PRESIDENT VORONIN ACCEPTS THE IDEA OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHISINAU 000614 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/UMB E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MD SUBJECT: PRESIDENT VORONIN ACCEPTS THE IDEA OF COMMUNISTS GOING INTO OPPOSITION Classified by: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In an August 4 meeting, a tired- looking and somber President Voronin did not appear to have a clear vision for how the PCRM would move forward in thepost-elections political environment. On the on hand he told the Ambassador that he was ready fo the PCRM to go into opposition, while at the sae time he expressed willingness to engage in negtiations with the other four party leaders on puting together a government. Voronin was clearlystill angry with Lupu for defecting from the PCRM and criticized his "highly exaggerated personal ambitions." The Ambassador raised his outrage ad disappointment with the GOM's expulsion of ENEO election observers and explained at length why this action was deplorable. President Voronin esponded by citing Russian interference in Moldoa's 2005 elections, and then admitted that when he saw the names of individuals involved in the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan and seventeen people from Georgia, he was frightened. Voronin acknowledged that he had over-reacted. End Summary. Ready for Coalition, or to be in Opposition -------------- ¶2. (C) In an August 4 meeting, President Voronin told Ambassador Chaudhry that he was willing to have some kind of cooperation with other political parties, but that thus far none of the four parties had contacted the Communists. Voronin said that this was normal since the opposition parties could not yet agree on what to do. When they decide upon what they want to do and come to us, he said, we are ready to listen. However, the President imposed certain conditions, saying that he was not ready to get together with people who had committed criminal activity in the past. (Note: Since criminal cases had been filed against Filat, Urechean and Chirtoaca, this condition could be an excuse to rule out cooperation with three of the four parties. EndNote) Voronin said that under certain circumstancs the Communists might vote for a presidential cndidate proposed by the other parties, but that uch a candidate should not be a member of any paty. Similarly, he said that for the sake of Molova's stability, the PCRM could cooperate with oter parties, but �0A;those parties should accept the ive principles which he had earlier promulgated. There should be an agreement on principles, he aid, not just negotiations on distributing mandaes. ¶3. (C) Voronin stated that he was ready to g into opposition. He repeated this idea more thn once during the meeting, saying again that it would not be a tragedy for the PCRM to go into "constructive opposition." He noted that the parliament was structured with an almost 50-50 split, and that this was how the population had voted. Voronin said that it was most important to him that there be a constitutional and legal transfer of power. He said that the PCRM would do everything in a civilized way, including going into opposition. ¶4. (C) Voronin claimed that presently he was more involved in affairs of state than the post- elections jockeying for position. He cited his current focus on as preparing the land for fall planting, events in the banking system, and activities of the customs agency, which were particularly important as much of the state budget depended upon their income. The opposition, on the other hand, was more preoccupied by these "electoral games." Voronin noted with some derision that the opposition was not really interested in the day-to-day work of their country's development, but was interested only in the distribution of portfolios. Voronin's Derision of Opposition, Anger at Lupu -------------- -- ¶5. (C) Voronin was quite well informed about the state of opposition coalition negotiations. CHISINAU 00000614 002 OF 003 Voronin said that the opposition was discussing the issues of forming a coalition among themselves. Voronin was aware that according to his information there had been some preliminary positive results in agreement to have a coalition, but some disagreements about distribution of portfolios. According to his preliminary information, opposition discussions now revolved only around the redistribution of portfolios and not on concepts and principles for running the country. Voronin said that everyone wanted to be Speaker or President, but no one wanted to be the Prime Minister. ¶6. (C) Voronin's tone and his comments revealed that he was still harboring grudge against Lupu for defecting from the PCRM. He said that the opposition coalition discussions now confirmed as a concrete fact that Lupu was now on the right ideologically. With some derision he cited Lupu as an example of a person who cares only about advancing his personal career. Lupu, he said, had no political content, only highly exaggerated personal ambitions. Lupu could go seek a job as an interpreter, he said scornfully, because he speaks a lot of languages. Most important, opined Voronin was personal dignity and conscience; a person lacking core principles was dangerous, -- very dangerous for politicians -- implying that Lupu's lack of principles was dangerous. ¶7. (C) In comparison, Voronin praised Rosca as someone who had remained loyal to the principles of his own party. Though the Communists had tense relations with Rosca during the years, including violent street protests, Rosca had proven himself to be trustworthy, and was now enjoying the Deputy Prime Minister position and stable relations with Voronin. Rosca, said Voronin, had never betrayed him. ¶8. (C) Voronin also cited the example of Tarlev as someone who had been inside the party but defected. In March 2001, Tarlev was a political unknown who Voronin had met as director of the candy factory Bucaria, and promoted his career. Tarlev is just one year younger than Voronin's youngest son, the president noted. When Tarlev left the party he had a rating of 26 percent popularity, cited Voronin, but that fell and Tarlev got only 1.6 percent of the votes. Voronin predicted that Lupu would suffer a similar fate, and end up losing all popular support. USG Concerns on ENEMO Expulsion -------------- ¶9. (C) The Ambassador told Voronin very bluntly that some of people had given him (the President) some bad information which had led to an unfortunate incident. After the President himself had encouraged the USG to invite additional elections observers, the Ambassador had told USAID to find an organization that knows the region and has elections monitoring experience. They had selected ENEMO. However, the CEC delayed on issuing the invitation, and then only accredited 53 of the intended 140 observers. Deputy Speaker Petrenco had assured the Ambassador that the others would get accredited, so observers started arriving in Moldova, particularly those from countries that did not require a visa. The USG was disturbed by the heavy-handed way those observers were rounded up, threatened, and expelled from Moldova. ¶10. (C) President Voronin responded by saying he shared the Ambassadors emotions and indignation, then relating the story of Russian interference in the 2005 elections. Relations with Russia were tense at that time in the post-Kozak Memorandum environment. According to Voronin, two days before the elections a train arrived with 200 militiamen and special forces. Earlier 76 employees of the Russian MFA had arrived, Voronin claimed, to organize a coup d'etat on election night. Voronin narrated how he had conducted a special operation, stopping the train, and then sending policemen with free food and wine until CHISINAU 00000614 003 OF 003 everyone was completely drunk, while simultaneously sending out 76 teams to round up each of the other agents. They were caught in a single day and put on the first plan out back to Moscow. Voronin noted that the Russians had never commented on that incident. ¶11. (C) Voronin admitted that when he saw the names of individuals involved in the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan and seventeen people from Georgia, he was frightened. The Ambassador explained that ENEMO had openly submitted its list of observers and that these people were experienced professionals, not trouble makers. People who come to make revolutions would not openly submit their names as ENEMO had done. The Ambassador suggested that in the future if Voronin had any doubts about any program he should speak to him directly. In the end, Voronin acknowledged that he had over-reacted and made a mistake. Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) President Voronin clearly realizes that the tide has shifted for the Communists. He understands that he no longer holds the power that he did before. We have never before seen him with such a tired and weak demeanor. Voronin seemed uncertain about the best course of action, but showed flexibility about either talking to the newly emerging coalition of four about broad cooperation or going into opposition. We suspect that given the serious economic crisis, Voronin may well be willing to step aside and let the other parties try their hand at running the country, in the hopes that the population would blame them for the failure and restore the Communists to power in the next round of elections. On the other hand, we cannot rule a broad coalition that keeps some PCRM members in positions of power. Moldova's party leaders need to move beyond the infighting over who will get which post and get on with the business of running the country. CHAUDHRY