TAMIL PARTIES CONFUSED AND UNDECIDED ON WAY FORWARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001061 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE SUBJECT: TAMIL PARTIES CONFUSED AND UNDECIDED ON WAY FORWARD REF: COLOMBO 1031 COLOMBO 00001061 001.6 OF 003 Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES VALERIE C. FOWLER. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D ) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Sri Lanka's main Tamil parties remain disorganized and unsure of their strategy for the upcoming election season. Faced with the possible role of kingmaker in the upcoming presidential election, the Tamil parties generally are uncomfortable with the prospect of supporting the reelection of President Mahinda Rajapaksa and are hesitant to support General Sarath Fonseka, who many Tamils view with suspicion after his service as Army Chief during the war against the LTTE. The parties and local observers agree that the Tamil parties would prefer UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe as a presidential candidate and remain disappointed with their current electoral options. Division within the Tamil parties probably will make it hard for any one Tamil leader to enforce a particular vote in the presidential election. END SUMMARY. Changed Dynamic -------------- ¶2. (C) Poloff recently met with representatives from several Tamil parties and local think-tanks to discuss the way forward for the Tamil political parties in the upcoming election season. Embassy contacts noted that the political environment had changed significantly in the last two months, with President Rajapaksa going from a clear-cut winner in the next presidential election in the eyes of many to facing a possible tough election battle with former Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) General Sarath Fonseka. In this context, interlocutors assessed that the Tamil vote could be crucial. TNA MP Suresh Premachandran told poloff that the Tamils could now provide the winning margin, serving as kingmaker, in any presidential election and were attempting to come to grips with their new-found leverage. ¶3. (C) Tamil contacts welcomed the increasingly competitive political environment because they have felt frustrated by their treatment under the Rajapaksa administration for the last four years. Premachandran, Akhila Ilankai Tamil United Front General Secretary (and personal advisor to Eastern Province Chief Minister Pillayan) Dr. K. Vigneswaran, and Center for Policy Alternatives (CPA) Senior Researcher Mirak Raheem all noted that the Tamil community would have a hard time believing anything President Rajapaksa said regarding Tamils. According to the interlocutors, past precedent of presidents failing to keep political promises to the Tamil community in their second terms and Rajapaksa's poor track record of addressing Tamil concerns in his first term only heightened the anticipation over a competitive opposition candidate in the upcoming presidential election. Concern Over Fonseka -------------- ¶4. (C) Despite the possibility of a competitive opposition candidate emerging in the upcoming presidential election, Embassy contacts assessed that it would be hard for Tamils to support General Fonseka. All interlocutors noted that Fonseka would have to work hard to overcome his past hard-line comments regarding the Tamil community. CPA's Raheem noted that Fonseka would be hard pressed to formulate a logical response to his comments that Sri Lanka was only for the Sinhalese. Vigneswaran said that a lack of clarity regarding Fonseka's political intentions further complicated matters for Tamils. Vigneswaran opined that it would be possible for Tamils to support Fonseka if he won the presidency and subsequently ceded power to UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe via a newly-created executive prime minister COLOMBO 00001061 002.2 OF 003 position (an option being floated widely in the local media). If Fonseka wanted to win the election and remain a powerful executive president, however, it would be hard for Tamils to support him. ¶5. (C) Embassy contacts uniformly noted that it would be hard for Tamils to trust Fonseka given his military background. Jehan Perera of the National Peace Council and Ceylon Workers Congress Vice President Ramiah Yogarajan noted that many minorities worried that Fonseka would be unable to transition to a civilian role and would rule over Tamils in an authoritarian manner. Despite his flaws, interlocutors assessed that Tamils might feel more comfortable with President Rajapaksa because he was a politician, thereby making him easier to negotiate with over resources for the Tamils. ¶6. (C) Interlocutors disagreed on whether negotiating a written agreement with Fonseka prior to him being declared the opposition's presidential candidate would suffice to calm the apprehension of the Tamil community in supporting a former military leader. (NOTE: Local speculation centers on Fonseka entering into a written agreement with the opposition parties whereby he would create a powerful executive prime minister position if he won the presidency, thereby ceding power to someone else, most likely UNP head Ranil Wickremesinghe, to run the day-to-day government. END NOTE.) Both Vigneswaran and the TNA's Premachandran noted that the Tamil community would need something in writing detailing General Fonseka's views on political reconciliation, power-sharing, and the executive presidency to receive Tamil support. Premachandran additionally noted that back-room assurances by Fonseka might be sufficient to receive support from the Tamil community. The CWC's Yogarajan, however, claimed that written agreements would not guarantee anything for the future; he noted that President Rajapaksa had virtually ignored all the agreements he concluded in the run-up to the 2005 presidential election. ¶7. (C) Embassy contacts universally noted that the Tamils would prefer a Wickremesinghe candidacy over Fonseka in the upcoming election. Wickremesinghe's association with the peace process during his tenure as prime minister and general trust with the Tamil community were cited as reasons that Tamil voters would support Wickremesinghe. When pressed on how Wickremesinghe would possibly deal with the Tamil community as president, Vigneswaran noted that he trusted Wickremesinghe to devolve police powers to the provincial level and fully implement the 13th amendment to the constitution; whereas Premachandran opined that Wickremesinghe would accelerate IDP resettlement and reduce the role of the Army in Jaffna. Division Within the Tamil Community... -------------- ¶8. (C) Embassy contacts noted that divisions amongst the Tamils could preclude the community uniting behind a single presidential candidate. Vigneswaran noted that the TNA was fractured and had not united in the post-war environment and interlocutors assessed that general divisions remained between many northern, eastern, Colombo, and hill Tamils. For example, Vigneswaran stated that TMVP head Pillayan had decided to support President Rajapaksa in the presidential elections but not in the parliamentary elections; whereas Yogarajan noted that certain up-country Tamil parties would continue to support the current government. ...Could Lead to Split Vote or Independent Candidate -------------- -------------- COLOMBO 00001061 003.2 OF 003 ¶9. (C) Interlocutors differed on how Tamils would ultimately decide to use their emerging clout in the upcoming election season. Embassy contacts disagreed on whether Tamils would ultimately find General Fonseka's candidacy unacceptable and decide to support a boycott of the election or disregard Rajapaksa and Fonseka by running an independent candidate. Most contacts agreed that even if one party such as the TNA decided to call a boycott of the presidential election, the difference between Tamils from Colombo, the east, the north, and the hills would make a total Tamil boycott of the election impossible, in practice. Tamil-JVP Discussions Off-limits -------------- ¶10. (C) All interlocutors told poloff that cooperation between the Tamil political parties and the JVP would be superficial and only based on their joint desire to see President Rajapaksa defeated in the upcoming presidential election. Embassy contacts assessed that it would be counterproductive for the Tamil political parties and the JVP to engage in any policy discussions because they could not agree on anything. Tamil interactions with the UNF alliance would be handled primarily through the UNP and SLMC. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) It is clear that the Tamil political parties remain divided and confused in the post-war environment. While the Tamils would prefer the UNP's Wickremesinghe as a presidential candidate, it is unlikely at this point that he would run solely against President Rajapaksa or in a three-headed race with Fonseka (even though interlocutors uniformly assessed that Wickremesinghe's electoral prospects improved dramatically in a three-way race with Fonseka and Rajapaksa because Wickremesinghe most likely would garner the lion's share of minority votes and liberal Sinhalese, whereas Rajapaksa and Fonseka would split the hard-line Sinhalese vote). Although Tamils remain distrustful of both Rajapaksa and Fonseka and have failed to articulate a political strategy in the post-war environment, they may already be garnering attention and resources commensurate with their emerging electoral clout. The Rajapaksa administration recently allowed travel for Tamils from Jaffna along the A-9 highway without military permission, a TNA visit to IDP camps, and have plans to resettle additional IDPs -- all moves likely designed, in part, to curry favor with Tamil voters. As the CPA's Raheem noted, "President Rajapaksa is a political chameleon...he will do what is necessary to survive." A conference last weekend in Switzerland was the first time most of the Tamil parties (and Muslims) have come together to chart a political path for the future and probably is only a small step in achieving the difficult task of uniting before the upcoming election season. Post will discuss results of the Geneva Conference with Tamil representatives in the next few days and report septel. FOWLER