Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09CHIANGMAI57
2009-04-23 07:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Chiang Mai
Cable title:  

GMS: POOR INFRASTRUCTURE, BORDER INEFFICIENCIES FORM ROAD

Tags:  ELTN ECON ECIN ETTC EWWT ETRD CH LA TH 
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PP RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHGH RUEHHM RUEHVC
DE RUEHCHI #0057/01 1130739
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 230739Z APR 09
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1024
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0058
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 1106
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CHIANG MAI 000057 

SIPDIS

STATE PASS TO DEPT OF COMMERCE, USTDA, AND CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PATROL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/17/2019
TAGS: ELTN ECON ECIN ETTC EWWT ETRD CH LA TH
SUBJECT: GMS: POOR INFRASTRUCTURE, BORDER INEFFICIENCIES FORM ROAD
BLOCKS ON NORTH-SOUTH CORRIDOR

REF: A. Chengdu 69 (Yunnan's Rocky Roads)

B. Vientiane 112 (China's Investment in Northern Laos)

C. Vientiane 88 (Flagship Road Deteriorates)

D. Chiang Mai 33 (French Links to Mekong Region)

E. 08 Chiang Mai 174 (East-West Corridor)

F. 08 Chiang Mai 169 (GMS Movement of People)

G. 08 Chiang Mai 52 (Logistics Development in GMS)

H. 07 Chiang Mai 166 (Northern Thailand, North-South Corridor)

I. 08 Vientiane 226 (GMS Summit)

J. 07 Vientiane 524 (New Transport Arteries)

K. 06 Vientiane 632 (Moving Laos into China)

L. 07 Chengdu 290 (China-Burma Border)

CHIANG MAI 00000057 001.2 OF 004


M. 07 Chengdu 124 (Yunnan and Southeast Asia)

CLASSIFIED BY: Kevin Rosier, Economic Officer, Consulate
General, Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CHIANG MAI 000057 SIPDIS STATE PASS TO DEPT OF COMMERCE, USTDA, AND CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/17/2019 TAGS: ELTN ECON ECIN ETTC EWWT ETRD CH LA TH SUBJECT: GMS: POOR INFRASTRUCTURE, BORDER INEFFICIENCIES FORM ROAD BLOCKS ON NORTH-SOUTH CORRIDOR REF: A. Chengdu 69 (Yunnan's Rocky Roads) ¶B. Vientiane 112 (China's Investment in Northern Laos) ¶C. Vientiane 88 (Flagship Road Deteriorates) ¶D. Chiang Mai 33 (French Links to Mekong Region) ¶E. 08 Chiang Mai 174 (East-West Corridor) ¶F. 08 Chiang Mai 169 (GMS Movement of People) ¶G. 08 Chiang Mai 52 (Logistics Development in GMS) ¶H. 07 Chiang Mai 166 (Northern Thailand, North-South Corridor) ¶I. 08 Vientiane 226 (GMS Summit) ¶J. 07 Vientiane 524 (New Transport Arteries) ¶K. 06 Vientiane 632 (Moving Laos into China) ¶L. 07 Chengdu 290 (China-Burma Border) CHIANG MAI 00000057 001.2 OF 004 ¶M. 07 Chengdu 124 (Yunnan and Southeast Asia) CLASSIFIED BY: Kevin Rosier, Economic Officer, Consulate General, Chiang Mai. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (SBU) This is the first in a series of reports on the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) issued by Consulate General Chiang Mai and Embassy Vientiane. Econ staff of both posts traveled together by road from the China-Lao border to the Lao-Thai border to collect the information reported in these cables. This cable addresses land transportation along the GMS's North-South Economic Corridor that runs from southern China to Bangkok and its nearby ports. Subsequent cables will address cross-border investment and trade issues in the GMS. Consulate General Chengdu also provided significant trip planning support and reporting coordination and recently issued a report on road links between Sichuan and Yunnan provinces (ref a). -------------- Summary and Comment -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Non-tariff barriers, led by infrastructure shortcomings and border-crossing inefficiencies, are the greatest obstacles to enhancing trade links within the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). Completed only about one year ago, parts of the R3A highway of the GMS's North-South Economic Corridor are already crumbling. Within Laos, Chinese-built sections of the road are collapsing while the Thai-financed part is under major reconstruction. In Thailand, road construction and expansion projects are on hold due to economic woes. Thes
e challenges are exacerbated by inefficiencies at customs and border crossings - such as duplicate inspections and manual transfer of goods from Chinese to Thai trucks. ¶3. (C) Comment: Efforts by the GOL and RTG to address infrastructure problems and border-crossing inefficiencies seem to be reactive at best. For example, while a nearly certain date is known for construction of the Mekong River bridge to connect Huay Sai, Laos to Chiang Khong, Thailand, there is a lack of understanding about how customs will manage the change and the presumed increase in cargo traffic that will follow. As such, there is a significant need for infrastructure aid and capacity building of customs and inspection procedures at the border points, particularly in Laos. End summary and comment. -------------- A Wide China-Lao Border -------------- ¶4. (C) Under the banner of the Asian Development Banks's Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) project, the southern China, northern Laos, and northern Thailand region has slowly grown more connected through the construction of the R3A highway. This land route is expected to be the lifeline of the North-South Economic Corridor, seen by many business leaders in the region as a potential "golden gateway" linking southern China to Bangkok and foreign markets further afield. The R3A begins its journey southward from Kunming (in southern China's Yunnan province),and crosses into Laos at Boten in Luang Namtha province. Although the spirit of the GMS agreement is that cross-border mobility should be more efficient, the reality is a wide border with various unnecessary obstacles. At the border crossing, Lao immigration oversees the movement of cargo trucks CHIANG MAI 00000057 002.2 OF 004 and people in and out of Laos. Officials there reported that they do not yet see many cargo trucks on the R3A at the border, but described the inefficient way in which cargo must pass from Chinese to Thai trucks (or vice versa in the opposite direction). Because Chinese cargo trucks may not carry goods through Laos and Thailand (and Thai and Lao trucks cannot do the same into China),trucks must back up to one another so that laborers can manually move the goods from one truck's container to the other's, an unnecessarily laborious process. ¶5. (C) Another oddity at the China-Laos border is the location of the Lao customs office. Unlike at usual border crossings, the Boten customs office is located about 12.5 miles deeper into Laos on the R3A at Na Tuey. The reason for the unusual location is the establishment of the three square-mile Chinese-constructed "special economic zone," which local Lao officials refer to as a Chinese concession (ref b). The zone has effectively pushed the border into Laos by about four miles. According to the Director of Provincial Customs at Luang Namtha, which manages the Boten border crossing, the GOL is not permitted to conduct customs operations in the zone, which is designed to be a duty-free area. About one half mile from the special economic zone's edge, however, provincial customs is constructing a new customs and inspection center; the customs director did not know when that project would be completed nor how it would change customs procedures. At the current customs location, the director said that the facility has one computer and has had electricity only since last year. Boten Customs does not offer traders any online options for filing customs paperwork. ¶6. (C) According to the provincial customs office, use of the R3A through the province remains low with only about 50 to 70 trucks passing through in either direction daily. The customs director said that cargo traffic at Boten is about one-fourth of the volume passing at Savannakhet, Laos, which is located on the East-West Economic Corridor that runs from Burma across to Vietnam. The director noted that since October 2008, about 375 trucks passed through Laos from China to Thailand and about the same number passed in the reverse direction. He estimated that cargo truck traffic between China and Thailand via Laos is increasing at a rate of about 10% annually, and will only continue to increase since the R3A has made travel from Kunming to the Thai border a "one-day trip." (Note: It is possible to journey by road from Kunming to the Thai-Lao border within 24 hours.) -------------- Please Watch Your Step -------------- ¶7. (C) Though the stretch of the R3A from Boten to Huay Sai (the full 142 miles of the highway within Laos) is less than two years old, it suffers from several problems that slow down transportation and make driving difficult and dangerous. It is not uncommon along the northernmost Chinese-built part to see a full lane of the road collapsed down the side of a mountain. In the southernmost Thai-financed part of the road, there is major construction which was actively under repair throughout the journey. Often, a full lane would be blocked by an avalanche of soil on the road. Despite this Thai-funded section being the most challenging to use, Lao officials along the route are more critical of the Chinese section that is in disrepair. According to the ADB, the Yunnan Highway and Bridge Company constructed the "Chinese section" of the road and, as of May 2008, is no longer liable for its repairs. One ADB expert told Vientiane's econoff that China has agreed to fund additional repairs on its section of the road, but Lao officials on the ground said they did not know who would fund the road's maintenance. Meanwhile, the entire Thai section of the R3A is under repair by a Thai construction firm with Thai financing. (Note: Ref c gives a detailed description of the quality of the R3A within Laos.) -------------- CHIANG MAI 00000057 003.2 OF 004 At Thai-Lao Border, The Road Stops Here -------------- ¶8. (C) The Lao-Thai border is the last remaining major choke point along the R3A, given the lack of a bridge across the Mekong River there. The border towns of Huay Sai, Laos and adjacent Chiang Khong, Thailand have lines of cargo trucks waiting to make their way across the Mekong River. Like at Boten, traders do not have the option to file customs papers online at Huay Sai. With no bridge yet built, traders have three options to get their goods from one side of the Mekong to the other. The first method is to unload the goods by hand from the truck to a boat. After the boat crosses the river, goods are reloaded back onto another truck manually. This is the most common method used about 60% of the time, according to the Huay Sai customs office, and marks the second time that goods must be moved manually from one vessel to another (see para 4). A second option is for the truck to unload the entire container of goods onto a boat, which then crosses the Mekong. A new truck and driver will pick up the container on the other side and complete the journey. This occurs about 20% of the time. A final option is for the entire truck, including the container and the driver, to mount a boat and cross the river. This method is also utilized about 20% of the time. ¶9. (C) The second two options, though more efficient, pose significant risks including capsizing and accidents on the ramps. On the Lao side, the "ramp" is a narrow and steep strip with shops and private residences on either side. On the Thai side, the currently used "dry season ramp" is unpaved and seems unsuitable for large cargo trucks, especially when carrying gas, a common Thai export to China via the R3A. During the rainy season, when the Mekong River is sufficiently high, an alternative and safer paved ramp may be used. While it seems highly inefficient for 60% of cargo crossing at this border point to be unloaded and reloaded by hand, the Director of Huay Sai Customs says that there is an advantage to this process. Without sophisticated inspection technology, the manual transfer of goods allows customs officials to thoroughly inspect cargo in a low-cost way. The customs director said he does not know how the process will change once the new bridge over the Mekong River will be built. -------------- Bridging the Gap -------------- ¶10. (C) The future Mekong River bridge, which will connect Huay Sai to Chiang Khong, is the last missing piece of the R3A route. On the Thai side of the Mekong River, at the bridge site, markers and a large sign prominently display the future location of the bridge. The sign indicates that construction began last month (though there is no sign of construction yet) and the process should be completed in 30 months. Chiang Khong customs officials said that construction should begin soon and will likely finish on time. On the Thai side, an additional five miles of road needs to be constructed to connect the future bridge to the current R3A highway. Chiang Khong customs officials said that because of the current economic crisis and uncertainties about government budgets, they are unsure when this missing link (and the expansion of the R3A elsewhere in Thailand from two to four lanes) will be funded and built. ¶11. (C) On the opposite Lao side, there is no indication that one is at the location of the future bridge; however, development along the road indicates that some kind of change is coming. A large construction site very near the bridge site marks the location of a future casino-resort, a Korean investment. Also, at the village which one must pass to get from the R3A to the bridge, villagers are fully aware of the new Mekong Bridge and are looking forward to its construction, having been told by the GOL about the project since 1998. CHIANG MAI 00000057 004.2 OF 004 Villagers said that just three months ago Lao government officials came to survey this bypass road which needs to be widened and repaved. They said that the road will expand by about 11 yards, but that they will not receive any compensation as this land along the side of the road already belonged to the government. -------------- The R3A's Ugly Step-Sister: The R3B -------------- ¶12. (C) Despite all of its faults, the R3A is considered the road of greatest potential along the North-South economic corridor. As such, the parallel R3B which runs from southern China to Thailand via Burma remains a mystery. Sources in Laos and Thailand claim that the R3B, which enters Thailand at the border town of Mae Sai in Chiang Rai province, is hardly used because the PRC has ordered the Burma-China border crossing closed to prevent Chinese citizens from crossing to gamble at the casino on the Burma side. There is good reason to believe that this is not true and that the road is used for some commerce. One reason to doubt this explanation is that a Chinese-owned casino at the special economic zone in Boten, Laos is popular among middle class Yunnanese; yet the PRC has not given any signs that it will close that border point. Second, various Yunnanese, Burmese, and Thai merchants at the large Chinese goods market in Mae Sai said that their goods are produced in China and, usually, are shipped by land from southern China through Burma to the adjacent town of Takilek where the goods are then brought across into the Thai market. Although all bets are on the R3A as the "true highway" of the North-South economic corridor, there are signs that the R3B is a backdoor channel already in use (see septel on GMS trade issues). -------------- Background: A Bumpy Start -------------- ¶13. (C) In an effort to better understand the economic consequences of the R3A highway, econ staff from Chengdu, Vientiane, and Chiang Mai originally planned to travel the entire route together. We hit our first bump in the road when the Yunnan Foreign Affairs Office, after an initial approval, subsequently declined Consulate General Chengdu's request to travel via road into Yunnan province. With China obstructing access, posts rearranged the trip to cover the route from the China-Laos border at Boten, Laos through northern Thailand. (Note: Ref a describes more about limited access to Yunnan province.) ¶14. (C) Consequently, our journey began from Vientiane, which ultimately highlighted the R3A highway's isolation of the capital city and political-economic hub of Laos. Vehicles that travel from Vientiane along local Lao roads to the R3A face a bumpy start. The current 240-mile road that connects Vientiane to Luang Prabang takes approximately eight hours to drive at an average speed of 30 miles per hour because of the mountainous terrain, lack of tunnels and bridges, and poor road conditions. From Luang Prabang to Luang Namtha, where the local highway system connects to the R3A, the drive is an additional eight hours; and this stretch of Lao highway 13 is under dire need of repair. In addition to the road being curvy and steep, roaming villager-pedestrians and frequent potholes hinder easy movement. The cumulative 16 hours of travel time from Vientiane to the R3A at Luang Namtha underscores the isolation of this "economic corridor" from the political and economic center of northern Laos. MORROW

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