DASD WALLANDER DISCUSSES TRANSNISTRIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHISINAU 001000 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/UMB E.O. 12958; DECL: 12/15/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PINR RS MD SUBJECT: DASD WALLANDER DISCUSSES TRANSNISTRIA WITH FORMER MINISTER OF REINTEGRATION SOVA Classified by: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Wallander and the Ambassador met with former Minister of Reintegration Vitalie Sova on December 11 to discuss the current situation in Transnistria. Sova stressed U.S. and Russian engagement are the key to a solution to the conflict, noting that he and former Transnistrian "Foreign Minister" Litskai were prepared to form a non-governmental working group to propose a way forward. End Summary. Transnistria Overview -------------- ¶2. (C) At a December 11 lunch, former Minister of Reintegration Sova told DASD Wallander and the Ambassador, that Moldova must find "the intersection of Moldovan and Russian interests" to make progress on Transnistria. Sova noted that although the former Moldovan government proposed "demilitarization" of Transnistria as a confidence-building measure, the Russians said they first wanted Moldovan guarantees of permanent neutrality. The previous government had balked at this condition. ¶3. (C) Sova opined that Russian peacekeepers had been "useless" since 1995, when animosity over the 1992 civil war had subsided, and their continued presence only served to maintain the status quo. With the Ukrainians essentially content with the current situation and Romania preoccupied with other issues, only the U.S. and Russia could solve the Transnistria problem. Sova lamented the fact that this was not a priority for either country, and Moldova would have to be content with mere dialogue at the current time. Possible Solutions -------------- ¶4. (C) Despite the lack of prospects for progress, Sova offered views for a constructive way forward on Transnistria. As there will be no progress without a productive discussion of the military situation, Moscow must be made to understand that the eventual withdrawal of its peacekeepers is inevitable. Unfortunately, the Russia-Georgia conflict had complicated the situation and negatively influenced Russia's relations with all of the former Soviet republics. Instead of promoting resolution of conflicts and stability, Russia is interested in "Balkanizing" and instilling fear in the former Soviet republics. ¶5. (C) In response to DASD Wallander's query on whether Russia would be receptive to U.S. engagement with Russia on Transnistria, Sova advised that the U.S. should seek to influence Russian civilian experts. The U.S. should appeal to Russia for a phased withdrawal, first of the Russian Operational Group of Forces, followed by RussiaQs peacekeeping troops. These forces would be replaced with a neutral body, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). While the Russians wanted guarantees of Moldova's neutrality, they must understand that Moldova had the right to determine its own security. At the same time, Sova said, the Russians needed to be reassured that Moldova's economic, historic, and linguistic ties with Russia meant that the two countries would always be linked. Sova-Litskai Initiative? -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that it was important for individual citizens, not just the authorities on both sides of the Dniester, to be involved in discussions on Transnistria. Sova noted that both he and former Transnistrian "Minister of Foreign Affairs" Litskai, whom he had CHISINAU 00001000 002 OF 002 know since 1993, were now free to use their experience and connections to develop a solution that will reflect both the territorial sovereignty of Moldova and the republic status of Transnistria. As both Sova and Litskai are working for their respective governments, they are both free to conduct Track II diplomacy using their knowledge from their years of official negotiations. Sova noted that he had discussed this project with Litskai and found a non- governmental organization to be their umbrella organization, for which they are seeking a grant. Sova underscored that Transnistrian leader Smirnov would likely not approve of such an independent body, but he hoped that Smirnov would be out of power "within two years." ¶7. (C) In response to DASD Wallander's urging that Sova include Russian, European, and U.S. experts in his working group, Sova agree that the inclusion of international experts would be helpful. He was less supportive of Russian participation, suggesting that the Russians would work with Smirnov to "crush" the initiative. Sova was also lukewarm to the idea of including Ukrainian and Romanian experts, since the proposals he read from those two countries were "not useful" for Moldova. EU Travel Ban -------------- ¶8. (C) Sova shifted to the EU's travel ban on Transnistrian leaders, commenting that with the exception of Vice President Alexander Koroliev and Deputy Minister of Security Oleg Gudymo, the ban should be dropped for all on the list, including Smirnov. According to Sova, the EU would then have banned the "worst offenders," while Smirnov would be put on the defensive and have to decide how to respond. Sova added that Smirnov's sons regularly traveled to Europe. Transnistria After Smirnov -------------- ¶9. (C) Sova said that "Obnovlenie", Shevchuk's political party, was the only real political alternative with sufficient funding and cadres to replace Smirnov's forces. According to Sova, Smirnov's party had no future without Smirnov. Sova discounted the strength of the Left Party, Social Democrats, and Communists. ¶10. (C) Sova concluded by stressing that sooner or later, Moldova would break through on the Transnistria issue, but only with external help. There could not be a solution without U.S. and Russian engagement. ¶11. U) This message was cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Wallander.grgr CHAUDHRY