GUINEA SECURITY FORCES PART II: A DISCUSSION OF

S E C R E T CONAKRY 000373 SIPDIS FOR DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2029 TAGS: PREL PGOV PMIL KDEM ASEC GV SUBJECT: GUINEA SECURITY FORCES PART II: A DISCUSSION OF TARGETED SECURITY FORCES ASSISTANCE Classified By: RSO Philip W. Nazelrod for reason 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) In examining the current state of Guinea,s military and civilian security forces (septel),it becomes apparent that there is a compelling need to discuss the shape and direction of future USG engagement. To facilitate free, fair, and transparent elections, all but humanitarian and election-related aid to Guinea has been suspended. While this approach may properly guide the junta,s actions and facilitate elections, it may also lead to missed opportunities to steer law enforcement units in the right direction and result in an even more entrenched and maladjusted military state. For example, the current crackdown on narcotics traffickers opened a door to all sectors of Guinea,s security forces (the military, police, courts, and prisons). Prior to the coup d,tat, such crackdowns were token actions at best, whereas the arrest of several kingpins demonstrates a serious change in practice from former President Conte,s regime. Moreover, Guinean government requests for US anti-narcotics assistance and information sharing has greatly increased. Our current level of access to detained suspects and information is unparalleled. In order to take advantage of this unprecedented opening, the following discourse highlights the importance of a targeted aid program and suggests two specific high impact and low cost strategies to further USG goals in the security forces sector. -------------- THE NEED FOR TARGETED ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶2. (S) In Guinea, assistance affords the USG a strong democratic bond with society. Through the use of aid incentives ( the carrot,) we are able to strategically emphasize the value of democratization and majority rule. Conversely, the suspension of aid or denial of certain programs ( the stick,) maintains the Guinean security forces sector structures and goals. Linking the provision of aid to free, fair, and transparent elections may influence the behavior and capacity of the junta and encourage popular support for the elections. Our integrated approach with other donor countries (notably members of the European Union or African Union) provides this firm and consistent message. ¶3. (S) However, deficiencies remain in linking assistance to elections. On one hand, stability in the security forces sector supports recovery and development. On the other, insecurity hampers such recovery and can make it more difficult to manage prospective aid programs in later years. The release of aid to the security forces sector - prior to elections - can enhance Guinea,s stability and reduce future reliance on donor countries. Furthermore, donor countries such as Spain and France are already beginning to express interest in coordinating security (and law enforcement) efforts with the USG and GOG (the creation of law enforcement vehicles such as a &Mini-Dublin Group8 or Narcotics Working Group are just two examples suggested). ¶4. (S) The junta,s pursuit of high-level narcotics traffickers, the crackdown on illegal drug manufacturers, and the reported arrest of Red Beret military members (who are often suspected of committing acts of banditry) have opened a small window of opportunity. However, the lack of engagement our current policy mandates could result in the window closing and our opportunity to expand on Guinea,s positive security initiatives could be delayed or lost. In an effort to capitalize on these initiatives, manage assistance strategically, and assemble donor country support, the following paragraphs suggest two areas to consider providing targeted assistance. -------------- THE NEED FOR PROGRAM GUIDANCE -------------- ¶5. (S) In the post election environment, the development of effective security strategies will be vital to not only ensure the stability of Guinea, but to also enhance human rights protections and guard against corruption. Program guidance need not be narrowly defined as the complete construction of a law enforcement element. We may find it advantageous to provide consultative resources for the development of robust programs. ¶6. (S) One example, Major Ibrahima Balde, commander of the Gendarmerie, has set the vision of the Gendarmerie as the premier police force in Guinea. Using his experience (albeit limited) with the United Nations, his goal is to build a security force modeled after western policing departments. He appears to be advancing his vision within the CNDD as evidenced by the Gendarmerie,s rapid assumption of security jurisdiction. He does, however, lack much needed experience in training, development, and leadership. ¶7. (S) Another example, the Ministry of Special Services, Anti-Drugs, and Organized Crime (Ministry of High Crimes), headed by Minister Moussa Tiegboro Camara, is staffed by short-term teams that straddle jurisdictional boundaries. These teams, according to Major Balde who claims to have advocated for the creation of the Ministry of High Crimes, are modeled after his interpretation of an &Inter-agency Task Force8 designed to operate with full jurisdiction and complete autonomy. Balde and Tiegboro want to build a full-time task force within the Ministry of High Crimes staffed with 800 officers total (400 Gendarme, 200 MOS Police, and 200 GAF Officers). Balde reportedly worked with the US Drug Enforcement Agency in Haiti and that interaction was his inspiration for the task-force model. ¶8. (S) A final example, the Ministry of Security, while largely impotent, still employs the largest number of civilian security forces. The failure of the Ministry of Security to act on a national scale spurred the initiative of many local departments. A handful of neighborhood mayors and police commanders developed local police procedures similar to a &neighborhood watch8. While the motives are, at times, questionable, the end result is the creation of small pockets of policed areas by officers who are ill equipped but trying to improve safety. ¶9. (S) By providing consultative services and training to the Ministry of High Crimes, Gendarmerie, and neighborhood Police Departments, we may be able to steer development in proper directions. These directions include, but are not limited to, training standards, ethics, task-force development, and community involvement. Experts, such as Department of Justice Legal Advisors, International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA),and Department of State (i.e. International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs(INL)), would enjoy the current open-door environment between the USG and the various security forces leaders and staffers. -------------- THE NEED FOR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE KNOWLEDGE -------------- ¶10. (C) In the early weeks of the CNDD,s existence, the Ministry of High Crimes conducted sweeping anti-narcotics operations which netted a handful of suspected narco-kingpins and a slough of lower level operatives. The arrests garnered much needed public and international support and even precipitated visits from foreign narcotics officers from various organizations, including the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UN),the Drug Enforcement Agency (USA),and Serious Organized Crime Unit (UK). Tiegboro, along with the Ministry of Justice, opened the door for international involvement and interviews of key suspects. ¶11. (S) The Minister of High Crimes and the Minister of Justice, Siba Loholamou, allowed agents from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) to interview two kingpins, Ousmane Conte (former president Lansana Conte,s son) and Mamady Kallo. Both Ministers expressed satisfaction in working with the DEA and pleaded for further assistance in conducting investigations. An interesting note: When queried on the evidence collected for prosecution, Loholamou advised that the GOG does not have any strong evidence. He requested investigative assistance and appealed for legal assistance and claimed the French were able to send two advisors. ¶12. (S) The excitement abated quickly as the CNDD realized that they lack a defined strategy regarding how to prosecute the suspects. Tiegboro personally petitioned the international community to assist in conducting prosecutions. He advised that the CNDD would like to deport the suspects to any country willing to prosecute them. Minister Loholamou followed suit, asking the international community to assist in building a jurisprudence program capable of prosecuting international criminals. When interviewed, Loholamou told the RSO that he is trained only as a military investigator and does not have suitable skills in law or the legal system (despite the fact Loholamou claims to hold a degree in law). ¶13. (S) Furthermore, theft, assault, rape, and various other crimes are noticeably rising in the capital city. Arguably, the frustration resulting from a lack of experience can be noted in recent decrees issued by the Ministry of High Crimes. Tiegboro authorized law 4550 which, in effect, legalizes vigilante justice. This law provides for citizens who witness or catch a criminal to burn him alive as punishment for their crime. ¶14. (S) Focusing on increasing the investigative capacity of the security forces can multiply the success of arrests, prosecutions, and stability. To wit, investigations in cases of human, narcotics, and currency trafficking will place the international spotlight on Guinea which would force Guinean authorities to deal with these issues. Embedding US criminal investigators, such as from the Drug Enforcement Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of State would assuredly assist in the success of criminal investigations and prosecutions of international suspects. This must also be accompanied by increased assistance for courts and prisons. ¶15. (S) It must be noted that this openness does not lessen the quite real indictment of many leaders currently in positions of power. Suspected narcotics and human traffickers (often times high ranking military officers) function with impunity, a trend that is likely to continue under any new regime which comes into power. Considering, however, the value that can be obtained in establishing investigative footholds with available resources; the impact of our involvement would be quite positive. ¶16. (S) COMMENT. What does exist, at least for the moment, is the opportunity for us to enroll ourselves in the development of the security forces with relatively little risk or cost. Decreasing our engagement certainly will not produce dire consequences. It will, however, hamper the development of Guinea or ) at the very least ) diminish our capacity to affect political or policy changes in the future. END COMMENT. RASPOLIC