worth.
--------------
FINANCIAL WORRIES
--------------
7. (SBU) Komara emphasized that his biggest worry is that
Guinea may lose the long anticipated debt relief under
HIPC. "I do not know how the government will survive if we
do not get that relief," he told Charge. Based on his own
informal calculations, Komara said that he already sees a
2009 budgetary gap of at least $88 million. Charge pointed
out that any funds freed up by debt relief under HIPC must
target specific sectors, such as education and health.
Komara nodded in understanding, saying that those sectors
could certainly use additional resources.
8. (SBU) Charge questioned what the government could do to
address key public issues such as water and power. Komara
said he hoped to capitalize on his personal network of
contacts to bring in specialists that could develop a
long-term infrastructure development plan. Komara noted
that Guineans generally do not pay taxes and they are even
less interested in paying for public utilities. He told
Charge that only by providing regular services could the
government begin to effect the mentality shift necessary to
begin collecting tax revenues.
9. (C) Turning to USG bilateral assistance programs,
Charge told Komara that the USG was planning to announce
the suspension of all non-humanitarian, non-electoral
financial assistance on January 5 in the absence of an
announced election date within six months. Visibly
concerned, Komara asked for details on what kinds of
assistance would be cut. He asked the Charge to provide
him with a list of such programs as soon as possible.
Komara also requested that the USG consider postponing the
decision for another week in order to give him time to
address some of our key concerns.
--------------
LACK OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE
--------------
10. (SBU) Charge also mentioned the incident in which the
military raided opposition leader Cellou Diallo's residence
on January 1 (reftel). Komara said that he was totally
unaware of the incident until he received a phone call at
11:30 that night. He immediately called the president who
also reportedly knew nothing about it. Komara said that he
went personally to Diallo's residence to apologize. He
acknowledged to Charge that the incident makes it look as
if the government lacks complete control.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
11. (C) Based on first impressions, Komara seems affable,
intelligent, and committed to his job. If he is in fact
granted complete autonomy and allowed to run the
government, he may very well be able to move things
forward. At the same time, he faces a host of challenges
that previous government officials have been unable to
overcome, despite the sincerity of intentions they may have
demonstrated in the beginning. Facing very high popular
expectations for immediate improvements in overall
governance while lacking a popular mandate may make it
difficult for Komara to effectively assert his authority
with the military junta. Guineans and foreign observers
alike are watching Komara's cabinet nominations and
subsequent political moves closely in order to get a sense
of how effective a civilian leader he might be. END
COMMENT.
RASPOLIC
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM ASEC GV
SUBJECT: CHARGE MEETS WITH GUINEA'S NEW PRIME MINISTER
REF: 08 CONAKRY 0823
Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF SHANNON CAZEAU FOR REASON 1.4 B AND D
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. After describing how he unexpectedly
landed the position of prime minister, Kabine Komara
assured Charge that he expects to have "complete autonomy"
as Guinea's new head of government. He said that he will
be free to appoint his own cabinet, although he expects to
appoint two or three military officials to some of the
remaining cabinet positions. Komara's most pressing
concerns include managing popular expectations for quick
fixes to endemic problems, maintaining eligibility for debt
relief under HIPC, and avoiding suspension of bilateral
assistance programs. Komara gave a positive first
impression. Guineans and foreign observers alike will be
watching him closely in the coming weeks in order to
ascertain how effective a civilian leader he might be. END
SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) Charge Raspolic met with Guinea's new prime
minister, Kabine Komara, the evening of January 3, the day
after Komara arrived in Guinea to assume office. Switching
back and forth between English and French, often in
mid-sentence, Komara was a charming and animated
interlocutor.
--------------
BECOMING PRIME MINISTER
--------------
3. (SBU) Relating how he became prime minister, Komara
told Charge that President Moussa Dadis Camara had called
him while he was in Paris, asking him to be part of
Guinea's new government. Komara said that he went home to
his three adult children in Cairo and discussed whether it
was a good move to become part of the government now, or to
wait a few years until a newly elected government is in
power. His children reportedly encouraged him to take the
job because he would best be able to influence events in
the immediate term. Komara said that he called the
president and told him he was interested in working for the
new government. Assuming that he was coming to discuss his
potential role further with the president, Komara received
a text message from his wife in Conakry after he had
already started his trip to Guinea. His wife reportedly
texted that Komara had been named prime minister and that
she would meet him at the airport with a clean boubou so
that he could address the press gathered there.
--------------
COMPLETE AUTONOMY
--------------
4. (C) Komara said that he has a good relationship with
President Camara. When asked about forthcoming cabinet
appointments, Komara said that he would "absolutely" be
able to name his own ministers, and that he recognized the
need for wider ethnic participation. However, he told
Charge that he expected that two or three of the remaining
ministerial positions would be filled by military
officers. He said, for example, that the Minister of
Justice could easily be filled by a military officer if
that officer had experience with the military justice
system. Again emphasizing that President Camara would not
influence cabinet appointments, Komara related how Camara
had passed him a piece of paper with the name of the
president's choice for Minister of Finance written down.
Describing the nominee as a poor choice, Komara said he
went back to the president and told him that he would not
name this person as his minister. Camara reportedly told
him "fine, pick who you want."
5. (SBU) As prime minister, Komara said that he strongly
believes that he will enjoy complete autonomy. He told
Charge that he expects to coordinate decisions with the
president, but that he would be empowered to run the
government as needed. Komara said that he had already
talked to the president about the frequent communiques
coming out of the CNDD, and requested that he have an
opportunity to clear all further communiques before they
are issued. The president reportedly agreed.
--------------
MANAGING EXPECTATIONS
--------------
6. (SBU) At the same time, Komara was concerned about
managing both public and military expectations. He noted
that the CNDD had made a lot of promises and may be
CONAKRY 00000829 002 OF 002
expecting Komara to come in and quickly solve problems
perpetuated by decades of corruption. Describing previous
government officials as a bunch of "crooks," Komara said
that the government cannot fix everything all at once. He
drew the Charge's attention to the new-looking black
leather furniture in his office. Komara said that former
Prime Minister Souare had handed him a stack of unpaid
invoices upon leaving office, including an invoice for the
new office furniture. "Most of this stuff has not even
been paid for," he said. Komara added that many of the
invoices listed "ridiculous" charges, sometimes as much as
five times what something should have been worth.
--------------
FINANCIAL WORRIES
--------------
7. (SBU) Komara emphasized that his biggest worry is that
Guinea may lose the long anticipated debt relief under
HIPC. "I do not know how the government will survive if we
do not get that relief," he told Charge. Based on his own
informal calculations, Komara said that he already sees a
2009 budgetary gap of at least $88 million. Charge pointed
out that any funds freed up by debt relief under HIPC must
target specific sectors, such as education and health.
Komara nodded in understanding, saying that those sectors
could certainly use additional resources.
8. (SBU) Charge questioned what the government could do to
address key public issues such as water and power. Komara
said he hoped to capitalize on his personal network of
contacts to bring in specialists that could develop a
long-term infrastructure development plan. Komara noted
that Guineans generally do not pay taxes and they are even
less interested in paying for public utilities. He told
Charge that only by providing regular services could the
government begin to effect the mentality shift necessary to
begin collecting tax revenues.
9. (C) Turning to USG bilateral assistance programs,
Charge told Komara that the USG was planning to announce
the suspension of all non-humanitarian, non-electoral
financial assistance on January 5 in the absence of an
announced election date within six months. Visibly
concerned, Komara asked for details on what kinds of
assistance would be cut. He asked the Charge to provide
him with a list of such programs as soon as possible.
Komara also requested that the USG consider postponing the
decision for another week in order to give him time to
address some of our key concerns.
--------------
LACK OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE
--------------
10. (SBU) Charge also mentioned the incident in which the
military raided opposition leader Cellou Diallo's residence
on January 1 (reftel). Komara said that he was totally
unaware of the incident until he received a phone call at
11:30 that night. He immediately called the president who
also reportedly knew nothing about it. Komara said that he
went personally to Diallo's residence to apologize. He
acknowledged to Charge that the incident makes it look as
if the government lacks complete control.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
11. (C) Based on first impressions, Komara seems affable,
intelligent, and committed to his job. If he is in fact
granted complete autonomy and allowed to run the
government, he may very well be able to move things
forward. At the same time, he faces a host of challenges
that previous government officials have been unable to
overcome, despite the sincerity of intentions they may have
demonstrated in the beginning. Facing very high popular
expectations for immediate improvements in overall
governance while lacking a popular mandate may make it
difficult for Komara to effectively assert his authority
with the military junta. Guineans and foreign observers
alike are watching Komara's cabinet nominations and
subsequent political moves closely in order to get a sense
of how effective a civilian leader he might be. END
COMMENT.
RASPOLIC