INSIDE LOOK AT A DIPLOMATIC DEBACLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CONAKRY 000432 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV GV SUBJECT: INSIDE LOOK AT A DIPLOMATIC DEBACLE REF: A. CONAKRY 423 ¶B. CONAKRY 400 ¶C. CONAKRY 408 ¶D. FREETOWN 280 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Kent C. Brokenshire for Reason 1.4 B/D ¶1. (C) Summary: A closer examination of the July 11 CNDD communiqu, which placed Guinea's military on a high state of alert following alleged threats to the country's borders, provides a revealing look into the dysfunction and miscommunications of Guinea's current military government and the impulsive nature of the man who leads it. End Summary -------------- THE NARCOS ARE COMING.... -------------- ¶2. (C) During a recent conversation at a diplomatic reception, a career officer in Guinea's MFA, El Hadj Naby Dina Soumah, told Charge that the CNDD's July 11 communiqu caught Guinea's Foreign Ministry by complete surprise. The communiqu, which was read by junta leader Moussa Dadis Camara over national television, stated that troops financed by narco-traffickers were massing along Guinea's borders with Senegal, Guinea Bissau and Liberia, and were poised to strike. Dadis announced he was placing Guinea's military on high alert to thwart the perceived threat. ¶3. (C) The Guinean public has become accustomed to the antics of Dadis and did not react to his alarms with any concern. Nearly every observer of regional events quickly surmised that Dadis had invented this new menace either to focus the military's attention on the border regions and away from its own ethnic worries or as an artifice to delay elections. Across the spectrum of Guinean society, Dadis quickly became the butt of ridicule. Note: There were reports of an incident involving gunfire along Guinea's border with Guinea Bissau. However, nothing has surfaced to suggest a possible invasion or even a serious threat. End Note. -------------- REGIONAL EFFECTS -------------- ¶4. (C) While the communiqu stirred laughter and head shaking among the populace, Guinea's Foreign Ministry found itself facing a serious international incident involving three heads of state and five of the six countries on its borders. "The CNDD did not inform us about the border issue," said Naby. "They did not ask us to clear on the communiqu and they did not ask for our opinion." ¶5. (C) According to Naby, the MFA had been negotiating with neighboring states Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire on the venue for the Mano River Union Summit. During this summit the presidency of the Mano River Union was to be passed from Liberia to Guinea. The summit was originally scheduled to take place in Liberia. According to Naby, Dadis did not feel secure enough in power to leave the country, and insisted on changing the venue to Guinea. The Liberians graciously accommodated the request and informed the other nations. Sierra Leone president Ernest Koroma was scheduled to arrive in Conakry on July 13, while President Sirleaf Johnson made arrangements to travel to Guinea the following day accompanied by Cote d'Ivoire's Laurent Gbagbo. Then came the communiqu. ¶6. (C) "Imagine what Sirleaf Johnson must have felt," said Naby. "After offering to move the summit to Conakry she hears that Guinea has placed its military forces along Liberia's border on a state of high alert for reasons that are quite ridiculous." While the communiqu was seen as another CNDD bungle by the populace, it "scared all of our neighbors," said Naby. ¶7. (C) The communiqu also resulted in the cancellation of the summit. "Gbagbo heard that narco-traffickers were in control of our border areas and asked for assurances of security," said Naby. When the Guinean Government was reportedly unable to provide a satisfactory response, Gbagbo canceled his visit. Soon after, Sirleaf Johnson also canceled, saying she would not attend without Gbagbo. This left Sierra Leone's Ernest Koroma waiting on the tarmac in Conakry for the Godot-like delegations from Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire to arrive. Meanwhile, Senegal, Guinea Bissau and Liberia all denied any narco-military activity along their borders with Guinea. -------------- CONAKRY 00000432 002 OF 002 DAMAGE CONTROL SPARKS MORE CONTROVERSY -------------- ¶8. (C) Seeing that the communiqu was setting off international alarms abroad and laughter at home, Dadis tried to downplay its significance, which created further embarrassments. He claimed it dealt purely with military matters too technical for civilian comprehension. When this failed to quieten the chuckles of disbelievers, he threatened to jail anyone who criticized the communiqu, particularly members of political parties. This didn't placate anyone but it did bring human rights groups into the picture in defense of free speech. ¶9. (C) Dadis has reportedly grown tired of discussing the communiqu. During the visit of the International Contact Group (Ref A),he mentioned the communiqu only to say that if anyone attempts to use it has a tool to block elections he would "pursue them and punish them." He then quickly changed the subject. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) Little apparent thinking beyond the impulsive went into the formulation of the communiqu. Neither is there evidence to suggest that any consideration was given to its possible consequences, either domestic, regional or international. Though the MFA could have warned Dadis of dire consequences of broadcasting such a volatile message in the midst of Mano River Summit negotiations, its views were apparently never considered. This is not the first time that Dadis has launched new initiatives without consulting the experts at hand. In this case, he has so alienated the MFA that Guinean diplomats in Conakry routinely approach US counterparts to state that their president is a national embarrassment. ¶11. (C) The incident also points to disturbing flaws in the government's command structure. Perhaps the most notable is Dadis' penchant for making on-the-spot decisions without due consultation or consideration of the consequences. He does this quite frequently, with the result that he has built up a steady record of taking decisions based on incomplete information and little debate. The second is the fear that grips his advisers whenever there is unpleasant news or dissenting advice to give Dadis. We have received repeated reports of this. Their ensuing silence on this score has created a bubble of infallibility around Dadis. Dadis apparently spends a great deal of time in this bubble convinced he is right on all counts. Only the occasional uproar from the population and or weary sigh from international community offers him hints of a different reality lying beyond. ¶12. (U) Embassy Conakry will continue to collaborate with the international community and local partners to impress upon Dadis and the CNDD that free and fair elections offer the best chance to achieve political and economic stability. Dadis has publicly committed Guinea to elections in 2009. On this matter he has made the right decision. We will work with our partners to assure him of this, and support efforts to see it through. BROKENSHIRE