The Way Forward in the North - A Serious Discussion about

UNCLAS COLOMBO 000621 SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/INSB, PRM, PM/WRA (NETLAND) STATE ALSO PASS TO USAID AID/W FOR ANE/SCA AID/W FOR DCHA/FFP FOR JDWORKEN, JBORNS AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA FOR ACONVERY, RTHAYER AND RKERR BANGKOK FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA WBERGER KATHMANDU FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA MROGERS AND POL SBERRY USMISSION GENEVA FOR NKYLOH USUN FOR ECOSOC DMERCADO E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM CE SUBJECT: The Way Forward in the North - A Serious Discussion about De-Mining and Returns ¶1. SUMMARY: Charge met with Presidential Advisor Basil Rajapaksa on June 15 to ask about Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) priorities for de-mining and to discuss how the U.S. Government (USG) could support those within a strategic framework. M.S. Jayasinghe, Chairman of the National Steering Committee for Mine Action, W.K.K. Kumarasiri, Secretary of the Ministry of Nation Building and Estate Infrastructure Development (M/NBEID) also attended, as well as USAID officer responsible for coordinating de-mining issues. The discussion included de-mining performance to date, the GSL's desire to create its own civilian humanitarian de-mining unit (HDU) within the Ministry of Nationbuilding, and Rajapaksa's thoughts on a strategic framework for de-mining to support returns in the North. The conversation also included prospects for an early release of the GSL "180-Day Plan" for the North, especially thoughts on how IDP returns would take place. In response to our suggestion, Rajapaksa instructed Mr. Kumarasiri to write a letter to the Embassy outlining the GSL's priorities for de-mining. He also agreed to joint work on a presentation due in two weeks that will outline a de-mining approach for the North incorporating priority geographic areas, an illustrative timetable, and coordination of roles for the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) and de-mining INGOs. End Summary. U.S. SUPPORT FOR A DE-MINING FRAMEWORK ¶2. State/WRA's proposal to contribute an additional $6 million in FY 2009 de-mining funds would make the USG the largest donor this year to de-mining operations in Sri Lanka. Given the importance of de-mining as a prerequisite for displaced people to return home, and the need to program these funds within a short timeframe, the Charge had requested this meeting to discuss the best use of these resources. To date, the GSL has issued task orders for de-mining on a piecemeal basis. This has proven inefficient, since it does not allow mine action NGOs to scale up their operations for a longer planning period. Charge wanted to emphasize the importance of operating within a forward-looking, strategic framework. GSL PRIORITIES FOR DE-MINING THE NORTH ¶3. Rajapaksa outlined what he saw as priorities for de-mining operations in the North. He spoke of the need to consider the Sri Lankan Army's (SLA's) three corridor advance, as it fought the LTTE - columns that moved northward from Mannar, Trincomalee, and Vavuniya. He said that a current priority of SLA de-miners was to gain access to communities by clearing the main roads in these corridors (A32 along the Mannar coast, A9 leading to Kilinochchi and Jaffna, and A34 and A35 leading into Mullaitivu District). Clearing mines along these main trunk roads allows infrastructure projects to take place, including road widening and the installation of electricity lines. He emphasized how important de-mining is to support economic reconstruction, particularly for specific projects likely to receive foreign assistance. Examples sited in Mannar District included potential World Bank funding of reconstruction work on the Giant's Tank and Japanese Peace Fund funding for work on the Akattimurripu Tank. He also described the JICA-funded transmission line leading north from Trincomalee, the irrigation canal leading to Jaffna from the Iranamadu Tank in Kilinochchi District (with possible Asia Development Bank financing),the Padawiya Wewa Tank in southern Mullaitivu District, and the Walawe Oya irrigation system of one of the Mahaweli River tributaries. Unrolling maps of the Northern Province's five districts, he pointed out areas of former high population density - such as Kilinochchi Town - as top priorities for de-mining. He emphasized that de-mining of population centers should include hospitals, schools, and government facilities, as well as housing. In contrast to the East, where people returned to their communities before the surrounding paddy fields had been cleared of contamination, Rajapaksa emphasized the importance of simultaneously clearing areas of important economic activity (paddy fields for farmers and access to the sea for fisher communities). He also pointed out Madhu Church on his map - an area heavily mined and a famous Catholic shrine that receives up to 500,000 pilgrims every year. ¶4. Charge then brought up the State Department's pending proposal of an additional $6 million in FY09 funding for de-mining and how to best utilize these resources. He suggested a phased approach emphasizing assessments and technical surveys to release large areas quickly for IDP returns, and defining the respective roles of the Army and international mine action NGOs. Rajapaksa took issue with the suggestion that the INGOs' work could be more productive if they were to begin with surveys of large areas of responsibility (such as Mannar District's Manthai West Division, which is approximately 600 square kilometers). He pointed out that much of the North is uninhabited jungle, and that technical surveys and de-mining operations need to be focused on the priority roads and larger towns. Although not opposed to assessments and technical surveys for identifying areas of low mine risk, Rajapaksa wanted to be sure that INGOs "did not bite off more than they could chew." He also said that the survey work of INGOs would have to rely mostly on SLA maps and army experience as to where minefields had been laid, since civilians had been herded out of conflict areas by the LTTE before its fighters had withdrawn, making civilian testimonies of mine placement out of date. HUMANITARIAN DE-MINING UNIT ¶5. Rajapaksa asked if some of the $6 million from PRM/WRA could be used to equip the nascent civilian HDU within the Nationbuilding Ministry (note: to be staffed largely by retired military personnel). He said that the HDU was, in part, a response to the Japanese Government's suggestion that a civilian de-mining capability be developed within the GSL. (Note: Japan recently announced an additional $1.5 million for de-mining operations in Sri Lanka, including funding for INGOs, andJapan has contributed significant resources for d-mining in the East.) Charge reiterated that Stte Department funds were to finance INGO operation, but that he would consult immediately with State/WRA to see if there was any flexibility. Charge also brought up a potential FMF contribution of up to $2 million to purchase de-mining equipment for the SLA, depending on the recommendations of the upcoming DoD demining mission. BATTLEFIELD AREA CLEARANCE IS NOT HUMANITARIAN DE-MINING ¶6. Rajapaksa again referred to a Nationbuilding Ministry-prepared table that showed that from 2002 to date 75 percent of mine clearance had been performed by the Army (75 percent) and another 10 percent by an Indian mine action NGO, Horizon. EmbOffs pointed out that Battlefield Area Clearance (BAC) was in no way comparable to humanitarian de-mining. Rajapaksa responded that the SLA works faster - and longer hours. One of his advisors added, "SLA de-miners start at eight o'clock in the morning and end each day at four in the afternoon. INGOs begin at ten and end at two. INGO demining teams stand down for one week, after three weeks of work, whereas the army never stops." CONCRETE STEPS TOWARD A FRAMEWORK ¶7. Rajapaksa agreed to two U.S. suggestions to better define the contributions of the SLA and INGOs to humanitarian de-mining operations in the North. First, he committed to have the GSL send a letter to Charge outlining GSL priorities for de-mining the North. This will help planners work within a strategic framework that addresses the Government's priorities for returns. The second suggestion was that - taking advantage of the upcoming DoD assessment - the SLA and INGOs meet to define their roles and relative strengths, and to develop a collaborative approach to addressing the de-mining priorities in the North. Rajapaksa agreed to prepare a presentation of this approach in two weeks' time. RETURNS -- HARD TO PIN DOWN ¶8. The discussion turned to returns and GSL plans for addressing the priority recovery needs in the North. Rajapaksa stated that the Government's return policy is "first displaced, first to return." This is consistent with suggestions in other fora that the GSL's return strategy may be a comprehensive one that includes people displaced from their homes in the North over the past several years, and not only the roughly 280,000 IDPs displaced since last October by the conflict. Rajapaksa indicated that there were already 100,000 people living in Mannar District, another 100,000 in Vavuniya District, and 559,000 in Jaffna District, in addition to the IDPs in the Vavuniya camps. These people, he said, should be given priority consideration in terms of reconstruction planning. ¶9. The Government has requested all ministries to draft recovery/reconstruction plans for the North. By sector, these plans address the priority needs of the first 180 days, and then a two-year time period. Rajapaksa proceeded to thumb through several preliminary drafts of these sector plans, pointing out priority projects for ports, electricity, irrigation, health, and others. He mentioned that he would be traveling the next day to Vavuniya to speak directly with district authorities about their 180 day and two-year priorities, and that he would be making similar trips to discuss the priorities of other districts of the North. By the end of June, he expected to have the sector plans fully vetted and consolidated. The Charge encouraged him to share these plans with the international community within the shortest possible timeframe. ¶10. Rajapaksa also touched on conditions in the Vavuniya IDP camps. From a returns standpoint, he said that it was important that returns take place, as soon as possible, to all five districts. Otherwise, he thought that it would be psychologically hard for people to see others returning to one or two districts (for example to Mannar or Jaffna),with no returns to their own districts (for example, Mullaitivu). He said that it was important for people in the camps to feel engaged and to be suitably prepared for rebuilding their lives at home. He talked about the importance of vocational training, for example to help with shelter construction. He suggested that a shift to temporary shelters in the camps - those of wooden poles and tin roofs - would be practical not only for immediate shelter needs in the camps, but also as part of the package for families who return. He lamented that a few individuals and international organizations were making statements and assumptions about the GSL's long-term intentions for these IDPs, when, in reality, the GSL wanted them to return as soon as possible - with appropriate skills to aid their reconstruction and recovery. COMMENT ¶11. Charge asked whether the GSL had any concrete goals for returns by the end of 2009. Rajapaksa said, "If we can finish de-mining, we'll return everyone by then. It depends on whether we get the equipment we need." We found this an unfortunate way to end what was otherwise a serious and constructive meeting, typical of GSL responses to the international community's repeated requests for the GSL to disclose its timetable and strategy for the returns of its displaced people in the North. However, Rajapaksa articulated clear and defensible priorities for de-mining. He welcomed that that the USG is ready to commit substantial resources to support de-mining efforts, but remains skeptical that the INGOs will perform at the speed required. We are concerned that this will set the stage for the GSL to blame the INGOs if de-mining proceeds at a pace short of expectations. Since humanitarian mine action agencies are to focus on people, and not economic assets, Rajapaksa's list of infrastructure priorities for de-mining may be somewhat at odds with the mission of mine action INGOs. This illustrates the importance of better defining roles of the INGOs and SLA. His willingness to share the GSL's priorities in written form is a positive signal. ¶12. COMMENT CONTINUED: The next two weeks will be important, as post and the DoD assessment team work with the SLA and INGOs to develop guidelines for roles and closer cooperation. PRM/WRA's anticipated grants to mine action INGOs are therefore very timely. The challenge will be to incorporate these resources into an overall GSL de-mining framework and to get started while avoiding bureaucratic delays. Embassy staff will need to play an active role as facilitators among the different players such as the SLA, the Nationbuilding Ministry, and UNDP. Although there was no mention of a "returns framework" the meeting offered hope that the GSL is sincere about people returning home as soon as conditions are right. Factors discussed included a) the speed of de-mining operations, b) the need for returns to all districts, c) the importance of meeting the needs of the entire displaced population of the North, not just the 280,000 Vanni IDPs, and d) the soon-to-be-disclosed 180-Day Plan, as an indicator of what the Government views as priority conditions for returns and recovery. Each of these factors has political overtones, reflecting their complexity and the continuing uncertainty around how and when returns will actually occur. MOORE