SRI LANKA: FEW RESULTS FROM HIGH-LEVEL VISITS

C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 000479 STATE FOR SCA/INSB E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREF PREL CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: FEW RESULTS FROM HIGH-LEVEL VISITS Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James R. Moore for reasons 1.4 b and d ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Successive visits by UN Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes, UK Development Minister Mike Foster, UK Foreign Secretary Miliband and French Foreign Minister Kouchner, as well as frequent high-level contacts by Charge with GSL have yielded no progress on getting a UN security team into the No-Fire Zone (NFZ) or achieve a humanitarian pause in fighting. Japanese FM Akashi was expected to arrive April 30 for a three-day visit. President Rajapaksa announced the end of combat operations at mid-day on April 27, and in particular the end of the use of heavy caliber guns, combat aircraft and aerial weapons, but sources inside and outside the NFZ say this pledge has not been kept. President Rajapaksa told Holmes on Monday that medicine would be allowed into the NFZ on the ICRC medevac ferry. GSL is promising better cooperation and coordination on aid for IDPs, and some limited progress has been seen on allowing international aid into the IDP camps. However GSL appears intent on taking control of the entire NFZ militarily, whatever the cost to civilians still there. The GSL shows no signs of honoring an agreement to Nambiar and the UN SG to allow a UN team into the NFZ to try to obtain a release of civilians from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). End Summary. JOHN HOLMES VISIT -------------- ¶2. (SBU) UN Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes visited IDP camps and met with President Rajapaksa on April 27 to press for access for a UN team into the NFZ to negotiate with the LTTE for their surrender and/or a release of civilians. Results were disappointing, with only an agreeement to allow medicine into the NFZ on the ICRC medical evacuation ferry, which happened April 28. Although President Rajapaksa announced the end of combat operations at mid-day on April 27, and in particular the end of the use of heavy caliber guns, combat aircraft and aerial weapons, sources both inside and outside the NFZ reported casualties April 28-30 from continued use of such weapons, and many other casualties from the use of smaller weapons. UK AND FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTERS TEAM UP -------------- ¶3. (C) UK Foreign Secretary Miliband and French Foreign Minister Kouchner arrived on April 29, visited the Manik Farm �0A;IDP site and the new French field hospital, and met with senior GSL leadership. At the conclusion of his visit, Miliband asked Charge to convey the following points back to the Department. First, it appeared very difficult for anyone to get accurate information about what is actually happening on the ground. President Rajapaksa himself appeared poorly informed about ground realities. Second, the President appeared increasingly worried about the opinion of the international community, in particular with regard to the IMF stand-by loan and the GSP negotiations with the EU. There is as yet no evidence that this concern on his behalf will translate into concrete positive steps from GSL. Third, Rajapaksa is beginning to focus on a political way forward along the lines of the 13th Amendment-plus. ¶4. (C) British Deputy High Commissioner reported to Charge that Miliband and Kouchner focused on three main issues - a ceasefire, access to IDPs and a timetable for IDP returns. They made a strong push with the President, Foreign Minister and Defense Secretary for a ceasefire to allow civilians out and humanitarian aid in. The GSL was steadfast in its opposition to a ceasefire, saying the LTTE was nearly defeated and a ceasefire would only allow the LTTE to regroup. ¶5. (C) In all their meetings with the GSL, Miliband and Kouchner pushed for full access to IDP camps for humanitarian workers and for treatment of IDPs that meets international humanitarian standards. They raised the problems of non-issuance of visas for ICRC staff and military checkpoint blockages of aid shipments to the camps. The President appeared to be unaware of such problems and turned to the FM for clarification. The President committed to better cooperation with the UN and NGOs and to greater access to IDP transit sites. At Miliband's suggestion, the President agreed to meet with the UN and ICRC resident representatives to discuss these concerns. ¶6. (C) Miliband and Kouchner stressed the need for a month-by-month plan with benchmarks for returning IDPs to their homes. This would enable the international community to work with and support GSL in meeting these targets. Although the main focus was on more immediate concerns, they also encouraged the President to articulate a political proposal and way forward. SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER "DISINVITED" -------------- ¶7. (C) Miliband and Kouchner told the President that the denial of permission for Swedish Foreign Minister Bildt to accompany them would not help Sri Lanka's standing in the EU, particularly since Sweden was set to take over the EU Presidency. (Note: A decision on renewal of GSP for Sri Lanka will be made by the EU during Sweden's Presidency.) The UK's Deputy High Commissioner told Charge privately he felt the decision to block Bildt's visit was taken by Bogollagama in part because a visit he hoped to make to Sweden earlier this year did not materialize. An additional consideration may have been the size of the delegation coming on April 29. JAPANESE FM AKASHI UP NEXT -------------- ¶8. (C) Japanese FM Akashi will arrive on April 30 for a three day visit, including flying to the Manik Farm IDP site the morning of May 1, meeting with Basil Rajapaksa that afternoon, and then meeting with President Rajapaksa the morning of May 2. He was to see the Co-Chair Ambassadors the evening of May 2 to brief them on his meetings with GSL. CHARGE PRESSES GSL -------------- ¶9. (C) Charge met seperately during the week with Foreign Minister Bogollagama, Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Senior Presidential Advisor Basil Rajapaksa and Foreign Secretary Kohona to reinforce these joint messages. He noted that while the April 27 announcement of an end to combat operations was a positive step, the military must abide by its commitment to refrain from aerial bombing and the use of heavy weapons. He expressed deep concern over continued civilian casualties. He reiterated our messages on conditions for IDPs, humanitarian access to transit sites, and the need for publicly announced benchmarks for the return of IDPs to their homes. UNFRIENDLY GSL FOLLOW-UP TO MILIBAND/KOUCHNER VISIT -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) On April 30, the day after FMs Miliband and Kouchner were in Colombo, Foreign Minister Bogollagama called in UN Resident Representative Neil Buhne and the UK and French Heads of Mission to complain that the figures Miliband and Kouchner cited for the casualties in the NFZ were inaccurate and deliberately misleading. In the government's view, the UN provided these numbers on the basis of incorrect information provided by two government medical authorities and the Assistant Government Agent in the NFZ, whom the government feels are under intense pressure from the LTTE. Buhne defended the accuracy of the figures, maintaining they were the best estimates available. FM Bogollagama also questioned the alleged violations of the GSL's commitment not to use heavy weapons inside the NFZ, and called Chief of Defense Staff Donald Perera who maintained that heavy weapons had not been used. ¶11. (C) Foreign Secretary Kohona briefed Charge on the April 30 meeting. Charge cautioned Kohona that GSL was suffering from a major credibility problem in foreign capitals. The Charge told Kohona it was incumbent on the GSL to make good on its commitments and provide credible figures of its own rather than shooting the messenger. ¶12. (C) COMMENT: The week's procession of high-level visitors carrying consistent messages left the government with no doubt of the international community's consensus on the need to halt combat operations and prevent further large scale casualties in the NFZ. Their messages on international access to IDPs at each stage in the transfer process from the no-fire zone to transit sites, conditions in and access to the transit sites, and the importance of early returns were equally clear. Even as it appeared to realize the possible costs of its actions, the government did not blink in its resolve to continue military operations in the NFZ until the remaining territory comes under its control and the last LTTE leaders still there are captured or killed. End Comment. MOORE