PARTY LINE BEGINS TO EMERGE FROM GOG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CONAKRY 000228

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM ASEC GV
SUBJECT: PARTY LINE BEGINS TO EMERGE FROM GOG

Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF SHANNON CAZEAU FOR REASON 1.4 B AND D


1. (C) SUMMARY. Over the past few weeks, Embassy officers
have been hearing what appears to be an emerging "party line"
from the Government of Guinea. CNDD loyalists and career
civil servants alike are maintaining that the CNDD represents
Guinea's best solution for the near-term, and that Dadis and
his administration are doing what needs to be done to ready
the country for an eventual transition, which is likely to
take much longer than a year. Equally clear is the idea that
elections are being imposed upon the country by an
international community that does not fully appreciate
Guinea's political realities. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Between the Charge's recent attendance at a
diplomatic corps briefing given by the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, the Pol/Econ Chief's meetings with the Ministers of
Labor and Justice and senior MFA officials, and the DATT's
meeting with the Secretary General of Defense, it appears
that the Government of Guinea is beginning to articulate a
clear party line.

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CNDD IS THE ANSWER TO GUINEA'S PROBLEMS
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3. (C) Guinean Government officials maintain that the CNDD
is doing exactly what needs to be done to get the country
ready for its next government. There is a general consensus
that the system needs to be "cleansed" in order to prevent
corruption and weak governance in the future. This cleansing
includes rewriting the constitution, recouping stolen funds,
and stifling narco-trafficking. Government contacts argue
that the military is the only institution capable of
effectively addressing these long-standing issues. When
questions of fundamental human rights issues, such as due
process, are raised, officials respond with arguments about
how the country's judicial system is endemically corrupt and
therefore unreliable. While some may not agree with the
methods, they do seem to accept the idea that these
activities are necessary.

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ELECTIONS ON OUR TERMS
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4. (C) Support for the CNDD's agenda feeds into the GoG's
views on elections. Everyone agrees that elections are the
ultimate end goal, but many are increasingly adamant that
Guinea will not be ready for elections this year. Some argue
from a technical standpoint, saying that the process is
already too far behind and there are too many steps ahead to
be able to hold elections before the end of the year. Others
argue that it would be catastrophic for Guinea to hold
elections until the "cleansing" is complete. These officials
are concerned that holding elections too soon would simply
perpetuate the problems of the past.


5. (C) A visiting Italian student working on a dissertation
focussing on the international community's response to the
December 23 coup, said that a number of government officials
told her that elections would not happen unless the
international community coughs up the money to pay for them.
She noted that one official said "if they want the elections
so badly, then they can pay for them."

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FOREIGNERS DON'T UNDERSTAND OUR REALITY
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6. (C) When faced with direct statements of USG policy,
Guinean officials respond with comments about how the
international community does not really appreciate Guinea's
complex political reality. They question how the USG, for
example, can continue to condemn the coup and the CNDD when
we were willing to work with the late President Conte's
obviously corrupt, undemocratic regime. They argue that the
country's only alternative after Conte's death was a coup.
Further, they argue that without continued military
intervention, the country will quickly descend into civil war.

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A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE
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7. (C) Another emerging theme is the belief that the USG
condemned the coup as a matter of policy rather than because
of an informed decision. Government officials have
frequently described the USG's condemnation as "a matter of
principle." They might joke and say "we understand that you

CONAKRY 00000228 002 OF 002


have to condemn us, but now we want to talk about how we can
work together." Explanations to the contrary, focused on why
the USG fundamentally believes that an illegitimate military
junta is not in Guinea's best interests, seem to fall on deaf
ears.

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YOU'LL COME AROUND EVENTUALLY
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8. (C) The last and perhaps most troublesome theme is the
idea that members of the international community will
eventually soften their policies towards the military junta.
Government officials have repeatedly noted the suffering of
the Guinean people and pleaded for assistance. They
acknowledge the USG's suspension of aid, but in the next
breath, ask for money for one program after another. Body
language and comments suggest that government officials have
not really internalized the USG's message. They hear what we
are saying, but still seem to believe that we will eventually
have no choice but to offer the hand of assistance.
Officials are still talking about when, not if, the World
Bank's debt relief program for Guinea is approved.

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COMMENT
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9. (C) The GoG's emerging "party line" suggests that there
is increasing support for the CNDD and its agenda among even
career civil servants. This party line also suggests that
elections are not an immediate priority. At the same time,
there seems to be a belief that the GoG can pursue its own
agenda on its own timeline, and that the international
community will eventually get on board. Despite repeated
statements in the press, at public events, and in private
meetings, our message does not seem to be getting through.
Embassy will continue to underscore and explain USG policy in
an attempt to change some of these misguided impressions.
END COMMENT.
RASPOLIC