Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09COLOMBO1018
2009-11-06 12:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

FONSEKA'S U.S. VISIT AND RECALL MAKE WAVES IN SRI

Tags:  PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE 
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FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0736
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 2022
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 9058
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 7296
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 5205
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 3451
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RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO PRIORITY 0004
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 3815
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001018 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE
SUBJECT: FONSEKA'S U.S. VISIT AND RECALL MAKE WAVES IN SRI
LANKA

REF: COLOMBO 1006

COLOMBO 00001018 001.4 OF 002


Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION VALERIE C. FOWLER. REASONS: 1.4
(B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001018 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE SUBJECT: FONSEKA'S U.S. VISIT AND RECALL MAKE WAVES IN SRI LANKA REF: COLOMBO 1006 COLOMBO 00001018 001.4 OF 002 Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION VALERIE C. FOWLER. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) News of CHOD General Sarath Fonseka's visit to the U.S. and subsequent interaction with DHS dominated the local headlines in Colombo during the week of November 1. Many news outlets and political actors strongly criticized the U.S. for this apparent attempt to question Fonseka and possibly use his testimony against the Rajapaksa brothers in an investigation of possible war crimes committed at the end of the war. The JVP was much more vocal in its support of Fonseka himself, which likely indicated their continued desire to enlist him as their presidential candidate in opposition to President Rajapaksa. They attempted to give the appearance of being in direct contact with Fonseka throughout this time, being the first to announce publicly that he was in fact on a plane and returning to Sri Lanka. ¶2. (C) The official government response included a strong statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see reftel). On November 3, Ambassador also met with Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, relaying the same information to him regarding Fonseka and his scheduled DHS interview as she had given earlier to the Foreign Minister. The Defense Secretary responded that this story would be used by the JVP against the president. Upon Fonseka's arrival back in Sri Lanka in the early morning of November 5, the entire airport was reportedly placed in lockdown while he was flown by helicopter from the airport to his official residence, ostensibly for his protection. ¶3. (C) Various media reports and political commentators remarked that the U.S. would now be virtually off-limits to the Rajapaksas and to Fonseka, since they would not want to run the risk of interrogation or arrest on war crimes charges. The National Freedom Front claimed that Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa had been questioned for at least one hour by DHS officials upon entry into the U.S. during his visit in late September. Many of these commentators speculated that Fonseka and the Rajapaksas were likely planning to retire at least partially in the U.S., and this was now out of the question. In a meeting with Ambassador, current Sri Lankan Army commander Jagath Jayasuriya said he had no current plans to travel to the U.S. The JVP questioned Foreign Minister Bogollagama on the issue during a parliamentary session, and the FM claimed that the government had the matter completely in hand. ¶4. (C) The furor surrounding this news story was only amplified by unceasing recent speculation about whether Fonseka might run for president in possible upcoming elections. The JVP's public statements were likely meant for Fonseka as much as for the public, as they attempt to win him over as their candidate. In a continuation of their early election campaign rhetoric, they challenged Gotabhaya and Basil Rajapaksa to give up U.S. citizenship to affirm Sri Lankan strength and sovereignty. COMMENT -------------- ¶5. (C) The Fonseka affair was a complicated, convoluted game within a game that both Fonseka and the Rajapaksas were trying to play to their own advantage. The general could have quietly gone to the DHS interview then discretely reported the event to his political superiors upon his return. Instead, presumably he or someone close to him decided to leak the story to the SL press, emphasizing the COLOMBO 00001018 002.2 OF 002 USG desire to question him about Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. Fonseka may have been aiming to shift blame for war crimes accountability from himself to Gotabhaya while appearing to be the dutiful soldier reporting to his commander. At the same time, the Rajapaksas would like to see Fonseka eliminated as a political competitor -- but not through arrest and conviction abroad, where he presumably would quickly turn state's evidence on potential war crimes. Thus, they wanted him back in Sri Lanka as quickly as possible. Whatever their deeper meaning, this week's events will further the view among many here that there is at least a desire by some in the U.S. Government to remove the Rajapaksas from power. BUTENIS

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