Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09CONAKRY577
2009-09-18 14:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Conakry
Cable title:  

THE 7TH ICG-G: A HARD LINE IN NEW YORK

Tags:  UNGA PREL PGOV GV 
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PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHRY #0577/01 2611406
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P 181406Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4062
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CONAKRY 000577 

SIPDIS

AF FOR MARY BETH LEONARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2019
TAGS: UNGA PREL PGOV GV
SUBJECT: THE 7TH ICG-G: A HARD LINE IN NEW YORK

REF: CONAKRY 538

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Kent C. Brokenshire for Reason
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CONAKRY 000577 SIPDIS AF FOR MARY BETH LEONARD E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2019 TAGS: UNGA PREL PGOV GV SUBJECT: THE 7TH ICG-G: A HARD LINE IN NEW YORK REF: CONAKRY 538 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Kent C. Brokenshire for Reason 1. 4 B/D ¶1. (C) Summary: The Local Contact Group for Guinea recommends a strong unambiguous approach toward Dadis and the CNDD when the ICG-G meets in New York next week on the fringes of the UNGA. The main point is to make clear that a Dadis candidacy is unacceptable to the international community, and that it could become a destabilizing factor in terms of the transition process, with possible implications for regional security. The group urges the ICG-G to endorse a recent AU resolution, which condemns Dadis' possible candidacy and threatens sanctions. There is growing sentiment in the Local Contact Group that future meetings of the ICG-G should take place outside of Guinea. End Summary ¶2. (U) The Local Contact Group met September 17 at the British Ambassador's residence to firm up common position recommendations to forward to the International Contact Group for Guinea (ICG-G) when it meets in New York on September 22. The local group included COMs from the UK, US, France, Spain, Germany, Japan, Russia, the EU, UN, AU, IMF and World Bank. (ECOWAS was absent.) Unlike previous sessions, the group opted not to issue a joint communique to the ICG-G but determined instead that each representative would communicate the group's sentiment directly to their respective delegations to the ICG-G. -------------- MAIN POLICY POINTS -------------- ¶3. (U) The main points that the Local Contact Group urges the ICG-G to pursue are as follows - Strongly condemn the near-certain candidacy of Dadis - Support the African Union communique (shortly to be issued) noting the rupture of political dialogue in Guinea, condemning a Dadis candidacy, and threatening sanctions in 30 days if the CNDD does not reinvigorate the election process - Urge a resumption of serious political dialogue in Guinea. - Raise the possibility of international sanctions against Dadis and the CNDD if they continue along the current path of obstruction and manipulation. Sanctions include visa and bank account restrictions, which would hit the pocketbooks of CNDD members without affecting the general population. - Urge greater democracy promotion and engagement in Guinea on the part of African leaders &
#x000A; - Demonstrate clear international unity in dealing with the CNDD - Note: The groups advises against discussing possible cuts to election funding at this time -------------- MAKING THE MOST OF NEW YORK -------------- ¶4. (U) Following Dadis' hijacking of the last ICG-G meeting in Conakry September 3 (reftel),the local contact group felt that the New York venue will allow the international community to send a strong message direct to the CNDD without Dadis and his paid applauders distracting the group from the issues at hand. The New York venue will also allow the US delegation to make clear to GoG representatives that the Embassy-released communique of August 20 is an accurate statement of US policy; indeed, it was drafted by the Department. ¶5. (C) Another possible US action for consideration includes inserting language in President Obama's opening remarks at the September 22 luncheon for visiting heads of state (or at another appropriate venue) on the importance of free and fair Guinean elections, with a direct statement about CNDD candidacy concerns. If not possible, a like statement by the Secretary would have an equally positive effect. ¶6. (U) The level of representation at the ICG-G is still not clear but is likely to differ substantially. The Spanish Charge said the MFA would send its Director General of Political Affaires The British would likely ask its UN CONAKRY 00000577 002 OF 002 Mission to represent the UK. France is reportedly still uncertain who it will send to this session, though it should be noted that on September 3 the French delegation to the ICG-G consisted of the Ambassador and the MFA's equivalent of the PDAS for AF. The Guinean delegation will likely be headed by the Foreign Minister. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) This ICG-G meeting comes at a critical point in Guinea's transition process. At the last local ICG-G, the international community was prepared to issue a strongly worded communique emphasizing opposition to Dadis' candidacy as well as concerns over continued delays in elections. Dadis essentially cut the knees out from under this initiative when he hijacked the meeting and then privately announced his candidacy to the members of the ICG-G. Since that announcement two weeks ago, he has yet to come out with a formal statement to the general population, indicating that he may have been testing the waters. It may still be possible to get him to back down if we can make him understand that his potential candidacy could be an enormously destabilizing development, one that could very well push Guinea over the brink in the months ahead. ¶8. (C) Dadis is likely under significant pressure to make a formal announcement. Any hint of wavering on the part of the international community could entice him to take the next step. The concern is that if he does formally announce his candidacy, the CNDD may be able to orchestrate a massive demonstration of support as it has been doing with increasing success in recent months. If the opposition fails to mount a similarly strong demonstration, some international partners (especially Guinea's ECOWAS neighbors) may start to feel that regional stability concerns trump the need for democratic progress. If that happens, we could very well be looking at a trajectory that keeps the CNDD in power for the next twenty years. To prevent this scenario, it is imperative that the ICG-G demonstrate its unequivocal dissatisfaction with the transition process in Guinea, and include clear language about continued opposition to Dadis' candidacy. BROKENSHIRE

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