DASD Wallander Discusses Defense Reform

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHISINAU 001002 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/UMB E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MD SUBJECT: DASD Wallander Discusses Defense Reform with Acting President Ghimpu Classified by: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a December 11 meeting with DASD Celeste Wallander, Acting President Ghimpu welcomed continued U.S. defense-reform assistance, and blamed the Russians and the previous Communist government for a number of problems facing Moldova. In particular, he mentioned the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria; the unresolved Transnistrian dispute; and the lamentable state of the Moldovan Army ("destroyed by the Communists"). End summary. The Reset and USG Support on Transnistria -------------- ¶2. (C) Ghimpu stressed the Moldovan governments focus on finding a way to resolve the Transnistria issue, which he noted was "set up" in 1990 on Moscow's orders. It will be difficult, although as he mentioned to President Medvedev, the process cannot last forever. Seventeen years of dialogue had produced little and more traction was needed to resolve the conflict. Ghimpu thanked DASD Wallander for U.S. support on the Transnistrian issue in the five-plus-two process, which was critical. Wallander said the U.S. understood Moldovan frustration with the slow pace of talks, and stated that the "reset" of relations with Russia had improved the atmosphere with Moscow, which we hoped would benefit discussions over Transnistria. At the same time, she said, the USG does not accept the concept of spheres of influence, and is finding that there are those in the Russian leadership who do not view the region in such terms. To Ghimpu's apparent agreement, she rejected zero-sum-game thinking, and stated that USG involvement in Moldova was not anti- Russian. USG Support for Three Lanes of Military Reform -------------- - ¶3. (C) DASD Wallander noted USG support for the Moldovan military in three lanes: overall reform of the Ministry of Defense; NATO interoperability (which, she stressed, does not presume membership); and bilateral cooperation efforts. She commended Minster of Defense Marinuta for his vision and concrete plan for improving the Moldovan Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces, and interest in accelerating much needed reforms. Wallander noted Marinuta's statement in a meeting earlier that day that all such decisions were to �A;be made by Moldova's political leadership. She also noted that the Department of Defense looked forward to hosting Minister Marinuta at the biennial Bilateral Defense Consultations in Washington, January 11-12. The BDC would establish the strategic direction of U.S.-Moldovan defense relations and offers the U.S. and Moldova an opportunity to shape military engagement in 2010-11. Ghimpu on PCRM Destruction of Army; NATO; and Afghanistan -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Ghimpu lamented the poor state of the Moldovan Armed Forces, noting that "the Communists" (PCRM) had destroyed the Army, doing little except for feeding and clothing the army over the last eight years. The previous government gave the Academy of Sciences twice the budget as the military. The Communists had unfortunately portrayed NATO as a "frightening conspiracy," pointing to polls showing that, while over 60 percent of Moldovans favor EU integration, fewer than 30 percent favor NATO membership. There was a need to portray NATO as an umbrella that maintains peace. Moldova is in the process of reinvigorating its IPAP efforts and will work with NATO on implementing necessary reforms. ¶5. (C) Ghimpu turned to the issue of Moldova's contribution to international operations. He noted that the Moldovan military had assisted in Iraq, and the government was in discussions about CHISINAU 00001002 002 OF 002 possible future contributions. This could possibly include Afghanistan, although there had been no decisions made about any contributions. Ghimpu noted that the Army would serve if given the order, but that many of its members were untrained 18-year olds. (Note: After the meeting, the head of the NATO Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration told us that an Afghanistan deployment could be exploited by the PCRM as a replay of the involuntary deployment of Moldovan conscripts in the Soviet military to Afghanistan in the 1980s. End note.) ¶6. (C) Thanking DASD Wallander for U.S. assistance, Ghimpu singled out the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute for providing training in party-building, and a "reform mentality." He said he appreciated the MCC's USD 262 million grant for roads and irrigation repair, while noting that people in Moldova also needed "to have their Soviet thinking repaired." ¶7. (C) Ghimpu turned to the constitutional reforms needed to change the parliamentary requirement for electing a president from the present three-fifths (61 votes) to a simple majority (51 or 52, depending on who is counting) of the 101 MPs. (Note: the ruling four-party Alliance for European Integration holds 53 seats. End note.) Although he stated that the reforms were necessary for the well-being of the country, irrespective of who was in power, he concluded that failure to reform would leave the PCRM with permanent power to block the election of a president. Comment: -------------- ¶8. (C) Ghimpu did not stray from his usual talking points: strong appreciation of USG support, and a reflexive anti-Russian and anti-Communist stance. Ghimpu used the press conference following the meeting to put in a plug for the idea of Moldova's signing a Strategic Partnership Agreement with the United States. ¶9. (U) This message was cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Wallander. CHAUDHRY