What Comes Next: Expert Views

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CHISINAU 000608 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/UMB E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM MD SUBJECT: What Comes Next: Expert Views SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY REF: Chisinau 604 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Moldovan experts agree that the July 29 elections offer a chance for opposition parties to exercise power, although the constitutional provisions for establishing a government will make the process complicated. The current ruling Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) retains the largest number of seats and may be able to block opposition initiatives. The four different analysts with whom we spoke each concurred that the four opposition parties will try to work together, but disagreed about whether this cooperation would successfully endure. Another point of disagreement was the extent to which a non-PCRM government should prosecute alleged crimes and corruption by outgoing GOM officials. On Transnistria, our analyst contacts believed that Chisinau's policy was unlikely to change significantly. There was general relief that the election had gone smoothly and had produced results acceptable to the parties, despite the challenges ahead. End Summary. Opportunity, yes Q capability, maybe -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In separate meetings, TDY poloffs spoke July 31 and August 3 with four leading Moldovan political analysts to explore potential post- election developments. Jockeying and speculation continue, complicated by Moldova's political system, (reftel) which will require either agreement by the two main blocs on a president or sufficient defections from one side to the other to reach the 61 votes necessary for electing a president. The experts agreed that Moldova's opposition parties had gained a real chance to play a significant role in governing the country. However, their ability to remain unified and to develop policies beyond "out with the Communists" is much less clear. Analysts agreed that the four opposition parties were united for the present, although views varied as to whether they would be able to govern together. The parties hold a slender edge (53 out of 101 seats in Parliament) even for votes requiring a simple majority, so maintaining party discipline and interparty concord will be of ongoing importance on all votes. ¶3. (SBU) Our contacts were in general agreement on the major differences among the four opposition �00A;parties. The Liberal Party, (PL),which gained 15 seats, is the most stridently pro-Romanian and anti-PCRM; its social policies tend toward the populist as seen in its support for lowering the retirement age. The 18-seat Liberal Democratic Party (PLDM) is widely regarded as pro-business with some talented technocrats Q but also alleged ties to dubious privatizations. The Our Moldova Alliance (AMN),with seven seats, has been in decline and our experts predicted it would disappear in the next elections. The new face in the opposition, with 13 seats, is the Democratic Party (PD),led by former speaker Marian Lupu who defected from PCRM in June. PD, formerly a marginal party, lacks a fully-developed ideology but several experts said it aspires to be a center-left social democratic party. It is also the party best placed to reach out to PCRM assuming Acting President Voronin can forgive Lupu's "betrayal." Cooperate with PCRM, or shut it out? -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The question of how, or whether, the opposition should try to work with PCRM emerged as a clear area of disagreement. Some commentators favored trying to lure potential PCRM defectors to an opposition-led coalition, arguing that the PCRM's declining support combined with the example set by Lupu could ensure success. Another analyst opposed any "cohabitation" with PCRM completely, CHISINAU 00000608 002 OF 002 while the fourth argued for working with PCRM to nominate a compromise candidate for President. Such a person, perhaps former Prime Minister Greceanii (who is not a member of any party), would not be entirely in debt to either side and would be harder to manipulate. In addition, the grave economic situation should push the opposition to "sharing the blame" by having at least some PCRM role in government formation. ¶5. (SBU) Two of our experts raised the question of how to address alleged crime and corruption by PCRM officials. One believed it crucial for the new government - which he expected could take power quickly despite the constitutional hurdles - to take immediate steps to "put people in jail" and restore public trust. His colleague, who came back to this point several times, argued the opposite: the PCRM retains substantial popular support, and for the opposition to appear to be engaged in a vendetta would further polarize an already difficult atmosphere. Non-transparent prosecutions would damage a key opposition claim: that they are the proponents of rule-of-law and democratic "European" values. Transnistria: major shift unlikely -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Regardless of how, or if, the government is formed, our contacts did not foresee a major shift on Transnistria. Several commented that attempts to push forward on Transnistria could be counterproductive and consume energy that could be better spent on priorities in right-bank Moldova. Comment: -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Neither Transnistria nor the Russian presence there elicited strong emotions from any of our experts. They all recognize that, however inter-party dynamics play out, domestic considerations come first. End Comment. Chaudhry