GUINEA SECURITY FORCES PART II: A DISCUSSION OF

S E C R E T CONAKRY 000373

SIPDIS

FOR DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV PMIL KDEM ASEC GV
SUBJECT: GUINEA SECURITY FORCES PART II: A DISCUSSION OF
TARGETED SECURITY FORCES ASSISTANCE

Classified By: RSO Philip W. Nazelrod for reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) In examining the current state of Guinea,s
military and civilian security forces (septel),it becomes
apparent that there is a compelling need to discuss the shape
and direction of future USG engagement. To facilitate free,
fair, and transparent elections, all but humanitarian and
election-related aid to Guinea has been suspended. While
this approach may properly guide the junta,s actions and
facilitate elections, it may also lead to missed
opportunities to steer law enforcement units in the right
direction and result in an even more entrenched and
maladjusted military state. For example, the current
crackdown on narcotics traffickers opened a door to all
sectors of Guinea,s security forces (the military, police,
courts, and prisons). Prior to the coup d,tat, such
crackdowns were token actions at best, whereas the arrest of
several kingpins demonstrates a serious change in practice
from former President Conte,s regime. Moreover, Guinean
government requests for US anti-narcotics assistance and
information sharing has greatly increased. Our current level
of access to detained suspects and information is
unparalleled. In order to take advantage of this
unprecedented opening, the following discourse highlights the
importance of a targeted aid program and suggests two
specific high impact and low cost strategies to further USG
goals in the security forces sector.

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THE NEED FOR TARGETED ASSISTANCE
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2. (S) In Guinea, assistance affords the USG a strong
democratic bond with society. Through the use of aid
incentives ( the carrot,) we are able to strategically
emphasize the value of democratization and majority rule.
Conversely, the suspension of aid or denial of certain
programs ( the stick,) maintains the Guinean security
forces sector structures and goals. Linking the provision of
aid to free, fair, and transparent elections may influence
the behavior and capacity of the junta and encourage popular
support for the elections. Our integrated approach with
other donor countries (notably members of the European Union
or African Union) provides this firm and consistent message.


3. (S) However, deficiencies remain in linking assistance
to elections. On one hand, stability in the security
forces sector supports recovery and development. On the
other, insecurity hampers such recovery and can make it more
difficult to manage prospective aid programs in later years.
The release of aid to the security forces sector - prior to
elections - can enhance Guinea,s stability and reduce future
reliance on donor countries. Furthermore, donor countries
such as Spain and France are already beginning to express
interest in coordinating security (and law enforcement)
efforts with the USG and GOG (the creation of law enforcement
vehicles such as a &Mini-Dublin Group8 or Narcotics Working
Group are just two examples suggested).


4. (S) The junta,s pursuit of high-level narcotics
traffickers, the crackdown on illegal drug manufacturers, and
the reported arrest of Red Beret military members (who are
often suspected of committing acts of banditry) have opened a
small window of opportunity. However, the lack of engagement
our current policy mandates could result in the window
closing and our opportunity to expand on Guinea,s positive
security initiatives could be delayed or lost. In an effort
to capitalize on these initiatives, manage assistance
strategically, and assemble donor country support, the
following paragraphs suggest two areas to consider providing
targeted assistance.

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THE NEED FOR PROGRAM GUIDANCE
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5. (S) In the post election environment, the development of
effective security strategies will be vital to not only
ensure the stability of Guinea, but to also enhance human
rights protections and guard against corruption. Program
guidance need not be narrowly defined as the complete
construction of a law enforcement element. We may find it
advantageous to provide consultative resources for the
development of robust programs.


6. (S) One example, Major Ibrahima Balde, commander of the
Gendarmerie, has set the vision of the Gendarmerie as the

premier police force in Guinea. Using his experience (albeit
limited) with the United Nations, his goal is to build a
security force modeled after western policing departments.
He appears to be advancing his vision within the CNDD as
evidenced by the Gendarmerie,s rapid assumption of security
jurisdiction. He does, however, lack much needed experience
in training, development, and leadership.


7. (S) Another example, the Ministry of Special Services,
Anti-Drugs, and Organized Crime (Ministry of High Crimes),
headed by Minister Moussa Tiegboro Camara, is staffed by
short-term teams that straddle jurisdictional boundaries.
These teams, according to Major Balde who claims to have
advocated for the creation of the Ministry of High Crimes,
are modeled after his interpretation of an &Inter-agency
Task Force8 designed to operate with full jurisdiction and
complete autonomy. Balde and Tiegboro want to build a
full-time task force within the Ministry of High Crimes
staffed with 800 officers total (400 Gendarme, 200 MOS
Police, and 200 GAF Officers). Balde reportedly worked with
the US Drug Enforcement Agency in Haiti and that interaction
was his inspiration for the task-force model.


8. (S) A final example, the Ministry of Security, while
largely impotent, still employs the largest number of
civilian security forces. The failure of the Ministry of
Security to act on a national scale spurred the initiative of
many local departments. A handful of neighborhood mayors and
police commanders developed local police procedures similar
to a &neighborhood watch8. While the motives are, at
times, questionable, the end result is the creation of small
pockets of policed areas by officers who are ill equipped but
trying to improve safety.


9. (S) By providing consultative services and training to
the Ministry of High Crimes, Gendarmerie, and neighborhood
Police Departments, we may be able to steer development in
proper directions. These directions include, but are not
limited to, training standards, ethics, task-force
development, and community involvement. Experts, such as
Department of Justice Legal Advisors, International Law
Enforcement Academies (ILEA),and Department of State (i.e.
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs(INL)),
would enjoy the current open-door environment between the USG
and the various security forces leaders and staffers.

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THE NEED FOR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE KNOWLEDGE
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10. (C) In the early weeks of the CNDD,s existence, the
Ministry of High Crimes conducted sweeping anti-narcotics
operations which netted a handful of suspected narco-kingpins
and a slough of lower level operatives. The arrests garnered
much needed public and international support and even
precipitated visits from foreign narcotics officers from
various organizations, including the United Nations Office of
Drugs and Crime (UN),the Drug Enforcement Agency (USA),and
Serious Organized Crime Unit (UK). Tiegboro, along with the
Ministry of Justice, opened the door for international
involvement and interviews of key suspects.


11. (S) The Minister of High Crimes and the Minister of
Justice, Siba Loholamou, allowed agents from the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) to interview two kingpins, Ousmane
Conte (former president Lansana Conte,s son) and Mamady
Kallo. Both Ministers expressed satisfaction in working with
the DEA and pleaded for further assistance in conducting
investigations. An interesting note: When queried on the
evidence collected for prosecution, Loholamou advised that
the GOG does not have any strong evidence. He requested
investigative assistance and appealed for legal assistance
and claimed the French were able to send two advisors.


12. (S) The excitement abated quickly as the CNDD realized
that they lack a defined strategy regarding how to prosecute
the suspects. Tiegboro personally petitioned the
international community to assist in conducting prosecutions.
He advised that the CNDD would like to deport the suspects
to any country willing to prosecute them. Minister Loholamou
followed suit, asking the international community to assist
in building a jurisprudence program capable of prosecuting
international criminals. When interviewed, Loholamou told
the RSO that he is trained only as a military investigator
and does not have suitable skills in law or the legal system
(despite the fact Loholamou claims to hold a degree in law).


13. (S) Furthermore, theft, assault, rape, and various
other crimes are noticeably rising in the capital city.
Arguably, the frustration resulting from a lack of experience
can be noted in recent decrees issued by the Ministry of High
Crimes. Tiegboro authorized law 4550 which, in effect,
legalizes vigilante justice. This law provides for citizens
who witness or catch a criminal to burn him alive as
punishment for their crime.


14. (S) Focusing on increasing the investigative capacity
of the security forces can multiply the success of arrests,
prosecutions, and stability. To wit, investigations in cases
of human, narcotics, and currency trafficking will place the
international spotlight on Guinea which would force Guinean
authorities to deal with these issues. Embedding US criminal
investigators, such as from the Drug Enforcement Agency,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of State
would assuredly assist in the success of criminal
investigations and prosecutions of international suspects.
This must also be accompanied by increased assistance for
courts and prisons.


15. (S) It must be noted that this openness does not lessen
the quite real indictment of many leaders currently in
positions of power. Suspected narcotics and human
traffickers (often times high ranking military officers)
function with impunity, a trend that is likely to continue
under any new regime which comes into power. Considering,
however, the value that can be obtained in establishing
investigative footholds with available resources; the impact
of our involvement would be quite positive.


16. (S) COMMENT. What does exist, at least for the moment,
is the opportunity for us to enroll ourselves in the
development of the security forces with relatively little
risk or cost. Decreasing our engagement certainly will not
produce dire consequences. It will, however, hamper the
development of Guinea or ) at the very least ) diminish our
capacity to affect political or policy changes in the future.
END COMMENT.
RASPOLIC