GUINEA IN THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE

S E C R E T CONAKRY 000716 SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D COPY - ADDING REFERENCE CABLE E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ASEC GV SUBJECT: GUINEA IN THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE REF: CONAKRY 0702 Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA MOLLER FOR REASON 1.4 B AND D ¶1. (SBU) This comprehensive look at Guinea three weeks after the September 28 killings in the stadium reflects accurately the situation in Conakry at that time. Drafted by then Acting DCM Cazeau who subsequently left post under ordered departure, this piece retains its value. Since the message was drafted there has been little real change. The commencement of talks in Ouagadougou designed to find a way forward that will lead to democratic elections has been the most momentous event. ¶2. (S) SUMMARY. Although citizens remain shocked and angry, Guinea has returned to relative calm and normalcy. At the same time, the political situation remains highly volatile. The below discussion provides a baseline analysis of where things stand in Guinea post September 28, touching on a number of considerations important to USG policy discussions, including the junta's perspective, problems with the military, the possibility of a power vacuum, the civilian response, the posture of the international community, and underlying ethnic considerations. END SUMMARY. ¶3. (SBU) More than three weeks after the September 28 stadium massacre, Guinea appears to have returned to a state of relative calm. Although scattered violence continued for at least three days after the massacre, the national days of mourning on October 1 and 2 ushered in what continues to be a peaceful, although tense return to business as usual. ¶4. (SBU) The political impasse remains front and center as international pressure mounts for the CNDD to step down. Strong statements from the U.S., France, the E.U., and the International Contact Group for Guinea have galvanized civilian leaders who remain firm in their calls for a national union government to immediately replace the military junta. International and local actors alike are also pushing for an international investigation into human rights abuses, an initiative that gains momentum by the day. Although some degree of "normal" has been restored, Guineans wait to watch the situation play itself out. ¶5. (S) The military's egregious human rights abuses have effectively destroyed what little credibility the CNDD had left. International and domestic actors alike have put elections on hold as the focus has shifted to the immediate goal of forcing the junta out of power. Embassy recognizes that there is much debate in Washington about policy implications and the way forward. -------------- DADIS -------------- ¶6. (S) To date, CNDD President Moussa Dadis Camara has made it clear that he has no intention of stepping down. Information from contacts suggests that on the contrary, the CNDD is under the impression that it can survive for the long-term. Members of the military have demonstrated little remorse for the violence, which some feel was necessary to reinforce the CNDD's authority. CNDD leadership may seek to appease the population and the international community, but only as much as it feels it needs to, and only in so much as it serves CNDD's own interests. In short, the military junta is firmly entrenched. ¶7. (S) That noted, the CNDD does feel the weight of international pressure. The international community has been united in a tough position (except for China and perhaps Russia). That, coupled with recent announcements such as the International Court of Justice's investigation, is reportedly sending shockwaves through the ranks of the military. Some of those close to Dadis, such as Sekouba Konate, are beginning to realize that if they are to survive individually, they need to start distancing themselves from Dadis. In this context, a coup d'etat is a significant possibility. As the current political impasse drags on, it is possible that other CNDD players may be increasingly willing to &sacrifice8 Dadis (i.e. make him step down) in order to maintain the junta,s grasp on power. ¶8. (S) Although Dadis has rejected calls to step down, it is still possible that he may eventually decide that he has no other option. Sustained international and domestic pressure on him to do so is critical if Dadis is to feel threatened enough to buckle. If Dadis does step down, several other problematic military personalities will need to go with him for the sake of stability, including Claude Pivi and Ibrahima Diakite Toumbah. -------------- THE MILITARY -------------- ¶9. (S) Regardless of whether or not Dadis steps down, the Guinean military will continue to pose a major problem. Factionalism, a pervasive lack of professionalism, and the general lack of discipline throughout the rank and file are all factors that contribute to Guinea's continued political instability. No one has complete control of the military, including Dadis. ¶10. (S) Many civilian leaders believe that the only way to successfully usher in a transition government is to bolster that government with external security forces. While a security force might pose a workable short-term solution, it may be difficult for that force to extricate itself further down the road. In the meantime, the military has already demonstrated the extent to which it is willing to go to preserve its grip on power. Without external intervention, the population will have a difficult time pushing its agenda for fear of severe retribution. -------------- THE LOOMING POWER VACUUM -------------- ¶11. (S) Assuming that international pressure prevails and Dadis does resign, he is going to leave an immediate power vacuum. Civilians will likely call for the installation of a national unity government, but it could take days to set one up if individual members of Les Forces Vives start jockeying for position in order to promote their personal agendas (which they have done in the past). If Dadis departs and there is no political solution at hand, chaos could follow. The military will seek to maintain its grip on power, likely trying to replace Dadis with a more "acceptable" military leader to navigate the transition. In addition, effective control of the military will be critical if the factions begin to sense that power is up for grabs. Individual members of Les Forces Vives are likely to start cutting backdoor power-sharing deals with high level military officers. -------------- THE CIVILIANS -------------- ¶13. (S) Guineans remain shocked and angered by the September 28 massacre, but the population as a whole has endured a number of such tragedies, perhaps less heinous but certainly horrific, over the last fifty years. This is a population that has been held hostage for decades by its own military, now more than 30,000 strong. At the same time, the actual number of politically active civilians is relatively small. They are led by Guinea's intellectual elites, many of whom are considered tainted because of their willingness to work for or with former President Conte, and in some cases, with Dadis. Furthermore, the opposition is broadly divided along ethnic lines, which fosters distrust and disunity. ¶14. (S) The opposition was deeply divided up until Dadis started indicating that he was considering running for president, a development that started forcing individuals to unite in a more productive, forceful way. That unity led to the September 28 demonstration and the subsequent violence, which has further solidified the opposition as a bloc. Unfortunately, as soon as the common enemy (the CNDD) is removed, we may start to see cracks in the opposition as individuals look to their own agendas once again. Unity in purpose will be all the more critical, however, if civilians are to successfully check military attempts to retain power. ¶15. (S) If international and domestic pressure fails to convince Dadis to step down, civilian leaders could ultimately decide to live with what they have. As distasteful as this might be, Guineans have a history of avoiding conflict and discord to the point of sacrificing any chance for positive change. Time is of the essence. As weeks and months go by with the CNDD still in power, civilians are increasingly likely to consider how they can make the best of a bad situation. Again, individual interests will come into play here as opportunists explore their options. Currently, the momentum for change is present and civilians are not yet close to backing down. However, Guinean history suggests that passive acceptance is a possibility. -------------- INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY -------------- ¶16. (S) To date, the international community has taken an almost universally tough stance towards the military junta. Partners who were difficult to mobilize nine months ago are now helping to lead the charge on allegations of human rights abuses and assertions that the military junta's time is over. The fact that the violence was so heinous in nature is likely to keep Western nations committed to a common course of action, at least for the next few months. ¶17. (S) ECOWAS and the African Union may be more nuanced. The two organizations have been firm in their position with the rest of the international community, and will likely continue to be so as long as the momentum on the ground remains steady. However, if civilians start to back off their objective or if the military looks like it is going to implode, individual member nations of these African organizations could start to waver. In particular, Guinea's neighbors are likely to be concerned about regional security, which may ultimately trump concerns about human rights or the trajectory of Guinea's leadership. Maintaining the current momentum will be critical to avoid backsliding. ¶18. (S) The CNDD will be increasingly desperate to find friends over the next few weeks. While the multi-billion dollar deal with China (reftel) had been in the works for months, the fact that China went ahead and signed it just a few days after the rest of the international community signaled its commitment to isolate the junta, has thrown the CNDD a much needed lifeline. They will be looking to China, and probably Iran and Libya as well, for political and economic support in the days ahead. Russia is also an unknown at this point. As part of the International Contact Group for Guinea (ICG-G),Russia agreed to the strong ICG statement issued on October 12. However, Russia's involvement is likely to hinge on their economic interests and they could take a position more favorable to the CNDD. -------------- Ethnicity -------------- ¶19. (S) While there have been isolated incidents of ethnic violence in Guinea's history, the country has never really been seen as at risk for ethnic conflict. However, Dadis' ethnocentric policies have sown the seeds of discontent. Furthermore, the September 28 violence is widely viewed as having been committed by the Forestiers with the victims having been largely Peuhl. Some members of the Peuhl community are angry and want revenge. Others realize that with the CNDD out of the way, they may finally have a chance to claim power. ¶20. (S) If the junta steps down peacefully, ethnic tensions should fade into the background. However, if the military implodes or if Dadis is forced out by a coup, we could see escalating incidents of ethnically motivated violence. At this point, the liklihood of a large-scale ethnic conflict seems minimal. However, if tensions continue to fester without a workable political situation on the horizon, ethnicity could become an increasingly dangerous element of Guinea,s tenuous transition. -------------- NEXT STEPS -------------- ¶21. (S) At this point, USG policy is focused on pressing the CNDD to step down. That pressure is having a positive effect. For it to be effective, it is critical that the international community, united, generally maintain the current momentum. Embassy has provided policy options in reftel for Department consideration. ¶22. (S) While our attention is presently on the junta, it is imperative that we start thinking about what needs to happen if we are successful and the junta actually steps down. Guinea's political situation is highly volatile and simply removing the junta does not at all guarantee a peaceful resolution since a resulting power vacuum would certainly be problematic. This is an issue the Embassy and Washington should consider in terms of how to influence a positive course of events leading to a true democratic transition. Moller