PRESIDENTIAL VOTE POSTPONED UNTIL JUNE 3;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHISINAU 000397

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM MD
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL VOTE POSTPONED UNTIL JUNE 3;
EXTRA TIME TO SEEK COMPROMISE

Classified by: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On May 28 the Parliament gathered
for the anticipated presidential voting. The
Communists proposed a postponement until June 3,
which passed. The time between the Parliament's
initial failure to elect a president on May 20,
and the May 28 session has been filled with
meetings attempting to bring the Party of
Communists (PCRM) and opposition parties together,
as well as cajoling and some ugly threats.
European Union Special Representative Kalman
Miszei had been actively trying to promote
reconciliation. Meanwhile, Ambassador Chaudhry
also met repeatedly with all sides to assess their
positions and assist the process. Opposition
leader Serafim Urechean (Our Moldova Alliance,
AMN) reported numerous calls and threats over the
previous days. Realizing that holding the
presidential vote on the 28th would result in a
second failure (which would require repeat
parliamentary elections to be scheduled),the PCRM
appears to be stalling for time for a last-ditch
effort to find additional votes. End Summary.

Ambassador Asked to Approach Opposition
--------------


2. (C) On May 20, in the hours following the
Parliament's initial failure to elect a president,
Deputy Speaker and PCRM politician Grigoriy
Petrenco called on the Ambassador. Petrenco said
that Acting President Voronin had personally
requested that Petrenco seek the Ambassador's
assistance in determining whether the opposition
would be open to dialogue. The Ambassador
underlined that a compromise required each side to
give up something, and tried to ascertain what the
Communists would be willing offer to win
opposition support. However, despite repeated
efforts, Petrenco was not ready to identify what
the PCRM would put on the table.


3. (C) Within the next 24 hours, the Ambassador
met the three opposition leaders represented in
the Parliament to discuss this question. Liberal
Democrat (PLDM) leader Vlad Filat responded by
stating repeatedly that that he was open to
dialogue. However, he noted that he had openly
put forth conditions for dialogue, and wanted
guarantees that his conditions would be met.
Additionally, Filat confided, he would be willing
to cast his vote if Marian Lupu were the PCRM's
presidential candidate. Filat complained that,
although Miszei was sincere in his efforts to
broker an agreement, he was insisting too much,
and overdoing it, creating resistance to his
message on the part of the opposition. Filat
noted that there had been various PCRM approaches,
from Presidential Advisor Marc Tkaciuk, Deputy
Speaker of Parliament Vladimir Turcan, and now
Petrenko, and asked that the Ambassador have
President Voronin clarify who was empowered to
negotiate on behalf of the PCRM.


4. (C) AMN leader Urechean responded that under
the right conditions he would agree to a dialogue.
He ruled out any discussion with Petrenco
(claiming he irritated people),but stressed that
there were definitely starting points for
negotiations. He noted with concern that, if
repeat parliamentary elections were held, the
Communists might emerge with the minimum 67 votes
required to pass any laws or constitutional
amendments they wished. Urechean said he
understood the risks of negotiating with the
Communists (i.e., being marginalized by his
electorate as Christian Democrat leader Iurie
Rosca had been for negotiating with the PCRM in
2005),but said that he was willing to take the
risk. Even the hardline Liberal Party (PL) leader
Mihai Ghimpu, did not rule out sitting down at a
table with the PCRM, though he did underline that
he would not negotiate with them.


5. (C) Though the Ambassador reported back to
Petrenco on May 21 that at least two of the
opposition parties were willing to talk, we heard
no further response from the government side about

CHISINAU 00000397 002 OF 003


this initiative. We did hear various reports of
efforts by Kalman Miszei to broker meetings, and
were aware that such meetings were taking place.

Marc Tkaciuk Asks Ambassador to Meet with Urechean
-------------- --------------


6. (C) On the evening of May 27, with the
presidential vote scheduled for the next day,
Presidential Advisor Marc Tkaciuk called on the
Ambassador and asked him to meet Urechean in the
morning, before the parliamentary vote. Tkaciuk
noted that on the previous day (May 26),he had
believed that the PCRM and the opposition had
shaken hands on a deal. However, Tkaciuk said, by
the following morning, when Urechean and Filat
were supposed to meet Voronin at 11:00 A.M. to
confirm the deal, the two opposition leaders said
they could not proceed, because their people did
not want them to do so. Tkaciuk noted that
private polling data suggested that in repeat
elections Urechean's AMN might not even cross the
six percent threshold.

Urechean Speaks of Calls and Threats
--------------


7. (C) In an early morning meeting on May 28,
Urechean noted that the day's parliamentary
session would be a historic moment for Moldova.
He described the previous two days and nights as
tumultuous, filled with calls and threats. He
claimed that the opposition had looked for
compromise, but that the Communists did not want
to find it. He admitted to having a private
conversation with Mark Tkaciuk (which was secret
from the public) in which Tkaciuk urged him to
provide the "golden" votes. They met again
together with Filat, most recently on May 27.
Urechean claimed that Tkaciuk believed the
opposition would vote with the Communists "because
he was talking but not listening to their
arguments." Urechean told us that at that morning
meeting with Tkaciuk on May 27 at 11:00, he
(Urechean) had announced that there was no deal.
Urechean said that his party members and
electorate did not want a deal, and stressed the
importance of demonstrating that the opposition
could be firm and present an alternative.


8. (C) Urechean reported that of his eleven MPs,
five had been contacted and urged to betray their
party. He said that the previous day (May 27)
threats had started to flow. Urechean said that
because of the pressures three of his regional
party leaders (in Cimislia, Ungheni and Soroca
districts) had suffered heart attacks. Urechean
claimed the Communists had threatened that they
"had 101 methods to cause them all heart attacks."
Urechean went on to explain that on the 27th his
phone had rung non-stop; Tkaciuk called twenty
times, and Voronin called a couple of times, but
he did not answer the phone. Miszei's assistant
came to him to tell him to pick up the phone.
Urechean said he was told that he had to go to
meet Voronin, and almost forced to do so. At 8:00
P.M. on the 27th, Urechean was called and
threatened that the government would launch a
massive criminal case against him and other AMN
members, if he did not cooperate. However,
Urechean waved these threats away, saying he was
not guilty of anything and hence not afraid.


8. (C) Urechean noted that there were two persons
in Filat's PLDM party who were more vulnerable.
He mentioned in particular a Mr. Furdai, who
previously had served as head of MoldovaGaz. The
Ambassador noted that he had also heard this name
several times from other interlocutors. Urechean
said he had information from the Prosecutor
General's office that criminal charges could be
brought against Furdai. Urechean also mentioned a
member of his own party, Vyecheslav Platon, who
has been in Moscow since before the opening of the
first parliamentary session on May 5. Urechean
explained that Platon had a personal business
conflict with President Voronin's son, Oleg, and
so had been in Moscow "for health reasons."
Urechean said he had personally instructed Platon
to leave.

CHISINAU 00000397 003 OF 003



Comment: The Drama Continues, Final Act Uncertain
-------------- --------------


9. (C) The Moldovan elections drama remains a
cliff-hanger. The PCRM has bought itself a few
extra days to find opposition members of
Parliament who will vote for a PCRM president.
There is no doubt that meetings, calls, and
threats will continue. We also believe that any
substantive compromises or change of presidential
candidates is unlikely; the opposition will
probably stand its ground. If the PCRM leadership
were ready to undertake serious negotiations, a
deal could be found. The threats reported by
Urechean suggest that the PCRM has become
desperate, and turned to playing hardball. Far
more productive would be a real discussion of
conditions and issues.


10. (C) One element of this drama concerns the
fate of the previous Speaker of Parliament, Marian
Lupu. Filat had confidentially indicated to us
that if Lupu were the PCRM's presidential
candidate, Filat would be willing to make a
compromise. While Acting Prime Minister Zinaida
Greceanii has already been chosen as the PCRM's
candidate for president, theoretically she could
step down, and a legal way could be found to hold
new nominations. Such details are not spelled out
in the law on electing a president. At this
point, the PCRM seems more bent on threats than on
a constructive effort to meet the opposition's
conditions.


11. (C) If the parliament fails to elect a
president on June 3 then, according to the law,
repeat parliamentary elections must be held. It
is not clear whether the PCRM would actually win
more votes in a repeat round. Small opposition
parties that failed to make it over the six
percent threshold will be scrambling to cast their
lot with other parties to ensure that their votes
are not wasted. It will be a challenge to ensure
the transparency necessary to guarantee that the
results will not be questioned a second time.
Without massive work cleaning up the voter lists,
the same problems will only be repeated. Society
is deeply split, and prolonging the crisis for a
second round of elections will not heal the rift.
Moldova remains for now in a state of political
crisis.

CHAUDHRY