Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09COLOMBO982
2009-10-22 12:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:
TAMIL LEADER URGES U.S., INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
VZCZCXRO2983 OO RUEHBI DE RUEHLM #0982/01 2951220 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 221220Z OCT 09 FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO ZDK RUEHLO #6833 3011323 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0673 INFO RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 1980 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 9016 RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 7254 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 5178 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 3401 RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 5133 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0007 RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0668 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4244 RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 9579 RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 6874 RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO PRIORITY 1339 RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 3791 RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000982
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE
SUBJECT: TAMIL LEADER URGES U.S., INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
TO PRESS GSL ON HUMAN RIGHTS
REF: COLOMBO 979
COLOMBO 00000982 001.5 OF 002
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA A. BUTENIS. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000982
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE
SUBJECT: TAMIL LEADER URGES U.S., INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
TO PRESS GSL ON HUMAN RIGHTS
REF: COLOMBO 979
COLOMBO 00000982 001.5 OF 002
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA A. BUTENIS. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: In an initial courtesy call, Tamil National
Alliance (TNA) leader R. Sampanthan discussed a range of
issues with the Ambassador, including upcoming elections,
human rights, and the role of Tamils in the post-war
environment. Sampanthan opined that the presidential election
would be held after the April parliamentary elections. He
urged the U.S. to push the government for accountability on
human rights violations. Sampanthan passed to Ambassador
copies of January 2009 letters to President Obama and
Secretary Clinton, the texts of which post has sent. (REFTEL)
END SUMMARY.
GSL Less Confident About Upcoming Elections
--------------
2. (C) On October 19, TNA leader R. Sampanthan paid an
initial call on Ambassador and discussed a wide range of
topics. Sampanthan offered that there seemed to be a contract
between Chief of Defense Staff Sarath Fonseka and the
opposition alliance, but stopped short of saying whether he
thought Fonseka would contest in the elections. Sampanthan
allowed that the relationship between Fonseka and the
government was fractured and said Fonseka was probably one of
the few candidates who could give President Mahinda Rajapaksa
a run for his money. He credited Fonseka with the tactical
decisions related to the war, while Gotabaya Rajapaksa served
as a conduit to the President. He thought it was unwise of
the government to try to hurt Fonseka, a widely-perceived war
hero, so soon after the end of the conflict. (NOTE:
Sampanthan's guarded comments about Fonseka's potential
presidential candidacy probably reflect his personal distaste
for both Rajapaksa and Fonseka, the architect and executor of
the war victory. END NOTE.)
3. (C) Sampanthan said he thought the government might wait
to hold a presidential election until after parliamentary
elections, because the idea of facing Fonseka as an opponent
made the government rethink its original strategy of
capitalizing on its victory over the LTTE by holding early
presidential elections. He confirmed that the TNA probably
would not field a candidate in the presidential elections.
GSL Accountability and the S/WCI Report
--------------
4. (C) The Ambassador mentioned the soon-to-be-released
report on incidents during the recent conflict and her hope
that the government would respond to the report by putting a
mechanism for accountability in place. Sampanthan argued that
the government would never allow a credible outcome and was
unlikely to allow an international inquiry, pointing out the
GSL's past attempts to undermine accountability. Sampanthan
said the U.S. must use this opportunity to put extreme
pressure on the GSL, which would not pursue a political
solution otherwise. He said a reconciliation commission,
similar to South Africa's post-apartheid commission, would
not work in Sri Lanka because of cultural and political
differences, and because the government remained in power.
Sampanthan said his Tamil constituents believed
reconciliation could take place but it needed to be based on
a credible stance on human rights and a political settlement
that gave them some power. He said that implementing the
devolution of power in the 13th amendment would not
sufficiently address the concerns of his constituents.
5. (C) The Ambassador outlined the main points of the report
on incidents during the conflict and assured Sampanthan that
that GSL would need to respond in some way or its
COLOMBO 00000982 002.2 OF 002
relationships with the U.S. would continue to suffer. She
pointed out that some members of Congress already questioned
U.S. participation in the recent TIFA conference. She had
suggested to the GSL that its response to the report be
measured, rather than immediately rejecting it, which would
erode the government's credibility. Sampanthan said that the
GSL pointedly had disregarded him and in doing so, lost an
opportunity to engage with the Tamil populace. He posited
that Rajapaksa was not at ease with himself and that he had a
guilty conscience for how the war was conducted. The
Ambassador thanked Sampanthan and promised to deliver a copy
of the report to him once it was released.
COMMENT
--------------
6. (C) Sampanthan's Tamil constituents remain politically,
socially, and geographically divided and do not appear to
have formulated a new political strategy. His urging the
Ambassador to press the government to respond to accusations
of human rights violations is predictable and will likely
continue. Not surprisingly, the government's reluctance to
meaningfully engage with the TNA post-conflict and its
snubbing of the TNA leader aggravate ethnic tensions still
smarting from the war.
BUTENIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE
SUBJECT: TAMIL LEADER URGES U.S., INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
TO PRESS GSL ON HUMAN RIGHTS
REF: COLOMBO 979
COLOMBO 00000982 001.5 OF 002
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA A. BUTENIS. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: In an initial courtesy call, Tamil National
Alliance (TNA) leader R. Sampanthan discussed a range of
issues with the Ambassador, including upcoming elections,
human rights, and the role of Tamils in the post-war
environment. Sampanthan opined that the presidential election
would be held after the April parliamentary elections. He
urged the U.S. to push the government for accountability on
human rights violations. Sampanthan passed to Ambassador
copies of January 2009 letters to President Obama and
Secretary Clinton, the texts of which post has sent. (REFTEL)
END SUMMARY.
GSL Less Confident About Upcoming Elections
--------------
2. (C) On October 19, TNA leader R. Sampanthan paid an
initial call on Ambassador and discussed a wide range of
topics. Sampanthan offered that there seemed to be a contract
between Chief of Defense Staff Sarath Fonseka and the
opposition alliance, but stopped short of saying whether he
thought Fonseka would contest in the elections. Sampanthan
allowed that the relationship between Fonseka and the
government was fractured and said Fonseka was probably one of
the few candidates who could give President Mahinda Rajapaksa
a run for his money. He credited Fonseka with the tactical
decisions related to the war, while Gotabaya Rajapaksa served
as a conduit to the President. He thought it was unwise of
the government to try to hurt Fonseka, a widely-perceived war
hero, so soon after the end of the conflict. (NOTE:
Sampanthan's guarded comments about Fonseka's potential
presidential candidacy probably reflect his personal distaste
for both Rajapaksa and Fonseka, the architect and executor of
the war victory. END NOTE.)
3. (C) Sampanthan said he thought the government might wait
to hold a presidential election until after parliamentary
elections, because the idea of facing Fonseka as an opponent
made the government rethink its original strategy of
capitalizing on its victory over the LTTE by holding early
presidential elections. He confirmed that the TNA probably
would not field a candidate in the presidential elections.
GSL Accountability and the S/WCI Report
--------------
4. (C) The Ambassador mentioned the soon-to-be-released
report on incidents during the recent conflict and her hope
that the government would respond to the report by putting a
mechanism for accountability in place. Sampanthan argued that
the government would never allow a credible outcome and was
unlikely to allow an international inquiry, pointing out the
GSL's past attempts to undermine accountability. Sampanthan
said the U.S. must use this opportunity to put extreme
pressure on the GSL, which would not pursue a political
solution otherwise. He said a reconciliation commission,
similar to South Africa's post-apartheid commission, would
not work in Sri Lanka because of cultural and political
differences, and because the government remained in power.
Sampanthan said his Tamil constituents believed
reconciliation could take place but it needed to be based on
a credible stance on human rights and a political settlement
that gave them some power. He said that implementing the
devolution of power in the 13th amendment would not
sufficiently address the concerns of his constituents.
5. (C) The Ambassador outlined the main points of the report
on incidents during the conflict and assured Sampanthan that
that GSL would need to respond in some way or its
COLOMBO 00000982 002.2 OF 002
relationships with the U.S. would continue to suffer. She
pointed out that some members of Congress already questioned
U.S. participation in the recent TIFA conference. She had
suggested to the GSL that its response to the report be
measured, rather than immediately rejecting it, which would
erode the government's credibility. Sampanthan said that the
GSL pointedly had disregarded him and in doing so, lost an
opportunity to engage with the Tamil populace. He posited
that Rajapaksa was not at ease with himself and that he had a
guilty conscience for how the war was conducted. The
Ambassador thanked Sampanthan and promised to deliver a copy
of the report to him once it was released.
COMMENT
--------------
6. (C) Sampanthan's Tamil constituents remain politically,
socially, and geographically divided and do not appear to
have formulated a new political strategy. His urging the
Ambassador to press the government to respond to accusations
of human rights violations is predictable and will likely
continue. Not surprisingly, the government's reluctance to
meaningfully engage with the TNA post-conflict and its
snubbing of the TNA leader aggravate ethnic tensions still
smarting from the war.
BUTENIS