EX-PRESIDENT LUCINSCHI THINKS COMMUNISTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHISINAU 000084 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/UMB E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/09/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINR MD SUBJECT: EX-PRESIDENT LUCINSCHI THINKS COMMUNISTS WILL FAIL; CRITICIZES VORONIN'S "POLICE STATE" Classified By: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In two meetings with Ambassador focused predominantly on Moldova's upcoming elections (Nov 14 and Feb 3),former President Petru Lucinschi was highly critical of President Voronin's regime (which he termed a "police state") and skeptical about the Party of Communists'(PCRM) prospects for success. He suggested that the current Communist-led government did not want to give up power under any circumstances and would struggle fiercely to retain its majority in the Parliament. Lucinschi believed that the non-Communist opposition parties would control the future Parliament, and that a post-electoral coalition would emerge involving Urechean, Filat, Ghimpu and Diacov. However, he projected a possible scenario in which neither side could elect the president and an opposition- controlled Parliament might propose a referendum on switching to direct popular vote. End Summary. Lucinschi Skeptical about PCRM Showing in Elections -------------- -------------- - ¶2. (C) Over the course of two meetings with Ambassador (November 14 and February 3),Moldova's former President Petru Lucinschi expressed his doubts about the ability of the Party of Communists (PCRM) to win control of the Parliament in the upcoming April 5 elections. He speculated on the extent to which the population would vote for the Communists, saying that even those serving in the security services claimed they would not support the PCRM. ¶3. (C) Lucinschi cited a recent survey showing that the PCRM enjoyed a rating of only 20 percent. Even hypothesizing that the Communists receive 25 or even 30 percent of the vote, at best the PCRM would gain some 40-45 seats in the Parliament (after seats were redistributed to account for votes for parties that had not crossed the threshold) and 55-60 seats for the other parties. Lucinschi believed that the Communist leadership already understood that the PCRM could not win a majority and would need allies to form a coalition. Lucinschi Critical of Voronin's "Police State" -------------- ¶4. (C) Lucinschi criticized Voronin, charging that since 2001 he had created a police state with a �0A;military-backed system of informers. People were frightened by the authorities and willing to report, he said. Lucinschi said the GOM was counting on keeping this situation hush-hush, but since many people had personally suffered at the hands of the regime, and the number whose brothers and sons had suffered was rising, many people were now aware of how the system worked. Lucinschi claimed that there was fear among the people; they were afraid of expressing their opinions, lowered their voices and suspected that their phones were tapped. ¶5. (C) Lucinschi was critical of the judicial system, citing "telephone justice," i.e., a system in which judges are called and instructed what to do. He told the story of a friend in the construction business who had judges and prosecutors come to him to buy apartments bringing suitcases filled with money. Who Will Form the Majority Coalition? -------------- ¶6. (C) Lucinschi said that the Communists were aware that many people were not satisfied, but still expected to keep power by forming a coalition. However, he thought, and that a 50-50 split might result, preventing either side from making a coalition. Lucinschi believed that despite their incompatibilities, the opposition parties would ally against the Communists. All of them -- Urechean, Filat, Ghimpu, and Diacov -- had CHISINAU 00000084 002 OF 003 suffered from the Communists, and thus, despite their differences would form an alliance. ¶7. (C) Lucinschi speculated on which parties would clear the threshold, mentioning Urechean's AMN (though now weaker than before),Filat's Liberal Democrats (very active now) and maybe Chirtoaca's Liberal Party. However, he thought it likely that three parties might not be able to form a majority. He noted that prospects for Iurie Rosca's PPCD were questionable as he had lost much support. Lucinschi viewed Braghis's Social Democratic Party as an ally of the Communists, charging that the Communists were financing Braghis's campaign. He shared a story about a businessman called into PCRM headquarters and told to run for Parliament, but on Braghis's list. ¶8. (C) Lucinschi had words of praise for Diacov's Democratic Party as an option for voters who could not stand either the Communists, or the "nationalist slogans" of the other parties. (Note: Luchinschi's son Chiril recently announced that he would run for Parliament on Diacov's list. End note.) Diacov's party won third place in the 2007 elections with 9 percent of votes and could pass the threshold, speculated Lucinschi, garnering some 8-10 percent of the vote. Diacov would definitely not ally with the Communists and would thus help guarantee that the PCRM could not make a majority. If so, the Communists would go into opposition in the future Parliament, as they had during the period when Lucinschi himself was president. Mass Media: Two Opposition TV Channels -------------- ¶9. (C) Lucinschi said that only two opposition TV channels now existed, PRO TV, which the GOM had attempted unsuccessfully to close, and TV 7, which was owned by his son Chiril. Though the younger Lucinschi owned the station together with an American company, the station depended financially upon ads from Russian N TV; N TV had invited Chiril Lucinschi to Moscow. Lucinschi speculated Moscow might either try to seize TV 7 or force him to sell it. Alternatively, Chiril might be asked to refrain from participating in the elections. The ex-president said he had already advised his son not to withdraw, now that he had publicly declared his intention to run for office. Widening the Playing Field of Political Parties -------------- -- ¶10. (C) Whereas earlier it appeared that the GOM was trying to deny registration to several opposition parties, Lucinschi suggested that the Communists had chosen a new tactic on party registration. Though the Ministry of Justice had initially re-registered only 12 of the 28 parties that had applied, on February 2 the Central Election Commission (CEC) announced that all 28 parties were approved for participation in the elections. Lucinschi speculated that the GOM had decided to let as many parties as possible participate in order to divide the opposition vote. ¶11. (C) Lucinschi speculated that the six percent threshold might be the PCRM's undoing as fewer parties would make it into the Parliament. If the Communists plus their immediate allies did not have enough votes to form a coalition, they would have to win support from (in other words, bribe, he explained) some other MPs. But, as a result of the threshold the PCRM would have fewer small parties to approach as possible allies. Perhaps No Side Strong Enough to Elect President -------------- --- ¶12. (C) Lucinschi speculated that the elections might yield a Parliament without any majority strong enough to elect a president. In this scenario Parliament might propose to have the president elected by popular vote. Lucinschi claimed that Filat, Urechean and Diacov supported returning to the previous system of direct CHISINAU 00000084 003 OF 003 presidential election. A referendum would allow the people to decide the question of amending the constitution to allow for popular election of the president. Holding a popular referendum could be decided with a simple majority in Parliament. ¶13. (C) Lucinschi claimed that surveys showed that 85 percent of the population would favor a direct popular vote of the president, and that key party leaders were also in favor. Lucinschi believed that a united opposition would have enough support from the population for an opposition candidate to be elected in a popular vote. Who Might be the Presidential Candidate? -------------- ¶14. (C) Asked about possible presidential candidates, Lucinschi suggested three names -- President of the Academy of Sciences Gheorghe Duca (currently not a member of any party; had previously been with the Democratic Party but could enjoy support from PCRM),Foreign Minister Stratan (both opposition and PCRM could support; not a member of any party, or former Minister of Foreign Affairs Popov (was Ambassador to France, and to Belgium; now works in Romania with Lukoil; people don't support him because he is not in country, but he could be a good compromise candidate.) ¶15. (C) Lucinschi thought that Lupu could be a good PCRM candidate but suggested that Voronin would not support him. Though the Communist electorate might not vote for Lupu, he could not be excluded as he was well prepared and a good canpaigner. Lucinschi dismissed Greceanii's presidential prospects, saying that she was a "nice lady," but just as she had appeared from nowhere, she would go nowhere. Comment -------------- ¶16. (C) While Lucinschi is one of Moldova's most knowledgeable interlocutors, he has his own axes to grind, and many of his comments appear to reflect both wishful thinking and self-promotion. We think he is likely under-estimating the Communists' electoral support and over-estimating the ability of opposition party leaders to work in coalition. Lucinschi was elected by direct popular vote in 1996. His presidency was marked by his own power struggle with the Parliament which resulted in then Speaker Diacov's introducing legislation to weaken Lucinschi by transforming the country into a parliamentary republic and changing the presidential election from a popular to a parliamentary vote. Since then, Lucinschi has wished to see popular presidential elections restored. However, any attempt to change systems after the elections could result in months of chaos. CHAUDHRY