S E C R E T CONAKRY 000372

SIPDIS

FOR DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV PMIL KDEM ASEC GV
SUBJECT: GUINEA SECURITY FORCES PART I: AN EXAMINATION OF
KEY SECURITY FORCES

REF: CONAKRY 0316

Classified By: RSO Philip W. Nazelrod for reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Six months ago, a coup d,tat brought a military
junta to power under the auspices of the National Council for
Democracy and Development (CNDD). Led by President Moussa
Dadis Camara, the CNDD embarked on a campaign to reframe and
restructure the military and civilian security forces. The
marginalization of the Ministry of Security gave rise to the
Ministry of Special Services and recast the military-led
Gendarmerie as a national police force. This first part
examines these changes and discusses the policy implications
resulting from a merge of civilian and military security
forces. The second part (septel) discusses the need for
future aid and provides an analysis of two specific
opportunities for assistance.


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THE LEAD SECURITY FORCES
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-- THE MINISTRY OF SECURITY --


2. (S) The once powerful Ministry of Security finds itself
increasingly marginalized, shifting from an organization of
relative authority to one of mistrust and apathy. Much of
the Ministry,s jurisdiction has been ripped away and
assigned to military elements, notably the Gendarmerie.
Those activities not reassigned, such as petty theft
investigations, have largely been ignored. The schism
between the Ministry of Security and the Guinean Armed Forces
(who form part of the Ministry of Defense) which dates to
2005, has widened dramatically in recent months.


3. (S) Headed by Guinean Armed Forces (GAF) General Mamadou
Toto Camara, First Vice President of the CNDD, the Ministry
employs approximately 11,000 commissioned police officers and
support staff. Of the 11,000, roughly 6,500 are new recruits
hired following the military mutiny in May 2008. The once
well-regarded police academy was shuttered in 2006 and
equipment warehouses were emptied during the 2008 mutiny.
With no formal training and a severe lack of equipment,
police officers attempt to learn through on-the-job training.
More often than not, however, many offi

cers simply sit on
the sidelines and are unwilling or unable to perform.

-- THE GENDARMERIE --


4. (S) Conceptually constructed based on the historic
French Gendarme model, Guinea,s Gendarmerie was originally
mandated to serve as military provost. Traditionally they
provided services designed to police the GAF. They limited
their civilian engagement to specific events such as crowd
and riot control. Since the coup, the Gendarmerie is
increasingly engaged in policing the civilian sector.


5. (S) Commanded by Major Ibrahima Balde, Chief of the
National Gendarmerie, the Gendarmerie recently assumed law
enforcement responsibilities in several key areas: (a)
Airport Security (b) Seaport Security (c) Customs and (d)
Immigration. Balde, a career Gendarme Officer, is a stark
contrast to the former commander, General Jacques Toure.
Uneducated and illiterate, Toure built a reputation as being
one of the most corrupt officers serving in former president
Conte,s regime. Toure, who was in the United States during
the December 23 coup, returned to Guinea early in 2009 and
was promptly arrested by the CNDD. As of this cable, Toure
remains in prison pending a trial date. On the other hand,
Balde is fluent in five languages and has been an active
participant in three United Nations (UN) missions. Most
recently, he was assigned as a judicial police officer for
the UN Mission to Haiti. While in Haiti, Balde reported
directly to two US Civilian Police (CIVPOL) officers, Richard
Warren and Michael Antonik.


6. (S) Balde claims his primary mission is to ferret out
the corruption within the Gendarmerie and the GAF. The
corruption, he intimated, is pervasive - specifically
identifying the intelligence units - and is a symptom of the
fact that the Gendarmes occupy a role &in the middle8 of
the Ministry of Security and Ministry of Defense. This role
(part civilian police and part military police) creates
confusion in Guinea, specifically outside of Conakry where
the Gendarmes are typically the sole policing agency (as
civilian police officers are rarely stationed outside of the

capital city). This confusion also lends itself to
noticeable tension between civilian and military forces and
rivalries are often pervasive as evidenced by the violent
military versus police clashes in June 2008.


7. (S) A recent recruiting drive swelled the number of
Gendarmes from 2,500 to an estimated 6,500 officers and
enlisted personnel. Enjoying the only law enforcement-type
academy in Guinea, the recruits have access to a new school
house and firearms range built with donations from the French
government.

-- THE MINISTRY OF SPECIAL SERVICES --


8. (S) Shortly after seizing control of the Government of
Guinea, the CNDD created the Ministry of Special Services,
Anti-Drugs, and Organized Crimes (Ministry of High Crimes).
The exact mission of the new ministry is largely undefined.
Through CNDD decree, however, the ministry is tasked with the
investigations of four principal criminal enterprises: (a)
trafficking in illegal narcotics (b) trafficking in persons
(c) laundering of money and (d) organized crime.


9. (S) Leading the Ministry of High Crimes is Captain
Moussa Tiegboro Camara, a Gendarme officer who, prior to the
coup, earned a reputation as being an intellectual. Sources
claim that former Gendarmerie commander General Toure was
suspicious of Tiegboro,s reputation so he had him
transferred to serve as the liaison officer between the
Ministry of Defense and Gendarmerie. As liaison officer,
sources report Tiegboro built strong relationships with
Ministry of Defense officers and, as a result, he was one of
a handful of Gendarme Officers selected to attend Commando
training offered by the Chinese government. This training
sent Tiegboro overseas during 2008 and he returned a few
weeks prior to the coup and was appointed Minister in January

2009.


10. (S) Staffing the Ministry of High Crimes has proven a
difficult chore for the CNDD. According to Tiegboro, the
Ministry does not have any permanently assigned officers or
agents. To investigate criminal activity, Tiegboro relies on
a small cadre (estimated at 100) of loyal officers from
various groups - notably the Gendarmerie, Judicial Police,
and select military officers from the Red Beret units. This
cadre forms a makeshift unit that typically operates under
Tiegboro,s leadership for a finite period of time. Once an
investigation is concluded, the members are returned to their
permanent duty stations. It is not uncommon for Tiegboro to
personally lead investigations.


11. (S) At the six month mark following the creation of the
Ministry, Tiegboro (and the CNDD) finds himself unable to
establish a strategy to deal with even basic crimes.
Tiegboro appeals to the citizenry for assistance and even
goes so far as to voice CNDD decrees condoning vigilante
justice. A number of Tiegboro,s activities have, in fact,
raised human rights concerns (see reftel).


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HOMOGENIZATION
--------------


12. (S) The fractured security forces appear to be in the
process of being rapidly folded into a military-led national
police force. The civilian component (commonly referred to
as &blue8) under the Ministry of Security remains the
largest policing organization and the only viable balance to
the military junta. However, it is distracted and its
influence rarely extends outside of Conakry. Further, the
strain of political marginalization, weakened influence, and
a lack of training and equipment gives one pause to reflect
on the future of the organization.


13. (S) The military component (commonly referred to as
&green8), represented by the Gendarmerie and Ministry of
High Crimes, are benefiting from astute jurisdiction
annexing, structured recruiting, and a sympathetic
population. It is possible that the military will continue
to amass authorities that should rightly belong to the civil
police. The danger of allowing the military to accrue both
civil and military policing authorities will result in less
transparency and does not provide for any kind of check and
balance within the nation,s security forces.


14. (S) We should not dismiss the trajectory the junta is

taking by establishing a homogenized security force. While
free and fair elections may restore civilian leadership to
Guinea, the role of the military in civilian policing will
most assuredly grow. In addition, if the military eventually
downsizes, it would be a logical step for these former
soldiers to take assignments in the policing sector.


15. (S) Focusing on the security forces sector en masse,
and without assigning a green versus blue determination, may
be the most effective method to effect positive change.
Assistance given at any level would, arguably, be shared
across many boundaries and the US must consider tailoring any
future cooperation/assistance packages so that they can
address this reality.
RASPOLIC