SRI LANKA'S FOREIGN MINISTER SEES "DEVOLUTION"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000807

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA'S FOREIGN MINISTER SEES "DEVOLUTION"
ONLY AFTER SPRING ELECTIONS

REF: SECSTATE 69680

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Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JAMES R. MOORE. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)

1.(C) SUMMARY: In apparent response to recent Washington
statements on moving forward more quickly with political
reconciliation, FM Bogollagama called in Charge to present
detailed arguments as to why "devolution" had to wait until
after presidential (January) and parliamentary (spring)
elections. Charge presented the U.S. humanitarian
benchmarks. FM responded that the GSL was doing well in
meeting the benchmarks, but Charge underscored the importance
of formulating strategic plans for IDP returns and demining.
Bogollagama said a decision on the ICRC mandate rested with
him but was sketchy on details other than to say the ICRC
role would be different in the future. END SUMMARY.

CHARGE UNDERSCORES U.S. CONCERNS ON RETURNS AND RECONCILIATION
-------------- --------------


2. (C) On August 13, Foreign Minister Bogollagama called in
Charge for a wide-ranging discussion, with emphasis on the
issue of GSL plans on reconciliation. Although FM did not
say so directly, his request for a meeting appeared to be in
response to recent remarks on the issue of reconciliation in
Washington by A/S Blake. The meeting opened with Charge
reiterating U.S. concerns on the welfare and early return of
IDPs. Charge noted that while the international community
understood the importance of registering IDPs in the camps
before release, it was also important to move as quickly as
possible and suggested a partial release of those already
registered. FM responded that 9,800, mostly elderly, IDPs
had been released, but some had returned to the camps because
they had no one to take care of them and no place to go.


3. (C) Charge also underscored the importance of moving
forward as soon as possible with political reconciliation.
He argued that the end of the war created an excellent
opportunity to heal the deep wounds that had plagued the
country. President Rajapaksa's meetings with Tamil
politicians and businessmen were encouraging, but we were
disappointed that he and others in the GSL were now signaling
that reforms would be delayed until after the next election.
Sri Lankans had expectations to move forward sooner, he
argued. Additionally, if Tamils saw no progress, they could
become increasingly alienated and turn to terrorism.

NO DEVOLUTION UNTIL AFTER ELECTIONS
--------------


4. (C) Bogollagama conceded these were good points but then
went into a lengthy monologue on why political reform --
which he called "devolution" -- would have to wait until
after presidential and parliamentary elections. Devolution
was part of the constitution and the GSL was committed to
implementing it, he argued. The GSL would look at the many
devolution proposals that were expected to come from the
parliamentary committees. At the same time, however, the
president needed to strengthen his political base in
parliament before moving forward. The president's SLFP party
only held 55 seats in parliament (NOTE: The actual number is
57 of 225 total seats. END NOTE). While he now had the
support of coalition partners, past experience with the
budget demonstrated that this support could evaporate under
stress.


5. (C) The first step toward widening the president's base,
according to FM, was presidential elections, which would be
called in November for January. Parliamentary elections
would then be called later in the spring. Bogollagama
believed the president's party would win two thirds of the

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seats and would then be in a position to move forward with
devolution. Charge pushed back, noting that the president
right now commanded high popularity and that waiting until
spring on political reform risked that strong popular support
dissipating and Tamil discontent growing.

FM FAVORABLE ON BENCHMARKS, SKETCHY ON ICRC MANDATE
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Charge took the opportunity of the meeting to review
briefly the benchmarks on dealing with the humanitarian
situation approved by the Interagency Policy Committee
(reftel). Bogollagama went down the list and believed the
GSL was making significant progress in each area. Charge
noted, however, the importance of a GSL strategic plan for
the return of IDPs, which had not yet been forthcoming.
Moreover, there was no overall plan for demining. He argued
that both the GSL and the international community could
better focus their efforts if they had these plans. On the
ICRC mandate, the FM claimed the MFA had dealt with the issue
and the decision on its redefined mandate rested with him.
He provided no details but hinted that the ICRC would not
"have the same role in the future." Its role, he said, would
match the tasks that were still outstanding and some ICRC
staff might have to leave.

REQUEST FOR MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY
--------------


7. (SBU) Bogollagama reiterated his request, which he said
had already been passed to Department via the Sri Lankan
Embassy in Washington, for a meeting with the Secretary in
Washington during the period of September 22-30. FM would be
in New York for the UNGA during that timeframe but preferred
to meet the Secretary in Washington and would travel there at
her convenience.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) Bogollagama's insistence that political reform must
wait until after presidential and parliamentary elections is
disappointing but not surprising. We have been hearing some
of the same arguments from others in the GSL, and this now
appears to be the party line. The decision on the issue
rests with President Rajapaksa, however, not the FM. We will
look for opportunities to press the president to reconsider.
MOORE