ALLIANCE ELECTS SPEAKER, BUT WHAT'S NEXT?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHISINAU 000671 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/UMB E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID PINR MD SUBJECT: ALLIANCE ELECTS SPEAKER, BUT WHAT'S NEXT? CHISINAU 00000671 001.2 OF 003 Classified by: Charge d'Affaires Marcus Micheli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) REF: (A) Chisinau 659; (B) Chisinau 626; (C) Chisinau 659 ¶1. (C) Summary: In decisive move that stunned many observers, on August 28 the four-party Alliance for European Integration (AIE) elected Liberal Party (PL) leader Mihai Ghimpu as Speaker in a rump session that continued after the Communist Party (PCRM) adjourned the Parliament's opening meeting (septel). Having passed this initial test of cohesion with flying colors, AIE leaders now face the difficult task of securing the eight votes necessary to elect their candidate, Democratic Party (DL) leader Marian Lupu, as President. The PCRM has dangled the possibility of providing the votes, but likely will demand major concessions and has declared it will not support Lupu. A schism within the PCRM or an Alliance-PCRM compromise on a non-party candidate could offer a way out, but should the Alliance fail, Moldova faces political deadlock and repeat elections in 2010. End Summary. Alliance Passes First Test -------------- ¶2. (C) Although the AIE originally agreed to propose Liberal Democratic Party (PLDM) leader Vlad Filat as Speaker and Lupu as President, Alliance cohesion was seriously threatened during the last week when Lupu, concerned that the PCRM would oppose his candidacy, demanded to be Speaker. (Note: The Alliance's 53 parliamentary seats are enough to elect the Speaker, but are eight votes short of the 61 needed to elect the President.) The AIE's four leaders met daily over the past several days in an effort to resolve the impasse; in a session that lasted until past midnight on August 27, both Lupu and Filat agreed to cede the Speaker position to Ghimpu. Under the terms of the new deal, Lupu will remain the Alliance's presidential candidate, while Filat will be their proposed Prime Minister. Presidential Election: Getting to 61 -------------- ¶3. (C) Ghimpu's August 28 election as Speaker (septel) demonstrated a decisive and dramatic show of Alliance unity. But attention now turns to the difficult task of electing the President. One possibility is that the Alliance, with its momentum-changing victory, will succeed in prompting a group of younger PCRM MPs to break with the party. Working against such a scenario, however, is the strong tradition of discipline and hierarchy within the PCRM. ¶4. (C) Perhaps more likely is a scenario in which the PCRM opts to "give" eight votes to the Alliance candidate. There is reportedly an on- going debate within the PCRM between a younger, reformist wing and the hardliners (ref A). The "reformers," associated with Voronin advisor Mark Tkaciuk, appear more inclined to compromise with the Alliance and move into the opposition (letting the Alliance take the blame for Moldova's deteriorating economy). The hard-liners, associated with former Deputy Speaker Vladimir Turcan, have been hoping that lingering mistrust between non-Communist leaders will splinter the Alliance, leading to the creation of a PCRM- controlled "Left-Center Coalition." ¶5. (C) The Alliance's decisive show of unity may help the "reformers" win the argument within the PCRM. If so, the PCRM will doubt seek to extract a steep price, likely involving immunity guarantees for Voronin, his family and some top officials of his inner circle as well as "acceptable" nominations for certain key power positions within the GoM. ¶6. (C) In order to push the PCRM towards a compromise, the Alliance also may postpone a presidential vote and instead begin an aggressive program of personnel changes and reform legislation. If the Alliance continues to CHISINAU 00000671 002.2 OF 003 demonstrate convincing solidarity and begins to threaten key PCRM interests (particularly in business),it is possible that the party will see the handwriting on the wall and make the jump to cooperate. Presidential Elections: Changing Horses Mid-Stream -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) While the Alliance has privately and publicly committed to nominating Lupu as its candidate for President. But the PCRM also has publicly vowed to oppose Lupu; should the Communists dig in their heels and reject Lupu in a first round of voting, the Alliance could still compromise with the PCRM and nominate a non-party candidate for a second round. One possibility is Ion Sturza (ref C). Filat, who is known to be close to Sturza, might propose this variant; however, Lupu, who would be the odd man out, would presumably do everything possible to prevent this outcome. ¶8. (C) Therefore, while Filat and the PCRM could, theoretically, elect Sturza President, such a scenario would collapse of the Alliance, and literally hand power back to the PCRM. Or alternatively, in a highly unlikely but theoretically possible scenario, if Lupu and Filat clashed over Filat seeking to ditch him for Sturza, Lupu could throw in his lot again with the PCRM. This would only happen with the high cost of being labeled a double traitor, and might require that Urechean jumped ship with him, because Lupu's defection would split the Democratic Party. Possibility of Deadlock and 2010 Elections -------------- ¶9. (C) Balancing out these various scenarios for electing a president is the persistent possibility that both sides will refuse to engage in meaningful dialogue, and the PCRM will refuse to cooperate. Two failed votes for President would require repeat parliamentary elections in 2010. However, both sides recognize that prolonged political crisis is not in Moldova's interests. On the PCRM side, Voronin and Tkaciuk have made public statements recently about the need to avoid repeat elections. The Alliance-controlled Parliament also will try to avoid this scenario by not rushing into Presidential elections until after they have aggressively worked to use legislative power to dismantle Communist power structures and patronage structures. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Jubilant after electing a speaker, the Alliance appeared to have learned the lesson that preserving cohesion in order to form a government is more important than who gets which post. Having passed this first test, the prognosis for group cohesive seems stronger than it was just a few days ago when still in crisis. If the Alliance succeeds in declaring the Presidential slot vacant (which they will attempt),as Speaker would be Acting President until the election of a new Head of State. ¶11. (C) Though Alliance boldly seized the initiative during the opening session of Parliament, it is clear that a rocky road lies ahead. While Voronin had appeared to be in denial about the implications of the new structure, the Parliament's ability to elect a Speaker while the PCRM deputies were absent, may convince him that the tables have turned. It is possible that the PCRM may try to challenge the legality of the Parliament's decisions or use their control of other state organs of power to erect other barriers. However, it is clear that August 28, 2009, will go down in Moldova's history as momentous day. Just one day after celebrating the country's 18th anniversary of independence, a non- Communist coalition took control of the Parliament, advocating for free media, a functioning justice system and a full slate of democratic reforms. While the final outcome of CHISINAU 00000671 003.2 OF 003 the Alliance's effort to form a government is not yet clear, the transition of legislative power is already a victory for the democratic process. MICHELI