SRI LANKA: IN FAREWELL, AMBASSADOR PRESSES HARD ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000563 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL MOPS CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: IN FAREWELL, AMBASSADOR PRESSES HARD ON HUMANITARIAN ACCESS AND POLITICAL SOLUTION Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JAMES R. MOORE. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In his round of farewell calls on Sri Lankan government officials, Ambassador Blake emphasized that having won the war against "Tamil Tiger" terrorism, the Sri Lankan government now needed to consolidate its victory by "winning the peace." Ambassador noted that following the military defeat of the LTTE, it was time for the government to address political concerns of the Tamils, including Sri Lanka's poor human rights record. It could do this by making good on its commitments to treat conflict-displaced persons fairly and return them rapidly to their homes, by seeking dialogue with its Tamil population on a political solution and by reaching out to the principal opposition party to ensure support for constitutional changes that would be necessary to implement devolution to the provinces. Ambassador strongly pressed the Sri Lanka government to cooperate with the UN and other international humanitarian agencies to provide access and treatment meeting international standards to Sri Lanka's nearly 300,000 newly displaced persons. He stressed that evidence of a firm commitment to early returns of the conflict victims to their original homes would help make it possible for the U.S. to contribute to longer-term stabilization and recovery programs in the country's war-torn north. An improvement in the human rights environment in Sri Lanka would also bring about an overall improvement in our bilateral relations, including a return to more normal levels of military-to-military cooperation. End summary. AMBASSADOR PRESSES ON HUMANITARIAN ACCESS -------------- ¶2. (C) In a meeting on May 18 with Foreign Minister Bogollagama and Foreign Secretary Palitha Kohona, Ambassador stressed the importance of facilitating a visit to the former "No-Fire Zone" by UN Secretary General's Chief of Staff Vijay Nambiar with the ICRC, in particular to ensure that any remaining wounded civilians receive medical treatment, but also to show the international community that Sri Lanka has nothing to hide. Ambassador said it was crucial to work with the UN and ICRC with the goal of meeting the government's commitment to return the majority of IDPs to their homes by the end of 2009. He proposed that a good start would be to issue identity cards to all IDPs in one of the camps, allow them freedom of movement, and then use that as a template for the other camps. This would show progress to the outside world, and to Sri Lankan Tamils and the Tamil Diaspora in particular. ¶3. (SBU) In a separate meeting on May 18, Ambassador asked Minister of Disaster Management and Human Rights Mahinda Samarasinghe to work closely with the ICRC and UN SYG Chief of Staff Vijay Nambiar to ensure the large numbers of wounded in the "No-Fire Zone" receive immediate care. Close cooperation between the GSL, UN and ICRC would be critical in the days and months ahead, he noted. Ambassador asked that GSL facilitate a visit by Nambiar and ICRC to the former "No-Fire Zone." ¶4. (C) Ambassador also raised the issue of humanitarian access with Minister for Export Development and International Trade G.L. Peiris. Peiris expressed the government's dissatisfaction with many in the international community who, rather than celebrating the GSL's monumental achievement, were only criticizing the government. Peiris believed that the press over-emphasized the importance of the role of the international community, the UN, and NGOs. He stressed that measures undertaken within the UN should be consensual, not coercive. Concerning the UN Human Rights Council's Special Session on Sri Lanka, Peiris commented "it will not lead anywhere." He was confident that Sri Lanka could muster the votes to defeat any resolution it did not agree with. Peiris noted that the displacement problem in Sri Lanka was an internal one. As the displaced persons did not meet the COLOMBO 00000563 002 OF 004 legal definition of refugees, it was by definition not an international problem in Sri Lanka. There was therefore some question as to how much the UN should be involved. DEATHS OF LTTE LEADERS: UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS -------------- ¶5. (C) Ambassador asked Bogollagama and Kohona about the attempts by LTTE leaders Nadesan and Pulidevan to surrender on the morning of May 18, and the circumstances of their deaths on that day. Foreign Secretary Kohona claimed that although Nadesan and Pulidevan had made a number of phone calls to intermediaries about their desire to surrender, they had then done nothing to indicate on the ground that they were surrendering, such as raising a white flag. (Note: Kohona subsequently contradicted this in remarks to the media, in which he stated that Nadesan and Pulidevan had been shot by the LTTE in the act of surrendering to Sri Lankan forces. End note.) ¶6. (C) Ambassador also requested that Samarasinghe specifically follow up on what happened to LTTE leaders Nadesan and Pulidevan, as they were reported to be trying to surrender, and were then reported dead. Samarasinghe said no details of the situation were confirmed yet, but that he would look into it. Ambassador suggested it would be best to investigate and find out what really happened. Ambassador also asked Samarasinghe to follow up on the status and well-being of four doctors and the Additional Government Agent who had remained inside the conflict zone to treat wounded civilians and coordinate aid shipments, and who had furnished information about civilian casualties to the UN and international media. He urged the doctors be well treated and released as soon as possible. NEED OF THE HOUR IS A POLITICAL SOLUTION -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Ambassador told all his Sri Lankan interlocutors that the Tamils needed a political system that accorded them a life of respect and dignity, and the ability to choose their own leaders. Whether this came through some sort of application of the 13th Amendment or some other means, it was necessary to show steps were being taken to address these larger political concerns. ¶8. (SBU) In his farewell call on President Rajapaksa on May 20, Ambassador stressed that the reconciliation phase must include two vital components: the humanitarian side - providing the IDPs with what they need and resettling them expeditiously - and the political side - power-sharing arrangements to give Tamils assurance of a future with hope and dignity. This was the way to defeat terrorism for good. The Ambassador encouraged the GSL to think about how to engage with Tamil representatives. Ambassador said it was particularly important to reach out to the Tamil Diaspora so they would stop supporting the LTTE. The President said the basis of his devolution plan would be the "13th amendment plus 1" - meaning implementation of the existing constitutional provisions for provincial councils, but adding an upper house to Parliament, modeled on the U.S. Senate. ¶9. (C) However, the President said that the Tamil National Alliance (the largest Tamil party in Parliament) was a problem. He did not know "if they were happy with it." The President thought that giving police powers to the provinces, as the TNA and others were demanding, would cause problems. He said that responsibility for prosecuting and punishing serious crimes against society - he specifically mentioned murder and rape - should be handled by the Sri Lankan state. He noted that the incumbent Supreme Court Justice had already decentralized the court system. Ambassador asked whether one step to ensure devolution of power to the provinces would be to abolish the concurrent list of powers to be shared by the COLOMBO 00000563 003 OF 004 center and the provinces, instead giving the provinces primary responsibility. Rajapaksa replied that "we,ve been thinking about this but haven't decided yet." Ambassador urged the President to bring Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe on board for the constitutional changes, for which a two-thirds majority is necessary. Rajapaksa made light of the possibility of cooperation with the main opposition party, hinting that "we're thinking of holding an election soon." (Note: the earliest President Rajapaksa could hold Presidential elections in November 2009.) ¶10. (SBU) The Ambassador told Minister Samarasinghe that a constructive political solution meant representation for Tamil citizens, by politicians with real popular support. He noted longer-term U.S. reconstruction assistance would depend in part on political progress and whether legitimate Tamil representatives exercised power in Tamil-majority areas. Ambassador stated there might even be persons inside the IDP camps who could emerge as effective political leaders. Ambassador offered U.S. assistance in ensuring the IDP camps were operated in accordance with international standards, and that no problems emerged there. He stressed that resettlement must occur rapidly, and that the U.S. was ready to assist with humanitarian demining programs. Samarasinghe said GSL was aware it needed to address the Tamil Diaspora, and that this group was "highly motivated." He spoke of this as a "golden opportunity" to address Tamils both inside and outside the country, and said he expected that the tone would be set by the President's scheduled speech to Parliament on May 19. ¶11. (C) The Ambassador recommended to G.L. Peiris that he and other moderates in the government advocate for concrete steps to move forward, including implementing the 13th Amendment, reaching out to opposition leader Ranil Wickremesinghe to seek the support of the United National Party for necessary constitutional changes to further the devolution process, and starting a genuine dialogue with Sri Lanka's Tamils. Ambassador observed that among the symbolic gestures the government could use to send a powerful signal would be to appoint an independent senior Tamil as a special advisor to the President. Ambassador pointed out that the IDPs currently interned in camps represented a large block of voters. The President would do well to establish representative committees of residents of the IPD camps and listen carefully to their concerns. Finally, the government should set up some sort of truth and reconciliation commission to help the healing process. Peiris opined that while a truth and reconciliation process may be cathartic, it is not always positive. Timing is key, he said, and he was not sure Sri Lanka was ready for it yet. HUMAN RIGHTS AND MEDIA FREEDOM -------------- ¶12. (C) In his meetings with the President and with Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa, Ambassador emphasized that our military-to-military relations would benefit greatly if we could solve the problem of child soldiers serving with the paramilitaries. The Defense Secretary said that releasing the child soldiers was part of the process of disarming all the paramilitaries, which had now begun. The LTTE no longer existed, so the police, not militias, could provide security to the leaders of these groups ) who were now ordinary politicians. ¶13. (C) Ambassador said that an improvement in Sri Lanka's poor human rights environment was also imperative for reconciliation and long-term peace in Sri Lanka. It would also be important to see an easing up of pressure on independent media, and an end to extrajudicial killings and disappearances, especially since all these had particularly affected Tamil populations. Ambassador said it was equally important to stop extrajudicial killings and disappearances, COLOMBO 00000563 004 OF 004 and disarm all paramilitaries, particularly those in Vavuniya. Further, he stressed it was time to turn the corner on media freedom. A free press was essential to the functioning of democracy. ¶14. (C) The President responded that slain editor Lasantha Wickrematunge was a friend of his, and claimed he was also a source who had provided information on the opposition and civil society. He and the Defense Secretary noted that relations with the government and the media were now much improved, with the press "way ahead of us" in praising the government's successful conclusion of the war. The President opined that the opposition "Daily Mirror" had the best presentation of his victory speech in Parliament, superior to that of the government-owned newspapers. PRESS CONFERENCE -------------- ¶15. (U) In his final comments to the media, Ambassador noted that the wounds of a twenty-six-year conflict would take time to heal. He noted that Tamils who lived in the LTTE-controlled areas had endured great hardships. He emphasized the critical importance of meeting the needs of nearly 300,000 newly displaced people, and for access by the UN, ICRC and other organizations to help them. He called for them to have freedom of movement and to be able to return to their homes quickly. Crucial for reconciliation would be a political framework to address the aspirations of minorities: "To achieve the promise of this new beginning and to ensure a lasting end to terrorism, bold actions are needed now to share power and to assure all of Sri Lanka's communities a future of hope, respect and dignity." MOORE