SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: INSURGENT LEADERS PRESS AHEAD ON PLAN TO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000058 SIPDIS NSC FOR PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/29/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: INSURGENT LEADERS PRESS AHEAD ON PLAN TO RESUME DIRECT TALKS WITH RTG REF: A. 08 CHIANG MAI 177 (DEMISE OF SECRET PEACE DIALOGUE) ¶B. BANGKOK 618 (INCREMENTAL PROGRESS ON TALKS) ¶C. CHIANG MAI 11 (STALLED PEACE PROCESS AWAITS SIGNAL) ¶D. CHIANG MAI 23 (SECRET DIALOGUE INCHES FORWARD) CHIANG MAI 00000058 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Mike Morrow, CG, ConGen, Chiang Mai. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) -------------- Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (S) Mark Tamthai, former RTG point-man for secret talks with southern insurgents, reports that militant leaders continue to meet among themselves to flesh out a proposal they aim to present as a basis for resuming direct dialogue with the RTG. He told CG April 28 that this effort, now broadened to include some non-militant Southern Thai religious leaders, is taking a "reasonable" direction that stresses a high degree of local authority yet fits within the framework of the Thai constitution. Tamthai continues, however, to harbor doubts about whether PM Abhisit's informal encouragement of this process is sufficient to lead to eventual engagement by the Thai military and old-guard Democrat Party leaders, who are not currently part of the process. ¶2. (S) Comment: It is encouraging that the insurgent leaders appear to have the political space to develop a plan that could serve as the basis for resuming reconciliation talks. The process remains highly fragile, however, given the exclusion of most key RTG power-brokers, and lingering uncertainties about the extent to which the insurgents can truly close ranks behind a peace deal. End Summary and Comment. -------------- -------------- Insurgents Meet Among Selves; RTG Sits Out -------------- -------------- ¶3. (S) CG met April 28 in Chiang Mai with Mark Tamthai, Director of Payap University's Institute of Religion, Culture and Peace and former RTG point-man for secret talks with southern insurgents. Tamthai said the insurgents, or what he now calls "the movement," continue to meet among themselves (outside Thailand) to develop a reconciliation proposal that could serve as the basis for resuming direct talks with the RTG. These meetings continue to be facilitated by the Henri Dunant �0A;Centre (HDC),whose role Tamthai described as being a "witness" to the process. Neither the RTG, nor Tamthai, participate in the meetings. Tamthai does, however, receive readouts and draft documents from the participants, and provides feedback. ¶4. (S) According to Tamthai, this process takes place with the informal encouragement of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, who has indicated willingness to have the RTG return to direct dialogue with the movement should it come up with a "reasonable" proposal for doing so. Asked to define "reasonable," Tamthai said it would entail greater representation, participation, and responsibility for the movement's Malay Muslims in the administration of the far southern provinces, but stop short of concepts such as autonomy and self-determination. ¶5. (S) Tamthai reiterated what he told DCM last November (Ref A): it would be entirely workable for the far southern provinces to take on the same status currently enjoyed by metropolitan Bangkok under the current Constitution; e.g., an elected governor and self-administration of schools, courts, and other services. The movement, with HDC's assistance, is in fact currently meeting in Malaysia to flesh out a framework document along such lines. There is still a lot of detail to be filled in because the movement has much to learn about the responsibilities it wishes to take on. For example, it needs to define what it proposes in terms of guaranteed Malay Muslim representation in provincial administrative bodies, and how it CHIANG MAI 00000058 002.2 OF 002 would administer development policy, education policy, and the courts. Only then could the movement's proposal serve as a useful basis for resuming negotiations with the RTG. ¶6. (S) Tamthai confirmed (as reported in Refs B and C) that the various militant groups comprising the movement continue to coalesce, in order to strengthen their credibility and speak with one voice, and continue to include in their deliberations influential non-militants, such as local religious leaders. Together, they are moving toward completing a reconciliation proposal as soon as possible, though they understand that in order to re-engage the RTG in dialogue the proposal must first contain sufficient detail on re-defining administrative responsibilities in the far South. -------------- -- Doubts About RTG Willingness to Resume Talks -------------- -- ¶7. (S) Tamthai admitted doubts about RTG willingness to engage in genuine dialogue, even were a "reasonable" proposal to emerge from the movement. Both the Thai military, and the old-guard leadership of PM Abhisit's Democrat Party, have long been disinclined to seek a political solution to the southern insurgency. Even Abhisit himself, Tamthai said, while supportive of the concept of reconciliation, is "conservative" about the parameters of what a reconciliation deal would look like. -------------- Prisoner Release, Violence Levels -------------- ¶8. (S) Yet the PM is open-minded about considering prisoner release as a goodwill gesture, Tamthai said. At Abhisit's request, Tamthai prepared and sent him briefing papers on several high-profile Malay Muslim prisoners, noting those he judged to be good candidates for release (religious leaders) and those he did not (militant commanders). ¶9. (S) Regarding the latest cycle of violence in the deep South (detailed in Ref A),Tamthai characterized these acts as targeted, "controlled" acts by the militants aimed at demonstrating their capabilities and remaining in the headlines, not random, "uncontrolled" acts perpetrated by persons acting outside of militant command structures. ¶10. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Bangkok. MORROW