EMBASSY COLOMBO EAC MEETING 04/01/2009

UNCLAS COLOMBO 000383 SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/RD/SCA, DS/IP/OPO/FPD, DS/C/PSP/DEAV E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC CASC PTER SUBJECT: EMBASSY COLOMBO EAC MEETING 04/01/2009 REF: A. COLOMBO 349 ¶B. STATE 23498 ¶C. COLOMBO 309 ¶D. POST SECURITY PROGRAM REVIEW CLOSING REPORT MEMO DATED 01/28/2009 ¶E. 08 COLOMBO 489 ¶F. 12 FAM 380 ¶G. 12 FAH-6 H-522 This message contains an action request (see para. 8) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: AmEmbassy Colombo convened an Emergency Action Committee (EAC) meeting on April 1, 2009. The EAC discussed post's residential security policy and the provision of static guards at residences, as well as a newly-drafted armored vehicle policy. The EAC concurred that no specific threats to any embassy personnel existed that would put them at extreme risk. Therefore, no embassy residences needed static guards if the residences received mobile patrol services. The EAC approved the armored vehicle policy. The EAC recommended that RSO seek approval and funding for one additional roving patrol and that RSO request two additional armored vehicles. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) On April 1, 2009, AmEmbassy Colombo convened an EAC meeting. Present for the meeting were the Deputy Chief of Mission, Regional Security Officer, Regional Affairs Officer, Political Officer, Economic Officer, Management Officer, Consular Officer, Public Affairs Officer, Acting USAID Director, Defense Attache', Marine Security Guard Detachment Commander, International Broadcasting Bureau Station Chief, Community Liaison Officer, General Services Officer, USAID Executive Officer, and the Medical Officer. The agenda items for the meeting were: -- The provision of static guards at residences, in excess of residential security standards and requirements -- RSO's proposed armored vehicle (AV) policy ¶3. (SBU) With reference to the static guard issue, the RSO advised the EAC that, absent the existence of a direct and credible threat to any particular Embassy officer, assigning static guards to a residence was not necessary and exceeded residential security standards. The RSO further noted that at post's threat levels (high for both political violence and crime),only the EMR, DCR and MSG BEQ (Marine House) receive residential security guard coverage, per applicable Overseas Security Policy Board standards. All other residences receive extensive physical security upgrades, have residential security alarms that notify a central alarm monitoring station, and receive mobile patrol services. The RSO counseled the EAC that these measures were more than sufficient to counter the actual threats (if any) to Americans and their residences. He added that three residences of International Broadcasting Bureau officers did have static guards because these residences were too far from the Embassy to receive mobile patrol coverage. ¶4. (SBU) The RSO told the EAC that his police sources had no information leading them to believe that a threat existed to any American citizens, other than the possibility of being caught in proximity to an attack on a "traditional" target of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In fact, RSO's police sources averred that the LTTE was too sophisticated and too concerned about its image with the international community to risk attacking American citizens (especially Embassy officers) intentionally. Other EAC members with sources within the host government security services agreed that they had no information regarding a specific threat to any Embassy personnel. The Defense Attache (DATT) asked to go on the record as opposing any decision to limit residential security services to the minimum that the standards require. The DATT averred that in an atmosphere of uncertainty over what the future holds, as regards to possible risks to Americans, the Embassy should provide residential security services that exceed standards, vice merely meet standards. The EAC concluded ultimately that the security environment did not warrant the provision of guards to any residences except for the residences described in para. 3 above. ¶5. (SBU) POL commented that the patrols were sometimes unable to reach residences within a reasonable time frame (five to ten minutes) at night. POL recounted an incident during which he called for assistance late one night and the patrol unit had not arrived for more than 20 minutes. When the patrol finally arrived, the guards told him that Sri Lankan security personnel had stopped them at a roadblock and searched their vehicle, therefore delaying their arrival. The RSO advised the EAC that when he arrived in Colombo in 2007, one patrol operated during the day and three operated at night (one 12/7 daytime, three 12/7 at night). The RSO said that since most attacks and criminal incidents had occurred during the daytime since his arrival at post, he assigned one night patrol to daytime duty (that is, RSO operates two patrols 24/7). He acknowledged that the draconian security measures (hundreds of police and military mounting nighttime search operations and manning roadblocks) could cause problems, though not frequently, by stopping and searching the mobile patrols and delaying their arrival. The EAC recommended that the RSO request funding from DS to establish an additional mobile patrol at night. RSO will provide justification and costs septel to DS/OPO/FPD. ¶6. (SBU) The EAC reviewed and approved RSO's draft AV policy. RSO distributed the policy in a Security Directive on April ¶2. In addition to complying with refs F and G, the policy states: -- Whenever possible, Mission personnel should opt for routes that will minimize the likelihood of being in proximity to a GSL facility or similar potential LTTE target. -- Post will maximize the use of AVs during working hours, particularly when personnel attend meetings at GSL facilities. -- All agencies should make every effort to provide AVs for their employees' use for business purposes. -- Mission personnel should utilize AVs to the maximum extent possible for official travel outside of Colombo to the North and East (the restricted travel areas). -- Agencies that do not have AVs should coordinate with their respective headquarters elements to obtain AVs. -- Some Embassy officers conduct business at facilities and with government contacts that may be LTTE targets, and therefore should utilize AVs more often. ¶7. (SBU) The USAID Executive Officer informed the EAC that USAID had obtained one AV and was hoping to obtain two additional AVs (Level C armor). The Embassy General Services Officer (GSO) informed the EAC that the motor pool normally had only four (4) AVs available, although the motor pool had a total of eight (8) AVs. The GSO said that post had one Level D AV for the Ambassador's use; two Level C AVs for the Marine Security Guards; and, one Level C for the DCM's use, leaving four (4) available for every day activities. The GSO was worried that using AVs for travel outside of Colombo would leave the motor pool with fewer AVs for use in Colombo (arguably where the greater threat to Embassy personnel exists). He added that two of the four currently available had already exceeded their service period and he was waiting for replacement vehicles. He added that AVs require more maintenance that unarmored vehicles and that the maintenance is more expensive, as well. The GSO suggested that post needed more AVs, and the EAC concurred. The EAC recommended that the RSO request two (2) additional Level C AVs from DS/C/PSP/DEAV. ¶8. (SBU) Action request for DS/C/PSP/DEAV - AmEmbassy Colombo requests DEAV provide two (2) additional armored vehicles (Level C armoring minimum) as soon as possible. As required by refs F and G, the EAC concluded that current AV inventory is insufficient to provide safe transportation to adequately support Mission activities, given the random nature of violent LTTE attacks in Colombo and throughout Sri Lanka (see ref E for more details). ¶9. (SBU) This cable addresses ref B, recommendation eight and ref C, recommendation 27 (Transportation Security Policy). Unless DS/IP instructs otherwise, RSO Colombo considers these recommendations resolved and closed. ¶10. (U) Post will continue to monitor the security environment and will report further developments, if any, septel. POC for this message is RSO Michael V. Perkins, who may be contacted at 94.11.249.8885, 94.11.249.8888 (MSG Post 1 after regular business hours),or via the classified and unclassified email systems. BLAKE