VORONIN SUGGESTS RUSSIA READY FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHISINAU 000212 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/UMB E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS RS MD SUBJECT: VORONIN SUGGESTS RUSSIA READY FOR OBAMA/CLINTON ENGAGEMENT ON TRANSNISTRIA Classified by: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a March 19 private meeting with the Ambassador, President Voronin said he believed that the Russians wanted to be rid of the Transnistria frozen conflict. If Secretary Clinton or President Obama raised Transnistria with Russia as part of "reset" bilateral relations, Voronin felt the Russians would be ready to move toward real discussions on a resolution of the conflict. Voronin repeated Medvedev's comments that both he and Foreign Minister Lavrov had a good impression of their meeting with Secretary Clinton. The President urged that the new U.S. administration push the troops issue with the Russians as this would give positive impulse to a Transnistria settlement. ¶2. (C) Voronin put a positive spin on the outcome of his March 18 "2-plus-1" meeting with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov, suggesting that the meeting had improved Moldova's relations with Russia and paved the way for a resumption of 5-plus-2 talks. To prove that the Russians were looking at life beyond a settlement, Voronin said that Medvedev had asked his opinion on who could best replace Smirnov. In response to the Ambassador's concerns about Russian peacekeeping forces (PKF),the Moldovan President made a sharp distinction between the PKF and the so-called "limited contingent" of Russian troops with no peacekeeping mandate and no authorization to stay. Voronin stated that those Russian troops, covered by the CFE and the Istanbul Commitments, should depart Transnistria. End Summary. A Positive View of the Moscow 2-plus-1 Meeting -------------- - ¶3. (C) On March 19 President Voronin summoned the EU, OSCE and U.S. Ambassadors to provide readout on his "2-plus-1" meeting in Moscow the previous day. Following a relatively short group briefing, Voronin met separately for over an hour with Ambassador Chaudhry (accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief). Voronin said that the 2-plus-1 meeting was Medvedev's idea, not Moldova's. Voronin stated that this "crucial trip" had two particularly significant positive results: (1) improving the bilateral relations between Moldova and Russia; and (2) paving the way for resumption of meetings in the 5-plus-2 format. Voronin said that he would meet with Smirnov on March 25 to give further impulse to the eight confidence- building working groups. In the first part of the meeting, when the EU Ambassadors were present in the room, Voronin apologized to Ambassador Chaudhry for not having accepted a meeting in the days before the 2-plus-1; to have met he said, would have appeared to the Russians as if he was coming with instructions from the Americans. ¶4. (C) Prior to the formal 2-plus-1 meeting, Voronin had met separately with Russian President Medvedev. According to Voronin, that meeting had set a good tone for trade relations, provided a positive stage for the 2-plus-1, and resulted in a promise of humanitarian assistance. Russia will provide Moldova with 50,000 tons of crude oil in time for the spring agricultural season. A significant result of the 2-plus-1, according to Voronin, was the agreement that the 5-plus-2 was expected to start within the first half of 2009. Additionally, noted Voronin, this was the first time that he had any discussions with the Russians concerning issues relating to conditions after the conflict was settled. Russians want Settlement: USG Should Push -------------- ¶5. (C) Voronin said that confidentially he would share something Medvedev had told him. Both Medvedev and Lavrov had a good impression of their meeting with Secretary Clinton. Voronin believed that, if the new U.S. administration would push the issues of Russian troops and the status of Transnistria with the Russian Federation, that CHISINAU 00000212 002 OF 003 effort would definitely give a positive impulse to a Transnistria settlement. ¶6. (C) Voronin said he felt that the Russians would like to be rid of the Transnistria problem. He believed that they would be interested in a settlement, if it could be done diplomatically, strategically and gracefully. He argued that putting the Transnistria issue on the agenda of Clinton and Obama's bilateral interactions with Russian counterparts would positively influence the Russians. Speculation on Smirnov's Successor -------------- ¶7. (C) To prove that the Russians are willing to reach a settlement, Voronin said that the previous day, when he was alone with Medvedev, the Russian President had inquired about who Voronin could see as a successor for Smirnov. This question he said was proof that they were looking at life beyond a settlement. Voronin had responded that the successor should be selected as a transition figure. It should be someone within the current leadership entourage, as a completely new figure would not be accepted. Voronin said that he had recommended Transnistrian parliamentary leader Yevgeny Shevchuk, even though, as he mentioned to Medvedev, the Transnistrian parliamentary speaker does not have a strong leadership character. Still, he would fit best as a transition leader. PKF Different from Russian Troops -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassador expressed USG concerns about the fourth point in the Joint Statement signed by the 2-plus-1 participants. That point, which welcomed the continued presence of the Russian peacekeepers and called for their transformation into an OSCE force after a Transnistria settlement, appeared to give Moldova's consent for Russian forces to remain on Moldovan territory until a Transnistria settlement was reached. In response, Voronin explained that the Joint Declaration referred only to the Peacekeeping Force, and not the "Limited Contingent" of Russian forces. Only the PKF had the right to be in Moldova under the terms of the 22 June 1992 agreement. These PKF troops were located on the security zone between right-bank Moldova and Transnistria, and had battalions of Moldovan and Ukrainian forces, in addition to the Russian soldiers. ¶9. (C) On the other hand, continued Voronin, on the territory where the 14th Russian Army had been located were 1,200 troops of Russian origin that the Russian Federation claimed were there to guard the Russian military base. Moldova had not given its consent for these troops to remain, and they represented a violation of Moldova's neutral status as guaranteed in the constitution, said Voronin. Though the Peacekeeping Forces had a mandate under the June 1992 agreement, the Russian troops at the base were not peacekeepers, had no legal status and should leave, per Russia's Istanbul Commitments. ¶10. (C) Voronin said that he considered it a success that the Russians had accepted transformation of the peacekeeping force to one under OSCE aegis. Now, he continued, they needed to begin discussions with the OSCE about the mechanism for this transfer. Voronin said that nothing would prevent passing the force to OSCE aegis even before a settlement was reached. He further explained that in case the achievement of a final Transnistria settlement were delayed, Moldova could take a unilateral decision to withdraw its forces, and perhaps Ukraine would withdraw its troops as well, to replace these with an OSCE force. Importance of Confidence-Building Measures -------------- ¶11. (C) Voronin noted that he would meet with Smirnov on March 25 to work on how to promote the CHISINAU 00000212 003 OF 003 eight confidence-building working groups, and to prepare for the 5-plus-2. He viewed the working groups as a way to penetrate into civil society in Transnistria, and reduce the impact of MGB propaganda on separatism. Contacts were important for helping the citizens to better understand Moldova's intentions. Though the financial situation in Moldova was bad, last year Moldova spent 780,000 Euros purchasing blood transfusion equipment for Transnistria, and this year was helping with 500,000 Euros to equip the maternity hospital. Moldova was offering free passports for Transnistrian residents. He noted that ten thousand Transnistrian students were studying at right bank universities, mostly for free. Complaints about European Ambassadors' TN Contacts -------------- -------------- ¶12. (C) During his briefing with the European Ambassadors, Voronin had noted his concern about their direct contacts with the Transnistrian authorities. He noted that the EU has a designated negotiator, Kalman Miszei, so European missions should rely upon Miszei to meet with the Transnistrian authorities. The GOM gets no information from their separate meetings, and so Voronin requested that the EU Ambassadors refrain from meeting with Transnistrian authorities. Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) We concur with Voronin's assessment that putting Transnistria on the high-level agenda for bilateral USG meetings with Russia could fast- track the 5-plus-2 process towards success. Voronin's perception that the Russians are ready but need a push suggests that the timing is right for the Secretary to give some impetus. For Moldova, signing the Joint Declaration represented an exercise in damage limitation. Voronin had long delayed a Moscow meeting for fear he would be asked to sign something completely unacceptable. We have heard reports of unacceptable elements in earlier drafts of a Joint Declaration that did not work their way into the final document (Voronin confirmed that there was an earlier draft which was completely unacceptable),suggesting that Moldova succeeded in its negotiating efforts to modify the text. Voronin appeared relieved that he had managed to escape his encounter with the bear unharmed, and in fact, had some optimism that he had detected signs that a settlement was possible. CHAUDHRY