Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09CONAKRY102
2009-02-13 09:14:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Conakry
Cable title:
CONAKRY RESPONSE - ASSESSING THE NEED FOR
how-toVZCZCXRO1168 PP RUEHMA RUEHPA DE RUEHRY #0102/01 0440914 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 130914Z FEB 09 FM AMEMBASSY CONAKRY TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3440 INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0584 RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE RUEABND/DEA WASHDC RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 CONAKRY 000102
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPT FOR AF/RSA CHRISTOPHER POMMERER, INL/AAE AARON ALTON,
AND DS/T/ATA TONY GONZALEX
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV SOCI KCRM SNAR ASEC GV
SUBJECT: CONAKRY RESPONSE - ASSESSING THE NEED FOR
INCREASED LAW ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL TRAINING
REF: STATE 05448
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 CONAKRY 000102
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPT FOR AF/RSA CHRISTOPHER POMMERER, INL/AAE AARON ALTON,
AND DS/T/ATA TONY GONZALEX
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV SOCI KCRM SNAR ASEC GV
SUBJECT: CONAKRY RESPONSE - ASSESSING THE NEED FOR
INCREASED LAW ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL TRAINING
REF: STATE 05448
1. (U) In response to reftel request, Post submits the
following information regarding assessed needs for increased
law enforcement and judicial training in Guinea. Post notes
that the USG has suspended aid to Guinea, with the exception
of humanitarian and democracy assistance, in response to the
December 23 coup d'etat and the subsequent installation of a
military junta.
--------------
KEY CHALLENGES
--------------
2. (SBU) Guinea's civilian law enforcement faces a wide
range of challenges, both internal and regional. Conakry is
rated as critical for crime, which is largely due to the high
frequency of theft, assault, and general banditry. Such
crime occurs primarily in the capital, but also throughout
urban centers in the interior. Many of these crimes are
committed by individuals in uniforms who are believed to be
military personnel, but may also be members of the police
force, or bandits who bought easily acquired uniforms.
Gang-style elements exist in the capital, largely defined by
ethnicity or nationality.
3. (SBU) Over the past 18 months, drug trafficking has grown
exponentially in Guinea, causing the country to emerge as a
regional hub for such activity. Guinea's notoriously porous
borders make smuggling of goods (counterfeit and otherwise)
and human trafficking significant problems. Available
statistics are unreliable, but contacts estimate that several
hundred individuals are trafficked in Guinea annually, both
internally and trans-nationally.
4. (SBU) During the recent wars that engulfed the region,
Guinea served as a transit point for arms trafficking.
International scrutiny and regional stability significantly
reduced this practice, although some arms trafficking may
still be occurring. Domestic and transnational terrorism
networks in Guinea are not remarkable. However, the French
believe they may be pushed south of the Sahel due to
successes by U.S. and international partners. Additionally,
it is not clear how important Guinea is to Hezbollah or
Hamas--or even Al Qaida.
--------------
HOST GOVERNMENT CAPACITY
--------------
5. (SBU) Guinea's police force is generally incapable of
addressing the challenges described above. A police strike
in 2007 followed a military mutiny in 2008, in which military
personnel killed at least 12 police officers, largely
stripped the civilian police forces of remaining training
facilities and equipment while damaging any existing
inter-agency enforcement initiatives. In addition, many
police officers may now feel threatened by their military
counterparts, rendering them incapable of countering rampant
crime committed by others in uniform. Currently headed by a
military general, who is a member of the ruling military
junta, the civilian police forces lack any consistent
training programs, supply system or finances. The police
have been under-resourced and under-trained for years, and
they have now been further marginalized by the military
regime.
6. (SBU) Endemic corruption throughout all levels of the
police and the government make effective law enforcement
difficult. Low salaries combined with inadequate training
contribute to this problem while increased narcotics
trafficking means that opportunities for corruption have
increased exponentially. Corruption extends to the Ministry
of Justice, with the result that corruption generally goes
unpunished. Due to the underlying lack of rule of law, all
but the most horrendous of crimes (e.g. kidnapping, murder)
go un-prosecuted. This environment often discourages police
forces from even attempting to launch major anti-crime
initiatives.
7. (SBU) Guinea's police force is severely understaffed
CONAKRY 00000102 002 OF 003
throughout the country. Most urban centers outside of
Conakry have only a handful of officers for populations of
25,000 to several hundred thousand people. The former
government launched a major recruitment effort in late 2008,
but the military junta reportedly lacks the resources to pay
salaries to these new officers. The Ministry of Security
condones the practice of taking on "volunteer" police
officers who wear uniforms, but generally do not carry
firearms. The fact that these individuals are generally
unpaid contributes to rampant corruption. In addition, some
of these "volunteers" have been on the force for years
awaiting fulfillment of promises of permanent employment,
which have yet to materialize.
8. (SBU) A small number of mid-level police commanders
possess a certain level of technical knowledge, often gained
from attending training programs abroad. The vast majority
of police officers have little to no policing skills due to
the lack of a training program. Basic training is a
three-month program that includes segments on human rights,
women's rights, and riot control. Agents are supposed to
undergo a nine-month training course while judicial police
are supposed to undergo an 18 month course. However, the
Guinean Police Academy is non-operational and any training
efforts are haphazard at best.
9. (SBU) What little equipment remaining in the control of
the civilian police forces is generally in poor condition. A
small number of motor vehicles service all of Guinea, and are
subject to frequent breakdowns. Side arms are not maintained
and the majority is circa 1940.
10. (SBU) Under the military junta, the civilian policing
forces (traditionally aligned with the Ministry of Security)
are being reconstructed under both Security and now a newly
formed Ministry of High Crimes and Anti-Drugs. It is unclear
how responsibilities and resources will be divided. The
President of the military junta recently authorized all
security personnel to shoot anyone believed to be involved in
drug trafficking, child trafficking, money laundering, or
armed robbery. It is unclear who is included in the security
forces. To date, no security personnel have tested this
authority.
--------------
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
--------------
11. (SBU) Guinean policing services would benefit immensely
from all forms of training. Basic police training programs,
including how to construct programs, could immediately
improve the quality and professionalism of the police.
Leadership knowledge for mid-level officers would serve to
reinforce and grow policing services. These types of
training programs should target precinct police officers,
Anti-Gang police, and Judicial Police.
12. (SBU) Specialized training, such as narcotics
interdiction and customs inspections, would align with both
Guinean objectives and other potential international donor
support. This training would target the Anti-Drug Office
(OCAD) and customs police (seaport, border, airport).
13. (SBU) Judiciary training, in any form, targeting all
layers of the Ministry of Justice would serve not only to
professionalize the judiciary but also to provide remedies to
victims. The current judiciary functions without a
generalized body of legal knowledge and with minimal
finances.
--------------
HOST GOVERNMENT AS A PARTNER
--------------
14. (SBU) Before the installation of the military junta, the
Guinean Government was keenly interested in USG assistance
for law enforcement programs. They repeatedly requested help
with training, general guidance, equipment, and supplies.
The new military regime has also expressed interest in
working with the USG, but our current bilateral policy stance
makes such cooperation difficult, if not impossible. The
CONAKRY 00000102 003 OF 003
political situation remains fluid and it is unclear how long
the current regime will stay in power. Guinea would be a
willing partner, but it will be several months before we will
know whether or not the country will be able to install a
legitimate government in the near-term.
--------------
OTHER INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS
--------------
15. (SBU) The French have provided a number of training
programs for police over the years. They are currently
training 90 police inspectors at the Anti-Riot base for one
month, a program that was initiated before the December 23
coup d'etat. The training focuses on investigative
techniques.
16. (SBU) Many international partners are currently
reviewing their bilateral assistance programs in response to
the coup, although the USG and Japan are the only countries
to date to have announced a bilateral suspension of aid.
Before the coup, Spain and the United Kingdom were interested
in exploring programs targeting anti-narcotics initiatives.
--------------
REGIONAL TRAINING FACILITIES
--------------
17. (U) There are no regional training centers in Guinea,
nor is Embassy aware of any plans to construct one.
--------------
POINT OF CONTACT
--------------
18. (U) Embassy point of contact is Regional Security
Officer Phil Nazelrod (224-65-10-43-77 or
nazelrodpw@state.gov).
RASPOLIC
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPT FOR AF/RSA CHRISTOPHER POMMERER, INL/AAE AARON ALTON,
AND DS/T/ATA TONY GONZALEX
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV SOCI KCRM SNAR ASEC GV
SUBJECT: CONAKRY RESPONSE - ASSESSING THE NEED FOR
INCREASED LAW ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL TRAINING
REF: STATE 05448
1. (U) In response to reftel request, Post submits the
following information regarding assessed needs for increased
law enforcement and judicial training in Guinea. Post notes
that the USG has suspended aid to Guinea, with the exception
of humanitarian and democracy assistance, in response to the
December 23 coup d'etat and the subsequent installation of a
military junta.
--------------
KEY CHALLENGES
--------------
2. (SBU) Guinea's civilian law enforcement faces a wide
range of challenges, both internal and regional. Conakry is
rated as critical for crime, which is largely due to the high
frequency of theft, assault, and general banditry. Such
crime occurs primarily in the capital, but also throughout
urban centers in the interior. Many of these crimes are
committed by individuals in uniforms who are believed to be
military personnel, but may also be members of the police
force, or bandits who bought easily acquired uniforms.
Gang-style elements exist in the capital, largely defined by
ethnicity or nationality.
3. (SBU) Over the past 18 months, drug trafficking has grown
exponentially in Guinea, causing the country to emerge as a
regional hub for such activity. Guinea's notoriously porous
borders make smuggling of goods (counterfeit and otherwise)
and human trafficking significant problems. Available
statistics are unreliable, but contacts estimate that several
hundred individuals are trafficked in Guinea annually, both
internally and trans-nationally.
4. (SBU) During the recent wars that engulfed the region,
Guinea served as a transit point for arms trafficking.
International scrutiny and regional stability significantly
reduced this practice, although some arms trafficking may
still be occurring. Domestic and transnational terrorism
networks in Guinea are not remarkable. However, the French
believe they may be pushed south of the Sahel due to
successes by U.S. and international partners. Additionally,
it is not clear how important Guinea is to Hezbollah or
Hamas--or even Al Qaida.
--------------
HOST GOVERNMENT CAPACITY
--------------
5. (SBU) Guinea's police force is generally incapable of
addressing the challenges described above. A police strike
in 2007 followed a military mutiny in 2008, in which military
personnel killed at least 12 police officers, largely
stripped the civilian police forces of remaining training
facilities and equipment while damaging any existing
inter-agency enforcement initiatives. In addition, many
police officers may now feel threatened by their military
counterparts, rendering them incapable of countering rampant
crime committed by others in uniform. Currently headed by a
military general, who is a member of the ruling military
junta, the civilian police forces lack any consistent
training programs, supply system or finances. The police
have been under-resourced and under-trained for years, and
they have now been further marginalized by the military
regime.
6. (SBU) Endemic corruption throughout all levels of the
police and the government make effective law enforcement
difficult. Low salaries combined with inadequate training
contribute to this problem while increased narcotics
trafficking means that opportunities for corruption have
increased exponentially. Corruption extends to the Ministry
of Justice, with the result that corruption generally goes
unpunished. Due to the underlying lack of rule of law, all
but the most horrendous of crimes (e.g. kidnapping, murder)
go un-prosecuted. This environment often discourages police
forces from even attempting to launch major anti-crime
initiatives.
7. (SBU) Guinea's police force is severely understaffed
CONAKRY 00000102 002 OF 003
throughout the country. Most urban centers outside of
Conakry have only a handful of officers for populations of
25,000 to several hundred thousand people. The former
government launched a major recruitment effort in late 2008,
but the military junta reportedly lacks the resources to pay
salaries to these new officers. The Ministry of Security
condones the practice of taking on "volunteer" police
officers who wear uniforms, but generally do not carry
firearms. The fact that these individuals are generally
unpaid contributes to rampant corruption. In addition, some
of these "volunteers" have been on the force for years
awaiting fulfillment of promises of permanent employment,
which have yet to materialize.
8. (SBU) A small number of mid-level police commanders
possess a certain level of technical knowledge, often gained
from attending training programs abroad. The vast majority
of police officers have little to no policing skills due to
the lack of a training program. Basic training is a
three-month program that includes segments on human rights,
women's rights, and riot control. Agents are supposed to
undergo a nine-month training course while judicial police
are supposed to undergo an 18 month course. However, the
Guinean Police Academy is non-operational and any training
efforts are haphazard at best.
9. (SBU) What little equipment remaining in the control of
the civilian police forces is generally in poor condition. A
small number of motor vehicles service all of Guinea, and are
subject to frequent breakdowns. Side arms are not maintained
and the majority is circa 1940.
10. (SBU) Under the military junta, the civilian policing
forces (traditionally aligned with the Ministry of Security)
are being reconstructed under both Security and now a newly
formed Ministry of High Crimes and Anti-Drugs. It is unclear
how responsibilities and resources will be divided. The
President of the military junta recently authorized all
security personnel to shoot anyone believed to be involved in
drug trafficking, child trafficking, money laundering, or
armed robbery. It is unclear who is included in the security
forces. To date, no security personnel have tested this
authority.
--------------
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
--------------
11. (SBU) Guinean policing services would benefit immensely
from all forms of training. Basic police training programs,
including how to construct programs, could immediately
improve the quality and professionalism of the police.
Leadership knowledge for mid-level officers would serve to
reinforce and grow policing services. These types of
training programs should target precinct police officers,
Anti-Gang police, and Judicial Police.
12. (SBU) Specialized training, such as narcotics
interdiction and customs inspections, would align with both
Guinean objectives and other potential international donor
support. This training would target the Anti-Drug Office
(OCAD) and customs police (seaport, border, airport).
13. (SBU) Judiciary training, in any form, targeting all
layers of the Ministry of Justice would serve not only to
professionalize the judiciary but also to provide remedies to
victims. The current judiciary functions without a
generalized body of legal knowledge and with minimal
finances.
--------------
HOST GOVERNMENT AS A PARTNER
--------------
14. (SBU) Before the installation of the military junta, the
Guinean Government was keenly interested in USG assistance
for law enforcement programs. They repeatedly requested help
with training, general guidance, equipment, and supplies.
The new military regime has also expressed interest in
working with the USG, but our current bilateral policy stance
makes such cooperation difficult, if not impossible. The
CONAKRY 00000102 003 OF 003
political situation remains fluid and it is unclear how long
the current regime will stay in power. Guinea would be a
willing partner, but it will be several months before we will
know whether or not the country will be able to install a
legitimate government in the near-term.
--------------
OTHER INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS
--------------
15. (SBU) The French have provided a number of training
programs for police over the years. They are currently
training 90 police inspectors at the Anti-Riot base for one
month, a program that was initiated before the December 23
coup d'etat. The training focuses on investigative
techniques.
16. (SBU) Many international partners are currently
reviewing their bilateral assistance programs in response to
the coup, although the USG and Japan are the only countries
to date to have announced a bilateral suspension of aid.
Before the coup, Spain and the United Kingdom were interested
in exploring programs targeting anti-narcotics initiatives.
--------------
REGIONAL TRAINING FACILITIES
--------------
17. (U) There are no regional training centers in Guinea,
nor is Embassy aware of any plans to construct one.
--------------
POINT OF CONTACT
--------------
18. (U) Embassy point of contact is Regional Security
Officer Phil Nazelrod (224-65-10-43-77 or
nazelrodpw@state.gov).
RASPOLIC