Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09CHISINAU643
2009-08-14 16:01:00
SECRET
Embassy Chisinau
Cable title:  

POSSIBILITY OF COMMUNIST PARTY SPLIT

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM EAID MD 
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VZCZCXRO2824
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHCH #0643/01 2261601
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 141601Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8293
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CHISINAU 000643 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2029
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID MD
SUBJECT: POSSIBILITY OF COMMUNIST PARTY SPLIT

Classified by: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CHISINAU 000643 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/UMB E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2029 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID MD SUBJECT: POSSIBILITY OF COMMUNIST PARTY SPLIT Classified by: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) Summary: Deputy Prime Minister Igor Dodon (strictly protect) confided to Ambassador that a group of younger, reform-minded members of the Party of Communists (PCRM) were considering breaking with PCRM to establish a new center-left party. This new party, which would focus on economic reform and implementing IMF recommendations, could unite with other non- Communist parties to attempt to elect a president. Dodon said that the new party would also seek to remove the hard-line PCRM Ministers of Interior and Security from office (an agenda that coincides with that of the four-party non-Communist coalition). In a separate conversation, political analyst Andrei Popov, who was elected MP on Democratic Party leader Lupu's list, shed further light on divisions within the PCRM. End Summary. Reformists Considering Breaking from PCRM -------------- ¶2. (S) On August 13, Deputy Prime Minister Igor Dodon (strictly protect) told the Ambassador that there were on-going discussions within the PCRM about the possibilities for making a coalition with one or two of the opposition parties. He said that he himself favored a coalition with Lupu, whom the PCRM would then support for President. However, to be palatable to Lupu, such an arrangement would require Voronin to renounce designs on either the Speaker or Prime Minister positions. Dodon conceded that he was unsure whether Voronin would agree to this, but said he would discuss the scenario with the Acting President when he (Voronin) returns from his vacation on August 15. ¶3. (S) Dodon then confided that if Voronin declined Dodon's proposal, a group of younger, reform-minded members of the PCRM could break with the Communists to form a new center-left party. Dodon said that this new group wanted to bring the IMF back and follow the recommendations of the IMF report, and was ready to push economic reform. In addition, they would seek to remove Minister of the Interior Papuc, Minister of State Security Services (SIS) Artur Resetnikov, Deputy Prime Minister Rosca, and Foreign Minister Stratan from office. ¶4. (S) Dodon said that the emergence of this splinter party would help create a real center in the Moldovan political spectr
um. The unreformed Communists would occupy the far left and Ghimpu's Liberals the far right, while Dodon's new grouping would work with the Democratic Party, Our Moldova Alliance (AMN),and the Liberal Democratic Party to put together a government. PCRM Division into Two Camps -------------- ¶5. (C) In a separate conversation on August 12, political analyst Andrei Popov (who was just elected MP on Lupu's list) also described to Pol/Econ chief the divisions within the PCRM. Popov, who noted that the 48-member PCRM parliamentary faction has 12 non-party members on its list (including eight who are among the top 22),said that the party split between "reformers" and "hard-liners" was obvious during the election campaign, and had sharpened now over how to handle the current political situation. ¶6. (C) According to Popov, the PCRM's reformist camp, headed by Voronin advisor Mark Tkaciuk, included such figures as DPM Dodon, Voronin's economic advisor Oleg Reidman, Deputy Speaker Grigorie Petrenco, Minister of Reintegration Vasile Sova, Yuri Muntaneanu, and others. The hard-line camp was headed by First Deputy Speaker Turcan, and included SIS head Resetnikov, Foreign Minister Stratan, Minister of Interior Papuc, Minister of Justice Victor Pirlog, Deputy Prime Minister Victor Stepaniuc, Eugenia Ostapciuc and Maria Postoico. Although Iurie Rosca was not a PCRM member, according to Popov, he was allied with the hard-liner camp. CHISINAU 00000643 002 OF 002 ¶7. (C) Popov explained that Mark Tkaciuk had hand- picked and groomed both Stratan and Lupu and helped them rise to Deputy Minister and then Ministerial levels. In 2005, when Voronin's re- election as President was uncertain, and Tkaciuk won over Iurie Rosca, eventually providing an additional 22 votes (rather than just the necessary 5),in exchange, Voronin let Tkaciuk's protege Lupu become the Speaker. According to Popov, Tkaciuk's relations with Stratan soured in 2004, and from 2006, when Lupu wanted to be more independent from Tkaciuk, their relations soured as well. The firing of Lazar as Minister of Economy in September 2006 signaled Lupu's waning influence. Popov said that Tkaciuk then focused on grooming an even younger group including Petrenco, Dodon, Muntaneanu and Ion Ceban. Comment -------------- ¶8. (S) It is clear that nothing is certain at this juncture and that all the players are actively considering their options. That said, Dodon's scenario of a split within the PCRM, while at present highly uncertain, could dramatically transform the political picture in Moldova. There could be enough "reformers" in the PCRM faction to ensure the election of the President, should the new group join with the non-Communist coalition parties. (According to Moldovan legislation, although MPs are elected on a party slate, once within the Parliament, an MP who wishes to change parties may do so.) ¶9. (S) It is unclear where Mark Tkaciuk stands in this complex scenario. After personally grooming Lupu and Stratan and helping them to rise to power, his relations with them soured; therefore we do not know if his hand-picked young reformers are breaking away from him, or if he is supporting this idea. Currently, our best guess is that they do not have his blessing, and that Dodon appears to be considering his own bid for the personal political limelight. CHAUDHRY

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