SOVA DESCRIBES LAVROV'S VISIT TO CHISINAU

C O N F I D E N T I A L CHISINAU 000142

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS RU MD
SUBJECT: SOVA DESCRIBES LAVROV'S VISIT TO CHISINAU

Classified by: Charge d'Affaires Kelly A. Keiderling for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a February 25 meeting, Minister for Reintegration
Sova briefed Ambassador on the outcomes of Russian Foreign Minister
Lavrov's February 23-24 visit to Chisinau. He said that Lavrov's
visit had taken place in a positive, calm atmosphere, with no
difficult issues pressed. Sova said that, though no decision had
been finalized, there were good chances that a 2-plus-1 meeting would
happen in March. If that meeting did take place, the Moldovans would
insist upon clearly stating that a final settlement could be reached
only in the 5-plus-2 format. If the Russians insisted upon a formal
press statement, then Sova promised he would consult with 5-plus-2
partners before such a statement was released. Sova said Moldova was
looking to U.S.-Russia talks in the CFE context to resolve the
question of withdrawing Russian forces. Sova said he believed there
was a real possibility of achieving a settlement with Smirnov. End
Summary.


2. (C) The February 23-24 visit of Serghei Lavrov to Chisinau was the
first time a Russian Foreign Minister has visited Moldova since 2001.
His visit included a meeting with Prime Minister Greceanii, with
Acting Foreign Minister Ostalep, attendance at a Russian Military Day
reception at the Russian Embassy, inauguration of a new Russian
Cultural Center building, and a one-on-one with President Voronin
that lasted approximately one hour. Though Minister for
Reintegration Vasile Sova briefed Ambassador on this visit, Sova
himself was only partially informed about the high-level one-on-one,
and expected to learn more directly from the President in the coming
days.

March 2-plus-1 Likely, but Not Yet Set
--------------


3. (C) Though the majority of press reports announced that the visit
resulted in a decision to hold a 2-plus-1 meeting in March, Sova
explained that the question of whether on not such a trilateral
meeting would take place was still open. However, he said it was
more likely than not that such a 2-plus-1 meeting would take place.
For now, consultations were still needed to establish whether such a
meeting would have positive results for both sides of the river. If
the GOM determined that a meeting would not have positive results, it
would inform Moscow, via its Embassy, that there was no reason to
meet. Though press reports reference dates between March 5 and March
15, Sova insisted that it was still too early to state any firm date,
though this time frame could not be excluded.


4. (C) Sova noted that there had been rumors (spread by the
Ukrainians) that Lavrov would bring to Chisinau some kind of document
to be signed at the 2-plus-1 meeting, but insisted that Lavrov had
not brought anything of the kind. Though in previous meetings Sova
had consistently rejected the idea of Moldova signing any document at
a 2-plus-1, he now conceded that such a meeting might well be
followed by a press statement. Moldova would want the statement to
cover three main points -- the need for a peaceful settlement,
recognition of the territorial integrity of Moldova, and settlement
only within the 5-plus-2 context. Sova assured the Ambassador that
if the Russians presented Moldovan officials with an accord to sign,
the GOM would reject it, insisting upon the 5-plus-2 format. A
5-plus-2 role was necessary, he said, because settlement was not just
about status, but also encompassed economic, social, demilitarization
and other issues. Sova underscored several times that Moldova would
not accept any separate settlement outside of 5-plus-2.

Some Bones of Contention on Status
--------------


5. (C) Sova noted that Russia appeared to have a clearer position
with respect to a Transnistria settlement. He said that Lavrov was
now speaking about a framework for legal relations between two
entities. Sova was pleased that the Russians had incorporated
"legal" into their concept, as Sova had been talking about the idea
of a special legal status for Transnistria. However, Sova also
expressed concern that Russia seemed to think that Moldova would not
be able to preserve its unitary status. Another sticking point in
Sova's mind was that Russia believed a settlement would be achieved
though an accord between Chisinau and Tiraspol, whereas the GOM
believed it had to be provided for in a law adopted by the Moldovan
parliament.


6. (C) Sova noted what seemed to be a positive change, in that Russia
now supported a settlement which respected Moldova territorial
integrity. However, he cautioned, it was still necessary to
understand what was meant by the term -- whether it meant only the
integrity of the external border, with a failed state inside, or
whether this territorial integrity would lead to a viable, functional
unified state inside that border. Merely preserving territorial
integrity was not enough, said Sova, Moldova needed more. Sova cited
the example of Serbia and Montenegro which used to be within one
international border, but under no circumstances would Moldova accept
such a mode of settlement.

Differences on Demilitarization
--------------


7. (C) The Lavrov-Voronin meeting also revealed differences in their
views on demilitarization. Sova said that the President mentioned
the idea of moving a few steps forward in demilitarization before a
political settlement, but was not able to convince Lavrov, who
believed that demilitarization should follow a political settlement.
Sova hypothesized that such a Russian position might be explained by
ongoing negotiations with the U.S. on an adapted CFE. Sova said the
Moldovans would continue to press to have demilitarization discussed
in the 2-plus-1 talks.

CFE Talks Need to Resolve Russian Military Presence
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Sova said that the Moldovan President would not accept any
form of Russian military presence in Transnistria. Transnistria was
part of Moldova, he argued, and the continued presence of Russian
troops would violate Moldova's neutrality. However, noted Sova, many
issues such as discussions of peacekeeping forces did not depend upon
Moldova, but depended upon U.S.-Russian CFE discussions. "It is a
question of what you agree upon with Russia and what you will insist
that we accept," he told the Ambassador. Moldova does not want to
allow any foreign troops on its territory, and this includes the
peacekeeping troops. Additionally, Sova expressed his concerns about
the presence of the "so-called" Transnistrian army. He suggested
that everyone knew who served in this army and who owned the
armaments this force used, and thus the issue of the Transnistrian
army also needed to be resolved. Moldova would not forget the
lessons of 2003 (Kozak Memorandum).

Smirnov's Recent Outbursts
--------------


9. (C) According to Sova, President Voronin had drawn attention to
the fact that, following Smirnov's recent visit to Moscow, the
Transnistrian leader had made a number of "unpleasant statements."
Lavrov had responded by noting that though Russia had certain
influence on him, Smirnov sometimes delivered surprises. Sova
speculated that Smirnov would not have announced a ban on travel for
EU and U.S. government officials without Russia's consent and
support. Sova suggested that Smirnov might make a show of creating
difficulties until after the elections but then would relax.

Russia Will Not Interfere in Elections
--------------


10. (C) Sova noted that Lavrov had begun his meeting with Voronin by
asking for the President's assessment of Moldova's upcoming
elections. Sova reaffirmed the Moldovan desire to avoid a repeat of
what happened in 2005 (when Russia had openly supported the
opposition coalition) and said that Moldova wanted to ensure that
there would be no direct intervention by any foreign powers. Lavrov
had assured Voronin that the Russians had no intention of being
involved in the Moldovan campaign in any way. Sova confirmed that
thus far there was no indication of any Russian interference in the
elections process. Sova reported that Lavrov had suggested that the
PCRM had good chances of winning, and thus would likely continue to
be the party involved in Transnistria discussions. President Voronin
had noted that it was the goal of the ruling party to preserve
political stability and said that it was important that no one from
abroad (including both Russia and the EU) support any political
party.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) It appears that the Moldovans were satisfied with the Lavrov
visit. While the Moldovan leadership is still very wary about its
experience with Russia and the Kozak Memorandum in 2003, Sova's
comments indicated an emerging readiness to cooperate with Russia to
enhance the prospects for resolving Transnistria's status. Moldova
is looking to make progress in the 2-plus-1 format but understands
that the overall settlement cannot be reached without 5-plus-2.
Moldova is proceeding cautiously in its interactions with the Russian
bear, and will try to use any 2-plus-1 consultations to engage the
5-plus-2 actors to tackle the status issue. For the first time, the
Moldovans seem to think that they can get something positive done in
2-plus-1. While Voronin failed to produce a settlement in time for
the elections, he may feel that progress in 2-plus-1 could bring an
electoral boost to the PCRM. The Russians, meanwhile, may calculate
that Voronin is feeling vulnerable and see this as an opportune
moment to press for advantage on their terms.


12. (C) As Lavrov's visit coincided with the electoral campaign it
can only be interpreted as a modicum of support for Voronin. In the
heat of Russia's anger following the failure of the Kozak memorandum,
Moscow had used the 2005 elections to campaign against Voronin and
his PCRM. Lavrov's visit now signaled a clear end to the Kozak
period, pressing the restart button on Moldova's prospects for
working with Russia on a Transnistria settlement. Some opposition
leaders have charged that Lavrov's visit would help boost PCRM
ratings in the elections, but it is not clear that warmer relations
with Russia would be a way for the PCRM to win over the Moldovan
electorate.

KEIDERLING