BURMA: KNU REPORTS BURMA ARMY MAY RESUME ATTACKS IN KAREN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000094 SIPDIS GENEVA FOR RMA E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/7/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PREF PHUM BM TH SUBJECT: BURMA: KNU REPORTS BURMA ARMY MAY RESUME ATTACKS IN KAREN STATE REF: A. JUNE 19, AND 22-24 OIS AND PREVIOUS ¶B. BANGKOK 1484 (DKBA OFFENSIVE AND CROSS BORDER FLOWS) ¶C. CHIANG MAI 80 (FIGHTING WANING) ¶D. CHIANG MAI 76 (JUNTA-LED OFFENSIVE) ¶E. CHIANG MAI 71 (ETHNIC ARMED GROUPS RETHINKING) CHIANG MAI 00000094 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai. REASON: 1.4 (d) -------------- Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (C) The Burma Army (BA) and Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA -- a pro-Burmese regime splinter group) may be preparing to renew their offensive against the KNU (Karen National Union -- a group engaged in armed resistance against the Burmese regime),according to KNU contacts. The sources suggested the BA's plan may also include attacking the United Wa State Army (UWSA - another armed resistance group with drug-trafficking links),something we judge highly unlikely. If the BA/DKBA carry out these attacks, the KNU are concerned that many more IDPs may cross into Thailand. Currently, the number of refugees that have fled to Thailand in the wake of last month's fighting stands at just under 3,200. ¶2. (C) Comment: The RTG response to the most recent influx of refugees has been positive (Refs A-D); no one has been forcibly returned to Burma, over 2,300 have been permitted to register as refugees, and NGOs are providing humanitarian assistance. However, some challenges remain; access to the site chosen by the Royal Thai Army to temporarily house the 2,300 refugees currently in need of protection is difficult, and UNHCR would like the RTG to provide better security. Furthermore, the current site could not accommodate additional refugees, although we believe NGOs would be able to provide for their basic needs. End Summary and Comment. -------------- A New BA/DKBA Offensive? -------------- ¶3. (C) On July 2, KNU contacts told us that according to sources close to the Burmese Embassy in Thailand, the BA/DKBA were again preparing to attack the KNU's Seventh Brigade (the one that bore the brunt of last month's fighting -- Refs A, C and D). According to the source, after completing those operations, the BA and DKBA will then set their sights on northern Karen State, where the KNU's First, Second, Third, and Fifth Brigades are headquartered. The source said that the third step in this plan is for the BA and DKBA to move further north and engage the UWSA. Our KNU contacts could not provide any insight into the timing or rationale behind this alleged plan. (Comment: We believe any BA/DKBA attack against the sizable and heavily armed UWSA is highly unlikely and could pose a significant political and military risk to the Burma Army. The regime and the UWSA have had a mutually advantageous ceasefire in place for 20 years. Any fighting between them would complicate regime efforts to convince the UWSA to integrate into a border defense force prior to the 2010 elections (Ref E).) ¶4. (C) Though our KNU contacts could not confirm the veracity of the above information, they told us that the BA and DKBA continue to recruit forcibly porters in both Mon and Karen States. The KNU's intelligence gathering also indicates that the BA and DKBA are planning to increase their combined troop strength in Karen State to approximately 6,000 -- a 100% increase over current troop levels. (Comment: It is too early to tell whether this increase will be permanent, or whether it is part of a regular rotation of troops in and out of the area, during which two units typically overlap for a short period of time.) ¶5. (C) According to the KNU, any attack against its brigades in northern Karen State would likely augment the flow of refugees into Thailand. That area is home to the Eh Htoo Hta IDP camp, which currently houses some 4,000 IDPs, our contact stated. (Note: Many of the approximately 4,000 IDPs who crossed into Thailand as a result of last month's fighting came from the Ler Per Her IDP camp in southern Karen State.) -------------- Karen Tension on the Rise -------------- CHIANG MAI 00000094 002.2 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Meanwhile, other developments are increasing tension among the various Karen groups, according to the KNU: the DKBA has reportedly agreed to join the Burmese regime's Border Guard Force (Ref. E); a DKBA commander was assassinated in an area controlled by the pro-regime KNLA Peace Council, which has accepted incentives (mainly land) from the regime in exchange for returning to Burma after previously fleeing; and the Shan State Army-South -- an active armed group that has not signed a ceasefire agreement -- has expressed interest in forming a military alliance with the KNU and Karenni National Progressive Party (the KNU's Karenni counterpart organization). These developments have led to bickering between the DKBA and KNLA/PC, and would appear to have made it difficult for the KNU and DKBA to contemplate mending their rift. Complicating matters further still, our KNU contact as well as another Burmese exile source told us that local Thai military officials along the border are allowing DKBA troops to cross into Thailand to purchase rations, which, according to the KNU, are in short supply among BA/DKBA troops. -------------- -------------- -------------- Reflections on Last Month's Offensive: KNU Still Holding -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) With the fighting that began in early June now over, the KNU is taking stock of the situation and carrying out its planned "unconventional tactics" (Refs A and C). The KNU base camp at Ko Hla Haing has still not been taken, our contacts confirmed, citing landmines as the main reason. Unfortunately, the KNU does not have consolidated mapping data for the mines, according to our contacts; rather, each battalion that planted mines is responsible for keeping records. This lack of coordination makes the mines a danger to both sides, our contact stated, adding that he believes the KNU laid between 6,000-7,000 in southern Karen State. Another difficulty the KNU faced during last month's fighting is the lack of training the Seventh Brigade has received in unconventional warfare, he told us, noting that the First, Second, Third and Fifth Brigades were much more skilled in this area, and were even making use of mines that are remotely detonated. The Seventh Brigade, he said, is better prepared for conventional combat, which is of little use given that the KNU is out-manned and out-gunned. ¶8. (C) The KNU is keeping a small detachment inside the Ko Hla Haing base that is periodically ambushing BA and DKBA troops according to our KNU contact. Since the fighting began in early June, our contact said the KNU has not suffered any fatalities, and that only eight of its soldiers have been wounded. Our contact did not seem concerned about the KNU's ability to retake the bases lost last month (Ref A),noting the KNU successfully retook a base in southern Karen State earlier this year that it had previously lost to the Burma Army and DKBA. He confirmed reports (Ref A) that the KNU is sending small numbers of troops deep into Karen State to ambush DKBA/BA forces from behind. ¶9. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassies Bangkok and Rangoon. MORROW ANDERSON