SRI LANKA: NEED FOR RAPID PROGRESS IN RESOLVING

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000573 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA (BOUCHER),SCA/INS AND PRM STATE ALSO PASS USAID AID/W FOR ANE/SCA, DCHA/FFP (DWORKEN, KSHEIN) AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA (MORRISP, ACONVERY, RTHAYER, RKERR) ATHENS FOR PCARTER BANGKOK FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA (WBERGER) KATHMANDU FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA AND POL (SBERRY) GENEVA FOR RMA (NKYLOH, NHILGERT, MPITOTTI) USUN NEW YORK FOR ECOSOC (D MERCADO) SECDEF FOR OSD - POLICY PACOM ALSO FOR J-5 E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREF MOPS PHUM PGOV PREL ASEC CE ECON SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: NEED FOR RAPID PROGRESS IN RESOLVING HUMANITARIAN CRISIS REF: A) COLOMBO 474 B) 2008 COLOMBO 1071 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: USAID/OFDA and PRM officers' monitoring of Vavuniya area sites for internally-displaced persons (IDPs) on May 18-22 revealed the post-May 15 outflow of civilians from the conflict severely stretched the Government's capacity to respond. While US-funded UN agencies and INGOs are aiding the Government in providing life-saving assistance, the Government's heightened security concerns have resulted in restrictive conditions on humanitarian assistance. The primary expected outcome of UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon's May 22-23 visit, unfettered UN access to the camps, was not realized, however agencies are working out compromises on access. If screening for LTTE is not carried out expeditiously, the continued confinement of men, women, and children in these restrictive sites will raise serious concerns. Post recommends close attention to a timeline to ensure U.S. humanitarian funding does not enable a long-term, confined camp environment which violates international humanitarian principles as well as the Sri Lankan constitution. ACTION REQUEST: Please see paragraphs 12-14. END SUMMARY. OFDA AND PRM MONITORING; GOVERNMENT NEEDS OUTSIDE AID, BUT CREATING RESTRICTIONS -------------- ¶2. (U) USAID OFDA Regional Advisor and PRM Regional Deputy RefCoord visited Vavuniya on May 18-22 to survey response to the final outflow of roughly 80,000-90,000 IDPs from the conflict zone. Officers monitored US-funded assistance, particularly to IOM and UNHCR, and discussed a potential donor coordination strategy with officers from the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the European Commission's Humanitarian Office (ECHO). ¶3. (U) The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports that 286,721 persons fled the final phase of conflict from October 27, 2008 through May 22, 2009. Many now reside in the massive new camp at Manik Farm, soon to gain the dubious title of largest camp for displaced persons in the world. SPHERE standards are not yet being met given severe overcrowding and nascent health and sanitation systems. There are no data available on crude mortality or morbidity rates; anecdotal evidence indicates high malnutrition rates among new arrivals. ¶4. (U) The Government maintains a heavy military presence at the Manik Farm sites, including armed soldiers in and around the zones, concertina wire ringing the sites, and multiple checkpoints on all roads. The camps are located on former forest land remote from any major towns. Government registration of camp residents continues but only summary data is shared with UN agencies, precluding efforts to reunite families split between different locations. International visitors are not permitted to speak at length with camp residents, and are prohibited from taking any photographs. ¶5. (U) Officers observed the Government's efforts to catch up to COLOMBO 00000573 002 OF 004 the influx through military razing of forest land. Roughly 20-30 acres of new land was cleared per day in Zone 4 and officers witnessed IOM and UNHCR efforts to erect approximately 600 two-family shelters per day as arrivals were coming in. Government buses continued bringing new arrivals to the sites as soon as shelters were erected; officers heard from an aid worker that 300 unaccompanied minors were staying in three tents. OCHA reports that even once Zone 4 is entirely cleared (estimated within two weeks) and the maximum number of shelters are put in place, there will still be overcrowding. UNHCR plans to push for more land in other districts and an expansion of Zone 4, as well as the release of individuals to live with host families in order to ease overcrowding. ¶6. (U) The health response is much improved from the late April 2009 visit by USAID Mission Director and OFDA Regional Advisor (Ref A); each Manik Farm zone now has a medical clinic staffed by Sri Lankan doctors and nurses, and ample bed space is available at both established and field hospitals in the region. However, patients must get to the clinics, as there is no health surveillance system in place conducting shelter-to-shelter visits; in some zones shelters may be over a mile from the nearest clinic and staffing is still inadequate. WHO and the Ministry of Health have yet to begin immunizations for children; measles is among the largest killers of children in camps worldwide, and vaccination rate is unknown here. Officers witnessed obvious war wounds among new arrivals at health clinics and hospitals, in particular persons with feet or hands entirely bandaged, including children and the elderly. Officers heard from health workers that post-May 15 arrivals from the conflict zone presented with fresh war wounds. ¶7. (U) OCHA and UNHCR have recently sent two senior level (P5) officials to Vavuniya to coordinate the UN response effort. OCHA's Mark Cutts and UNHCR's Johann Siffointe have already made important steps in consolidating UN positions and raising the profile of field-level concerns. OFDA Regional Advisor recommended the UN consult more closely with INGOs to ensure all aid agencies are involved in a unified platform, and avoid fractious tensions between agencies. ¶8. (U) Officers visited Zone 2 on foot during the vehicle restriction on May 21. Many new latrines have been constructed to improve poor sanitation conditions; however, stagnant pools of water and uncollected garbage remain. (Note: trench latrines, which have been the standard, are purportedly not used due to rumors that they are dangerous.) Non-food relief items were plentiful, and soda was available in a camp market; however residents' queues for water (via spaces reserved by jerry cans) numbered well over one hundred, as water tankers had not yet replenished the day's supply. ¶9. (SBU) The International Committee of the Red Cross has decided that it will not remain involved with assistance in Manik Farm sites so long as the Government's encampment is not time-bound and as long as restrictions on protection activities continue. (Note: A water plant set up by the ICRC will continue to provide enough water for COLOMBO 00000573 003 OF 004 up to 30,000 Manik Farm residents per day.) ICRC plans to continue monitoring of detainees and support of general health facilities but will not assist displaced persons camps. ACCESS RESTRICTIONS MAY BE EASED -------------- ¶10. (SBU) During the officers' monitoring visit, aid agencies eagerly awaited the May 22-23 visit of UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, believing the Government would agree to Ban's request for unfettered humanitarian access. (Note: the restrictions since May 16 restricting entry to only those vehicles with military escort stemmed in part from reports that INGO local staff attempted to smuggle IDPs out of the camps. End note.) However, the Government rebuffed the request. An influential local NGO reports that the Government had been prepared to ease the access restrictions during the UN SYG visit, but changed its mind after 14 NGOs released a letter criticizing the restrictions. ¶11. (SBU) While the issue of UN and INGO access to Manik Farm was not resolved during the UN Secretary General's visit, agencies have been working out a compromise in the field. Aid agencies are now able to access the camps provided insignia on vehicles are removed and provided the vehicles are transporting relief materials in the camps. (Protection and monitoring activities alone are still effectively barred, though protection staff can enter with aid deliveries.) If Government-imposed access restrictions hamper life-saving assistance in the future, Post will further engage the Government on this issue as needed. US RESPONSE PLANNING -------------- ¶12. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: The immediate issue of Government restrictions on UN and INGO access threaten to overshadow longer-term concerns on the militarized nature of the camps and on lack of freedom of movement for its residents, who are citizens entitled to rights under the Sri Lankan Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),which Sri Lanka has ratified. Senior Government officials have pledged on multiple occasions to return 80% of the camp residents to the North by the end of CY 2009; however, other signals indicate the camps will remain for 2-3 years. UNHCR, the UN lead for camp management, has communicated its concerns and expectations regarding the sites in official correspondence with the Government and in private conversations with senior leaders on many occasions. It is likely, however, the goalposts will shift without close attention by donor governments. The Government's screening of 800 residents confined in two camps in Mannar district, Kalimoddai and Sirukandal (Ref B), has been ongoing for fourteen months, providing basis for concern that the rapid screening of 300,000 new arrivals is beyond the Government's capacity absent significant effort and the commitment of new resources to expedite the screening process. COLOMBO 00000573 004 OF 004 ¶13. (SBU) Post recommends that Department conduct a review of the humanitarian situation as of August 31, 2009. Post anticipates Government achievement of the following goals within three months: 1) registration of camp residents completed, families scattered among sites reunited; 2) combatants identified and separated from camp population; 3) some individuals released to live with host families; 4) significant demining efforts underway in the North; and 5) start of returns to the North to certified mine-free areas. If the above steps are not achieved, the Department should signal to the Government that future USG assistance within the camps hinges upon demonstrated progress. The U.S. Government would communicate its intention to discontinue direct support within the camps by the end of the year. (Note: US support for demining, IDP returns, and rehabilitation efforts in the North would continue regardless of the decision on funding within the camps). ¶14. (SBU) Post recommends that Department liaise with UN agencies to ensure that CY 2010 Sri Lanka planning assumes a significant percentage of displaced Sri Lankans are returnees. UN planning should be on the basis of the Government's pledge to return a significant number of the IDPs by end of CY 2009, which will require ample resources into 2010. Senior Government officials have repeatedly stated that 80% of camp residents will be returned to the North by the end of CY 2009. Most recently, the Government committed to 100,000 returns by end of 2009 as part of the UN Common Humanitarian Action Plan mid-year review. UN agency appeals should permit the US and other donors to allocate resources appropriately, for example, to support assistance packages for IDPs returning to the North, while being assured the same contributions are not also continuing a long-term camp system. If significant returns (or release to host families where demining needs prevent returns) take place by the end of CY 2009, the US and the UN may determine that continued aid within the camps is still appropriate. Post suggests the Department establish a goal (perhaps 25% of new IDPs returned or released to host families by the end of calendar year 2009) as an internal measure of progress which will guide funding decisions. END ACTION REQUEST. MOORE