GUINEA POST-COUP: AN ANALYSIS AND POLICY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 CONAKRY 000340

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PMIL KDEM ASEC GV
SUBJECT: GUINEA POST-COUP: AN ANALYSIS AND POLICY
DISCUSSION, PART I

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ELIZABETH RASPOLIC FOR REASON 1.4 B AN
D D


1. (S) As we approach the six-month anniversary of the
December 23 coup d'etat, it is a good time to step back and
assess Guinea's evolution under the leadership of CNDD
President Moussa Dadis Camara, and to discuss where the
country might be headed over the coming year. The below
analysis reflects the thinking of the Embassy's reporting
team. It is by no means exhaustive, but will hopefully serve
as a useful point of departure as we consider the way forward
in terms of our bilateral relationship and policy. This
first part looks at the political and social context and then
outlines what might be ahead in the months to come. The
second cable (septel) discusses the subsequent policy
implications.

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SOCIO-POLITICAL FACTORS
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--THE GOVERNMENT--


2. (S) Despite the CNDD's repeated statements to the
contrary, government actions to date suggest that the CNDD
has a long-term agenda that does not include relinquishing
power, although they may eventually agree to step aside and
move into an "advisory" role in a post-election environment.
In the meantime, it is increasingly evident that elections
are unlikely to materialize before the end of the year. The
honeymoon period is drawing to a close and long-standing,
unresolved economic and social complaints are once again
beginning to rear their heads. Many government operations,
which were only borderline functional before, have come to a
screeching halt while other newly defined operations are
going forward at full speed without respect for rule of law.


3. (S) The country is governed by a core group of young
military officers who are largely unqualified for the jobs
they have taken on. CNDD President Moussa Dadis Camara is
the man in front for the time being, but available
information suggests that members of his entourage may be
pulling the strings. Dadis himself is erratic and
increasingly dictatorial. Indications of corruption have
already begun to emerge around some of his closest advisors
while other key ministers pursue problematic policies that
challenge basic human rights principles.

--THE MILITARY--


4. (S) The Guinean Armed Forces (GAF) have been a growing
problem for years, but especially since the May 2008 military
mutiny. The GAF is undisciplined, unprofessional, and
grossly overstaffed. The previous government consistently
acceded to military demands, not necessarily because Lansana
Conte was a military general himself, but because civilian
bureaucrats had no idea how to control the GAF, and were
afraid of the consequences of attempting to interfere in
military matters. The military is Guinea's strongest
national institution, and as such, it is no surprise that its
officers are now running the country. It should also
therefore be no surprise that these officers are unlikely to
quietly fade into the background just because civilian
officials are elected.

--THE POPULATION--


5. (S) At the same time, Dadis and the CNDD enjoy
significant popular support, although support for Dadis
appears to be waning. Despite the recent anti-Dadis
sentiment, there is a tacit acceptance of, if not advocacy
for, the need for a military-managed transition period. The
people have welcomed Dadis' crusade to "sanitize" the system,
and many seem to think that the CNDD should take as long as
he needs to accomplish that goal. People do want elections,
but they are in no hurry to head to the polls.


6. (S) Civil society organizations, labor unions and
political parties (Les Forces Vives) have been unable to
mount an effective civilian counterforce to the junta.
Crippled by infighting and mutual distrust, these groups
remain divided over political strategies and goals. They all
want elections, but they can't agree on when they should be
held or what needs to be done first. As they begin to
realize that the current leadership may be settling in for
the long haul, individuals seem to be looking more and more
to advance their individual interests, at the expense of the
common good.


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7. (S) Within civil society, Guinea's youths (aged 15 to 40)
represent the single-most powerful, potential voice for
change. There is a generational shift in progress as Guinea
moves away from the old leadership, which came of age during
the Sekou Toure era. Although literacy and education remain
a problem, the internet has revolutionized many young
people's access to information. There are core groups of
young intellectuals who are eager for change, well informed
of what is happening both in Guinea and the outside world,
and are willing to put their lives at risk. Largely
unemployed and unattached, these young people have little to
lose. At the same time, they are extremely vulnerable to
manipulation, and lack cohesion amongst themselves.
Political leaders, including former President Conte and the
new CNDD leadership, have successfully used cash to buy
support from one youth group or another. Guinea's young
people have been unable to pull together in a meaningful way
to date, but if they could, they represent the best chance
for a grassroots, pro-democracy movement.

--DEMOCRACY AS THE UNKNOWN--


8. (S) In some ways, Guinea has become marginally more
stable since the coup. Before Conte's death, people were
anticipating a transition, but that transition was undefined,
and people were afraid of what might develop. Now that the
initial scramble for power has been peacefully overcome,
people can see the shape of the transition and are largely
comfortable with it. In the same way, the prospect of
elections may be frightening. No one knows who might win the
election and what kind of power structure might emerge as a
result. This political unknown is particularly frightening
to many because of the ethnocentric nature of the political
parties. In the past, Guineans have proven to be extremely
conflict adverse. As such, they seem to be in no hurry to
rush towards another undefined transition. The current
system is one that they know well - despite its many flaws,
citizens know how to work that system. For many, democracy
represents the unknown.

--REGIONAL STABILITY--


9. (S) When looking at the political situation in Guinea and
the USG policy response, it is also important to step back
and look at the question of regional stability. Guinea has
long been one of the most politically stable countries in a
region devastated by civil conflicts. Towards the end of the
Conte regime, ECOWAS nations and other international partners
started watching Guinea closely, concerned that the country
would fall apart and subsequently cause the rest of the
region to destabilize. If Guinea were to implode, it is
likely that its immediate neighbors would experience some
spillover effects given how big and well equipped the Guinean
military is. This perspective is important to keep in mind
especially when looking at how ECOWAS countries may be
formulating their foreign policies towards Guinea. As
mentioned above, some might argue that the installation of
the military junta has actually brought Guinea more
stability. Like some Guineans, ECOWAS neighbors may also be
unwilling to push quickly for another transition. Senegal's
approach has been inconsistent with that of ECOWAS since the
beginning, and we are already beginning to see indications of
the same out of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali, and Burkina
Faso.

--THE ECONOMY--


10. (S) On the economic front, much of the population lives
on less than $1 a day and lacks regular access to electricity
and clean water. The GoG is facing a significant budget
crunch in the face of declining mining revenues and mounting
debt service payments. Despite this "official" lack of
national funds, the CNDD seems to be able to put their hands
on large stacks of cash whenever they need it. The GoG
continues to meet its debt obligations and pay government
salaries, but most ministries lack operational funds. Recent
and pending economic policy decisions on the part of the CNDD
may have devastating long-term effects. Contacts within the
international community have said that the GoG may be
approaching a financial crisis point. We have yet to see it
materialize, but it may be looming on the horizon.

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PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICANS
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11. (S) The United States continues to be viewed favorably
by most Guineans despite having taken what many Guineans view
as a unrealistic and unfair policy position in reaction to

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the coup. During routine meetings, Guinean contacts will
often mention their appreciation of the USG's assistance
during the Liberian and Sierra Leonian civil wars. At that
time, the USG provided highly valued military training to
elite Guinean forces, commonly called "Rangers." These
forces were instrumental in Guinea's successful repulsion of
neighboring rebel forces from Guinean territory. Bilateral
relations aside, Guineans generally like Americans and have
great respect for the United States and its democracy. At
the same time, as the economic and political situation
deteriorates and our policy position remains constant, these
sentiments could quickly change. There is already a
perception that the USG is abandoning Guinea in its hour of
need. If the situation worsens, this perception could become
stronger.

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THE ROAD AHEAD
--------------


12. (S) Given these realities, it seems that there are
several possible scenarios before us, which are not mutually
exclusive:

--DELAYED ELECTIONS--


13. (S) The only groups currently pushing for elections
before the end of 2009 are the international community and
its International Contact Group on Guinea (ICG-G),and
political parties. Most everyone else agrees that elections
are critical, but are not committed to a short timeline.
They are more focused on a broader transition agenda that
includes everything from constitutional and electoral code
reform to support for Dadis' crusade to "sanitize" the
government. Dadis and the CNDD have publicly committed to
holding legislative elections in October and presidential
elections in December, but few people seem to believe that
the elections will actually take place.


14. (S) The GoG is already off schedule in terms of the
election timeline proposed by Les Force Vives. Technical
difficulties persist. The voter registration campaign is
incomplete and people are beginning to challenge its
accuracy. The rainy season is upon us, which will severely
limit electoral preparations through early September, at
which point, the month-long observation of Ramadan will
commence. In addition, longstanding financial challenges
have not been resolved. Time is short, political will is
questionable, and there is much to be done. Despite these
obstacles, the donor community remains convinced that it is
still technically possible to hold elections before the end
of the year.


15. (S) These factors indicate that it is increasingly
likely that the GoG will push presidential elections into
2010, and probably legislative elections as well. Some
contacts have reported that members of the CNDD are seeking
to push elections to the end of 2010, a full two years after
the coup. Within the civilian sector, there currently seems
to be some support for this plan. However, most contacts
have emphasized that they would be unwilling to accept a
transition period that lasts more than two years. There is
also a good chance that even if the country organizes
legislative elections in 2009 or 2010, there may be a
significant delay between legislative and presidential
elections, which would ultimately prolong the CNDD's control
over the state.


16. (S) Information from other contacts indicates that
members of the CNDD may be actively strategizing as to how
they can permanently maintain their grip on power. Despite
the stated commitments of Les Forces Vives, the CNDD may very
well end up doing so with the tacit support of the
population, eventually legitimized through elections. Many
Guineans generally do not trust the system in place, nor the
potential political candidates. If the CNDD is able to start
addressing basic needs, such as electricity and water, the
population may be willing to let them stay. The Conte regime
started out much the same way and people eventually accepted
the "transition" as the new republic. Through apathy and
lack of cohesion, Guinea may ultimately slouch towards a
"third" republic with the CNDD at the helm.

--POPULAR DISCONTENT/CIVIL UNREST--


17. (S) As it becomes clear to the population that the
transition is likely to slide into 2010, the potential for
civil unrest is likely to increase. Following in the
footsteps of former GoG leaders, Dadis is already making

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grandiose promises to the population, such as those for
better access to water and electricity, and an improved
security environment. And like his predecessors, Dadis is
going to find it very difficult to fulfill these promises due
to the country's bureaucratic and fiscal reality. If
frustrations mount, people may decide to take to the streets
in protest.


18. (S) The prompt settlement of the recent taxi strike
indicates that Dadis has started down a similarly dangerous
path. Towards the end of the Conte regime, group after group
of supplicants lined up to demand that their concerns, most
of which were primarily financial, were addressed. The GoG
responded by throwing cash at them along with promises for
long-term solutions. Dadis essentially did the same thing
with the taxi drivers, and the next groups are already
starting to line up. If Dadis is unable to deliver long-term
solutions or a satisfactory amount of cash, he may face labor
strikes or public protests, which often turn violent.


19. (S) Civil unrest is nothing new in Guinea. There is a
possibility that widespread popular discontent could lead to
a nationwide movement such as that of early 2007, but it is
more likely that we will see sporadic, short-lived
demonstrations as different groups independently seek to
advance their own interests. Guineans are very sensitive to
the fact that more than 100 people were killed in 2007 by the
same military that is now running the country. For them to
risk those casualties again, there would need to be a
nationwide movement with a clearly defined goal. To date,
such a goal has not been articulated, and even when things
continued to deteriorate under Conte, civil society leaders
were not able to effectively organize themselves. At the
same time, it would be dangerous to discount the possibility
of a spontaneous uprising that quickly evolves into a more
organized mass movement. Either way, we expect to see more
unrest.

--COUNTER-COUP--


20. (S) The CNDD is divided within itself and its membership
seems to change daily. Indeed, it is difficult to even get a
clear reading on just who is on the CNDD. Some CNDD members
support the idea of a relatively short transition leading to
elections, but others seem to be actively strategizing as to
how they can permanently maintain their hold on power. Dadis
is caught in the middle and is in way over his head.
Available information suggests that although he is the
central authority, he is not a real decision maker. Rather,
it seems that he relies heavily on his circle of advisors,
particularly Sekouba Konate (Vice President and Minister of
Defense),who may often give him conflicting advice. If
Dadis starts to look like he is moving towards elections as
he says he is going to do, those with a more permanent agenda
in mind might start thinking about bringing in someone else
to head the CNDD.


21. (S) In addition, Dadis' erratic behavior and the
embarrassingly public dressingdown he has given some of his
ministers, including generals who were previously his
superiors, may encourage sedition. It has been said that
Dadis is president simply because he made it to the
microphone first. Embassy has begun to hear indications of a
possible counter-coup movement, which suggests that this
potential scenario is becoming more plausible.

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LOOKING AHEAD
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22. (S) The above discussion highlights the continued
uncertainty of Guinea's political transition. There are a
multitude of players and factors to consider and while the
current trajectory seems fairly evident, the situation could
change overnight. Six months post-coup, Embassy anticipates
that elections will likely be pushed into 2010 and that
popular discontent may continue to manifest itself in
small-scale demonstrations and labor strikes. Embassy is
also concerned about the possibility of a counter-coup, which
will continue to be a concern as long as this transition
period lasts. Oddly enough, this trajectory is not that much
different from the one we were looking at about the same time
last year: delayed elections, civil unrest, and the
possibility of military intervention. The main difference is
that the military is now in charge, which has significantly
modified our policy approach. A discussion of policy
implications follows septel.
RASPOLIC