GUINEA SECURITY FORCES PART I: AN EXAMINATION OF

S E C R E T CONAKRY 000372 SIPDIS FOR DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2029 TAGS: PREL PGOV PMIL KDEM ASEC GV SUBJECT: GUINEA SECURITY FORCES PART I: AN EXAMINATION OF KEY SECURITY FORCES REF: CONAKRY 0316 Classified By: RSO Philip W. Nazelrod for reason 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) Six months ago, a coup d,tat brought a military junta to power under the auspices of the National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD). Led by President Moussa Dadis Camara, the CNDD embarked on a campaign to reframe and restructure the military and civilian security forces. The marginalization of the Ministry of Security gave rise to the Ministry of Special Services and recast the military-led Gendarmerie as a national police force. This first part examines these changes and discusses the policy implications resulting from a merge of civilian and military security forces. The second part (septel) discusses the need for future aid and provides an analysis of two specific opportunities for assistance. -------------- THE LEAD SECURITY FORCES -------------- -- THE MINISTRY OF SECURITY -- ¶2. (S) The once powerful Ministry of Security finds itself increasingly marginalized, shifting from an organization of relative authority to one of mistrust and apathy. Much of the Ministry,s jurisdiction has been ripped away and assigned to military elements, notably the Gendarmerie. Those activities not reassigned, such as petty theft investigations, have largely been ignored. The schism between the Ministry of Security and the Guinean Armed Forces (who form part of the Ministry of Defense) which dates to 2005, has widened dramatically in recent months. ¶3. (S) Headed by Guinean Armed Forces (GAF) General Mamadou Toto Camara, First Vice President of the CNDD, the Ministry employs approximately 11,000 commissioned police officers and support staff. Of the 11,000, roughly 6,500 are new recruits hired following the military mutiny in May 2008. The once well-regarded police academy was shuttered in 2006 and equipment warehouses were emptied during the 2008 mutiny. With no formal training and a severe lack of equipment, police officers attempt to learn through on-the-job training. More often than not, however, many officers simply sit on the sidelines and are unwilling or unable to perform. -- THE GENDARMERIE -- ¶4. (S) Conceptually constructed based on the historic French Gendarme model, Guinea,s Gendarmerie was originally mandated to serve as military provost. Traditionally they provided services designed to police the GAF. They limited their civilian engagement to specific events such as crowd and riot control. Since the coup, the Gendarmerie is increasingly engaged in policing the civilian sector. ¶5. (S) Commanded by Major Ibrahima Balde, Chief of the National Gendarmerie, the Gendarmerie recently assumed law enforcement responsibilities in several key areas: (a) Airport Security (b) Seaport Security (c) Customs and (d) Immigration. Balde, a career Gendarme Officer, is a stark contrast to the former commander, General Jacques Toure. Uneducated and illiterate, Toure built a reputation as being one of the most corrupt officers serving in former president Conte,s regime. Toure, who was in the United States during the December 23 coup, returned to GUINEA early in 2009 and was promptly arrested by the CNDD. As of this cable, Toure remains in prison pending a trial date. On the other hand, Balde is fluent in five languages and has been an active participant in three United Nations (UN) missions. Most recently, he was assigned as a judicial police officer for the UN Mission to Haiti. While in Haiti, Balde reported directly to two US Civilian Police (CIVPOL) officers, Richard Warren and Michael Antonik. ¶6. (S) Balde claims his primary mission is to ferret out the corruption within the Gendarmerie and the GAF. The corruption, he intimated, is pervasive - specifically identifying the intelligence units - and is a symptom of the fact that the Gendarmes occupy a role &in the middle8 of the Ministry of Security and Ministry of Defense. This role (part civilian police and part military police) creates confusion in Guinea, specifically outside of Conakry where the Gendarmes are typically the sole policing agency (as civilian police officers are rarely stationed outside of the capital city). This confusion also lends itself to noticeable tension between civilian and military forces and rivalries are often pervasive as evidenced by the violent military versus police clashes in June 2008. ¶7. (S) A recent recruiting drive swelled the number of Gendarmes from 2,500 to an estimated 6,500 officers and enlisted personnel. Enjoying the only law enforcement-type academy in Guinea, the recruits have access to a new school house and firearms range built with donations from the French government. -- THE MINISTRY OF SPECIAL SERVICES -- ¶8. (S) Shortly after seizing control of the Government of Guinea, the CNDD created the Ministry of Special Services, Anti-Drugs, and Organized Crimes (Ministry of High Crimes). The exact mission of the new ministry is largely undefined. Through CNDD decree, however, the ministry is tasked with the investigations of four principal criminal enterprises: (a) trafficking in illegal narcotics (b) trafficking in persons (c) laundering of money and (d) organized crime. ¶9. (S) Leading the Ministry of High Crimes is Captain Moussa Tiegboro Camara, a Gendarme officer who, prior to the coup, earned a reputation as being an intellectual. Sources claim that former Gendarmerie commander General Toure was suspicious of Tiegboro,s reputation so he had him transferred to serve as the liaison officer between the Ministry of Defense and Gendarmerie. As liaison officer, sources report Tiegboro built strong relationships with Ministry of Defense officers and, as a result, he was one of a handful of Gendarme Officers selected to attend Commando training offered by the Chinese government. This training sent Tiegboro overseas during 2008 and he returned a few weeks prior to the coup and was appointed Minister in January ¶2009. ¶10. (S) Staffing the Ministry of High Crimes has proven a difficult chore for the CNDD. According to Tiegboro, the Ministry does not have any permanently assigned officers or agents. To investigate criminal activity, Tiegboro relies on a small cadre (estimated at 100) of loyal officers from various groups - notably the Gendarmerie, Judicial Police, and select military officers from the Red Beret units. This cadre forms a makeshift unit that typically operates under Tiegboro,s leadership for a finite period of time. Once an investigation is concluded, the members are returned to their permanent duty stations. It is not uncommon for Tiegboro to personally lead investigations. ¶11. (S) At the six month mark following the creation of the Ministry, Tiegboro (and the CNDD) finds himself unable to establish a strategy to deal with even basic crimes. Tiegboro appeals to the citizenry for assistance and even goes so far as to voice CNDD decrees condoning vigilante justice. A number of Tiegboro,s activities have, in fact, raised human rights concerns (see reftel). -------------- HOMOGENIZATION -------------- ¶12. (S) The fractured security forces appear to be in the process of being rapidly folded into a military-led national police force. The civilian component (commonly referred to as &blue8) under the Ministry of Security remains the largest policing organization and the only viable balance to the military junta. However, it is distracted and its influence rarely extends outside of Conakry. Further, the strain of political marginalization, weakened influence, and a lack of training and equipment gives one pause to reflect on the future of the organization. ¶13. (S) The military component (commonly referred to as &green8),represented by the Gendarmerie and Ministry of High Crimes, are benefiting from astute jurisdiction annexing, structured recruiting, and a sympathetic population. It is possible that the military will continue to amass authorities that should rightly belong to the civil police. The danger of allowing the military to accrue both civil and military policing authorities will result in less transparency and does not provide for any kind of check and balance within the nation,s security forces. ¶14. (S) We should not dismiss the trajectory the junta is taking by establishing a homogenized security force. While free and fair elections may restore civilian leadership to Guinea, the role of the military in civilian policing will most assuredly grow. In addition, if the military eventually downsizes, it would be a logical step for these former soldiers to take assignments in the policing sector. ¶15. (S) Focusing on the security forces sector en masse, and without assigning a green versus blue determination, may be the most effective method to effect positive change. Assistance given at any level would, arguably, be shared across many boundaries and the US must consider tailoring any future cooperation/assistance packages so that they can address this reality. RASPOLIC