FORGING CLOSER US-EU COORDINATION IN GUINEA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CONAKRY 000398

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2019
TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV GV
SUBJECT: FORGING CLOSER US-EU COORDINATION IN GUINEA

REF: CONAKRY 379

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Kent C. Brokenshire for Reason 1.4 B/D


1. (C) Summary: During a July 6 meeting, Spain's Ambassador
to Guinea told Charge he wished for closer EU/US coordination
in dealing with the political impasse in Guinea. Ambassador
Santos also noted the potential for greater coordination in
EU/US assistance issues. He emphasized that Spain, which
currently represents the Swedish EU Presidency, and will
itself take on the Presidency in January, had been among the
first EU countries to condemn the coup d'etat, and favored
continued pressure on the CNDD to hold elections in 2009. He
also called for a tougher line and greater engagement in
Guinea by the ICG-G and its chairman Mohamed Chambas. Santos
questioned the bilateral policies of France and China in
Guinea, and suspects that both may be playing a double game.
End Summary

--------------
SPAIN AND THE EU PRESIDENCY
--------------


2. (C) Charge called on Spanish Ambassador Jesus Santos
Aguado July 6 to discuss greater US-EU coordination in
pressing the CNDD to commit itself to a timely election
schedule. Santos said the previous EU Presidency represented
by Germany had been slow to take a strong line following the
coup d'etat and tended to soften any message of opprobrium,
which the CNDD interpreted as tacit support for a lengthy
transition. Santos approved of the clear, unambiguous line
the US had taken against the coup from the outset, and noted
that EU nations and the International Contact Group on Guinea
(ICG-G) were now both coming around to this position as well
(Reftel).


3. (C) Santos felt confident Spain would exert considerable
influence in representing the Swedish presidency since Sweden
had provided only vague outlines in setting its priorities in
Guinea. These priorities included the promotion of democracy
and stability. "We received nothing specific from Stockholm,"
said Santos. The Ambassador explained that instructions from
Sweden on EU-related business would pass through Madrid, as
would all EU-related material destined for Stockholm, thus
giving Madrid the opportunity to weigh in on issues of
concern. He added that Sweden was more interested in Baltic
issues while Spain viewed West Africa as a priority, and had
opened five new Embassies in the region in two years. "What
this means is that Spain will essentially have the presidency
in Guinea for a full year," said Santos, adding that the EU
bureaucracy in Brussels would continue to handle routine
matters.

--------------
PRESSING THE CNDD ON ELECTIONS
--------------


4. (C) Ambassador Santos said Spain fully favored a firm
approach in pressing Chambas and the ICG-G to hold the CNDD
to elections in 2009. He agreed that the sharp tone of the
local contact group's June 19 communiqu expressing
frustration over electoral progress had decisively swayed the
ICG-G in Sirte, Libya, to issue an equally terse message June

27. This message urged, among other things, that the CNDD
make a financial contribution to elections. Santos
interpreted the CNDD's offer a few days later of $3.2 million
to Guinea's independent electoral commission as evidence that
a clear, robust approach to the CNDD yields greater results
than pliant, soft-pedaling diplomacy. "We will continue to
push for an active international contact group," he said.


5. (C) Even with international support behind the effort,
Santos views elections in Guinea as problematic. He pointed
out that there were no strong political platforms, that the
parties themselves are personality based and divided along
ethnic lines, and that civil society is often weak and
indecisive when it should be the bold vanguard of change. The
country also has no tradition of separation of power. Most
troubling to Santos is that after 50 years of oppression,
Guinea's population has come to view its despotic state of
affairs as normal, as a kind of comfort zone easier to endure
than to change. "We need to be realistic about these things,"
he commented.

--------------
IMPROVING US-EU COOPERATION

CONAKRY 00000398 002 OF 002


--------------


6. (C) He agreed that the US and EU should work closely in
Guinea, particularly in coordinating efforts to press the
CNDD for elections. Noting how the CNDD has attempted on
occasion to play one country off on another he said, "We need
to talk frequently and have a solid dialogue between us to
make sure that we send no mixed messages." He affirmed the
need to work out a common strategy prior to the July 16-17
ICG-G meeting in Conakry as the surest means of keeping that
organization on a productive track in dealing with the CNDD.
He also hoped to better coordinate US and EU assistance
projects in Guinea to eliminate duplication. "We have a lot
of things to discuss," he concluded.

--------------
CHINA AND FRANCE: ODD FELLOWS IN THE GAME
--------------


7. (C) Turning to other players in Conakry, Santos said he
was suspicious of the Chinese and the French, and was unsure
what game they were playing. He had heard rumors that the
Chinese had offered CNDD president Moussa Dadis Camara a
helicopter, and may have quietly provided the CNDD with $10
million in funding. "If the CNDD is getting this kind of
support from China, they will continue to stay in power," he
concluded. Santos was aware that China had not extended any
formal recognition to the junta, but added that members of
the CNDD tend to greet the Chinese Ambassador with an
enthusiasm and warmth that possibly reveal an undisclosed
bilateral agenda. "I do not trust the Chinese Ambassador," he
said.


8. (C) Santos also noted a perceived inconsistency in French
diplomacy in Guinea. He pointed out that on one hand the
French delegation at the AU summit in Sirte stated that
France would not send any minister-level officials to Guinea
to treat with the CNDD. On the other hand, according to
Santos, the French Foreign Minister has offered to visit
Conakry. "It's always hard to tell what the French are
doing," said Santos. He added that while France may publicly
adhere to the EU policy line concerning Guinea, it frequently
has its own agenda which may be at odds with EU goals.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) Spain's ascension to the EU presidency in Guinea, both
as representing Sweden and in its own right, bodes well for
increased EU-US coordination on political and assistance
issues. Ambassador Santos clearly sees the need for a
multilateral approach in dealing with the political crisis in
Guinea, and views a strong partnership with the US as being a
key element of this strategy, particularly in maintaining the
ICG-G on a productive course. Spain's assumption of the EU
Presidency marks a clean break with the previous EU approach
under the direction of Germany which initially exercised a
more appeasing attitude towards the junta, a factor that only
changed in the last month after a lack of progress became
undeniably evident.


10. (C) US Charge and Ambassador Santos have enjoyed a
friendly relationship since serving together in Equatorial
Guinea years previously. This may account for the unguarded
nature of Santo's remarks concerning the policies of France
and China in Guinea. Following the December coup, Santos was
among the first Ambassadors in Conakry to advocate for a
strong multilateral front in dealing with the junta; he has
stuck to that line ever since. In representing the EU
Presidency in Guinea, Santos is now in a strong position to
realize this approach.


BROKENSHIRE