DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT RAJAPAKSA ON MEDIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 000032 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM CE SUBJECT: DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT RAJAPAKSA ON MEDIA FREEDOM, THE MILITARY AND HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN THE NORTH, AND ELEMENTS OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr. for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (c) Summary: In a January 8 meeting with President Mahinda Rajapaksa requested by Ambassador, the President offered little hope that investigations into recent attacks on the press would lead anywhere, but agreed to provide security for two prominent critics. He predicted the Sri Lankan military would be able to occupy all of northern Sri Lanka in "a couple of months," and reaffirmed his instructions to avoid civilian casualties. He agreed to look at a UN suggestion to set up camps for IDPs in newly liberated areas well away from Vavuniya, where serious human rights violations have occurred, and to consider sending reassurances to the IDPs that they will be treated according to international standards and resettled once demining has taken place. The President confirmed Sri Lanka will organize Provincial Council elections in the north, along the model of the Eastern Province, once the Vanni is occupied. He was more vague about prospects for a serious proposal emerging from the All Parties Representative Committee, or concrete ideas for implementing the 13th amendment, which provides for devolution to the provinces. End Summary. Need to Protect Press Freedom and Civil Society -------------- -- ¶2. (C) Ambassador opened by noting the USG's condemnation of the assassination of Morning Leader Editor Lasantha Wickrematunge. President responded that he also had condemned the murder and that he considered Wickrematunge a personal friend. He stated Wickrematunge had invited him to his wedding, which he had declined for security reasons. But he said that he and his wife had planned to host Wickrematunge and his wife for a celebratory dinner. The Ambassador urged the government to mount a serious investigation into the killing, particularly given the allegations that the perpetrators may have been associated with the government. The president categorically denied any GSL involvement and noted that he had appointed a special investigative team. He admitted, however, that the police had a poor record in such investigations. For example, it had taken the police two years to determine the owner of the auto-rickshaw that was used in the attempted killing of his brother the Defense Secretary in 2006. The Ambassador responded that the government should make improvements in police capabilities a national priority. ¶3. (C) Ambassador told the President these latest incidents against the press are widely seen as attempts to sqaush dissent in Sri Lanka. The President again denied government involvement and stressed that Wickrematunge had many enemies because of his paper's frequent exposure of corruption and other misdeeds. The Ambassador urged that the government provide police protection for Iqbal Athas, a Sunday Times columnist who reports frequently on the war, and J.C. Weliamuna, the head of Transparency International in Sri Lanka and a prominent human rights lawyer. The President expressed confidence nothing would happen to them. The Ambassador respectfully disagreed and reiterated the request for security, which the President agreed to provide. Reassure IDPs -------------- ¶4. (C) Ambassador asked the President how long it would take for the Sri Lankan military to completely occupy the Vanni. Rajapaksa responded that he instructed the military to take the utmost care to avoid civilian casualties, which would delay military operations. He anticipated the military would be able to occupy the North in "a couple of months." The Ambassador welcomed the President's concern about civilian casualties and urged the GSL to think about ways it could reassure the 270,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) in the north so that they would be willing to move into government-controlled areas. The first challenge would be for the UN and others to persuade the LTTE to allow freedom of movement, which thus far it has been unwilling to do. But another equally serious challenge was fear on the part of the IDPs of the treatment they might receive at the hands of the government. Ambassador noted that the UN had proposed to the Government that the GSL and UNHCR establish camps in newly-liberated areas of the North that were closer to the lands of the IDPs and well away from Vavuniya where very high levels of extrajudicial killings, abductions and other human rights abuses by paramilitaries in the area deter the IDPs from moving there. The President agreed to look at such an idea. Disaster Management Minister Samarasinghe agreed, but noted that more than 1,000 IDPs had moved south to Vavuniya already, where he claimed human rights abuses had come down in recent months. The Ambassador also urged that the government use the radio and leaflets to reassure the IDPs that they would receive food and other relief in camps that UNHCR would help to manage, and that they would be resettled to their original homes as soon as demining could take place. The President agreed this was a useful idea and asked his staff to think about air dropping inexpensive radios the IDPs could use. Urgent Need for a Political Solution -------------- ¶5. (C) Ambassador noted his concern that military successes had emboldened Sinhalese nationalists and other hard-liners to expand their extreme agenda to include abolition of the All Parties Representative Committee process. The Ambassador urged the President to state publicly his commitment to a political solution and spell out the elements of the government's strategy in that regard. The President responded that once the military occupies the north, the government's strategy is to duplicate what it did in Eastern Sri Lanka following the expulsion of the LTTE from that region. The top priority would be to organize provincial council elections. Ambassador responded that before the US and other members of the international community could consider assistance in resttling IDPs, we would need to be assured that political arrangements and the government's Chief Minister candidate would enjoy the support of the Tamils in the north. Social Services Minister Douglas Devananda for example, would not be a suitable choice because his paramilitary, the EPDP, had been responsible for the killings and abductions of large numbers of Tamils in Jaffna. The Ambassador suggested the GSL consult moderate Tamils like TULF leader Anandasangaree to find candidates that would enjoy Tamil support, including from the diaspora. The President reassured the Ambassador that he was committed to finding someone who would enjoy the support of the Tamils of the Vanni, including possibly someone from the diaspora. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador urged that the political strategy also include a component to address wider Tamil political demands, such as those ideas now under consideration by the APRC. The President stated that he was waiting for the APRC to finish its deliberations. He said he had instructed his aides to look at establishing a new upper house of Parliament, for example, to include representatives from each of Sri Lanka's 25 districts. He also affirmed that the APRC and a separate committee are working on ways to implement the 13th amendment (which provides for devolution of power to the provinces). He noted, for example, his support for giving Provincial Councils authority over community policing. Demobilizing Paramilitaries in the East -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador previewed the upcoming visit to Sri Lanka of PACOM J-5 MGEN Conant, who would also visit the East. Ambassador took the opportunity to re-state the urgency of Sri Lanka ensuring that the TMVP release all remaining child soldiers and stop new recruiting. The President responded the TMVP has no need for child soldiers and expressed confidence child soldiers would be released. Ambassador also urged that all TMVP paramilitary forces over the age of 18 also be demobilized noting that the USG had a program with the International Organization of Migration to provide psycho-social care and vocational training. The TMVP's demobilization would mark a major step in bringing security to the east. The President thanked the USG for such programs and noted his understanding that the GSL had arranged for some of the ex-TMVP combatants to obtain employment in South Korea. Foreign Secretary Kohona asserted that the recent economic downturn in South Korea might reduce the number of job offers from Korea. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) As always, the President sought to be reassuring, but offered few concrete assurances on any of the issues of importance to us. It was evident he has not thought through the specifics of what political solution he is prepared to offer, much less when. He remains focused on short-term priorities such as organizing the Central and Northwest Provincial Council elections in February and the war effort, and confident that he continues to enjoy strong support from his Sinhalese base. Blake