UPPER NORTH: THAKSIN'S HEARTLAND MAY MOBILIZE IF ECONOMY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000004 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/7/2019 TAGS: ECON PGOV EAGR KDEM TH SUBJECT: UPPER NORTH: THAKSIN'S HEARTLAND MAY MOBILIZE IF ECONOMY WORSENS REF: A. 07 CHIANG MAI 187 (NORTHERNERS REMAIN LOYAL TO "THAKSINOMICS") ¶B. 08 CHIANG MAI 178 (PRO AND ANTI-THAKSIN GROUPS IN CHIANG MAI: A PROFILE) CHIANG MAI 00000004 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Kevin Rosier, Consular-Economic Officer, Consulate General, Chiang Mai. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) -------------- Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (C) Local political leaders and experts from Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai provinces say that a deeper polarization of "yellow shirts" and "red shirts" in the upper north may result if the new Democrat-led government is short-lived, Thaksin remains active politically from overseas, and economic conditions worsen. If these conditions are met, former PM Thaksin Shinawatra loyalists in Thailand's upper north may strengthen and mobilize in 2009. SEPTEL will report on the views of villagers in the lower north. ¶2. (C) Red-leaning northerners, however, may be prepared to let their loyalty wane if the new government is effective at maintaining Thaksin-initiated populist policies, a situation that will take time to develop. While Thaksin-loyalists are divided on whether to give PM Abhisit's new government a chance, the minority yellow shirts of the upper north wholeheartedly welcome the new government, citing the elitist view that most Thaksin loyalists are not sufficiently educated to know what is best for them economically. These "yellow shirts" hope that the new government can counter red shirt movements from the north, even if that means involving the military. ¶3. (C) Comment: The fate of the upper north as a Thaksin-stronghold may lie in the hands of the more moderate Thaksin loyalists. While these Thais of the upper north still show support for Thaksin, their priorities in a worsening economy will likely turn away from political fighting and toward whatever solutions are available to improve living conditions. If PM Abhisit's government survives long enough to demonstrate effectiveness at improving the welfare of voters in the upper north and undercutting red shirt movements, Thaksin's base in the region could falter. If, on the other hand, the government fails, the presently strong red shirt movement of the upper north may provide more hope to those facing economic hard-times and come back with yet another strong performance in the next round of elections. End Summary and Comment. -------------- -------------- Unemployment and Debt Place Burdens on Upper North -------------- -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Though devotion to Thaksin among average upper north villagers may vary from the most diehard "red shirts" (the color of dress favored by Thaksin loyalists) to lukewarm fans, their growing economic problems are common, namely rising unemployment and debt. Economists have estimated over 1 million unemployed in Thailand this year. Though many of those losing work are in Bangkok, these newly unemployed are usually domestic migrants from Thailand's north or northeast regions. A Chiang Mai University labor economist says that the 1 million estimate is low and that without good government policies to fold these people back into the work force, they may remain unemployed for awhile. He expects that if the newly unemployed cannot find work - thereby placing economic burdens on their northern families as well - this may affect the current political polarization of yellow and red shirts in northern Thailand. Specifically, he predicts a strengthening red shirt movement as a consequence of growing economic hardships and, by extension, the likelihood of a Thaksin-backed political force winning decisively in any subsequent set of elections. ¶5. (SBU) In addition to growing unemployment, media have reported growing levels of debt among Thai farmers as commodity prices fall. Upper north villagers report that a large part of their debt comes from borrowing from the Village Fund, a Thaksin-initiated program that provides low-interest credit in villages. As in previous years (ref a),these villagers nonetheless continue to appreciate the option to borrow from the Village Fund. Leaders of one village in Chiang Rai province said that the average debt per household is about $2,800, and that every household in the village is in debt. When pressed on whether they resent the program because of their growing debt, they replied that they would still rather have the fund than not and that debt is an expected and common burden for families at their income level. -------------- The Bright Red Upper North -------------- CHIANG MAI 00000004 002.2 OF 003 ¶6. (SBU) It is well established from election results in 2001, 2005 and 2007 that northern Thailand is a base for former PM Thaksin Shinawatra, and the upper northern provinces of Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai are specific strongholds within the region. A group of Chiang Rai farmers told us during a December 16-18 trip that they will do "whatever it takes" to get Thaksin back in Thailand and back in power. These farmers complained that since Thaksin was removed from office by the coup d'etat of September 2006, their economic welfare has been in decline. These farmers, who identified themselves as devout red shirts, said that their loyalty to Thaksin has only grown as economic conditions have worsened. As a result, they have rallied under the leadership of red shirt organizers and participate in protests upon any immediate request. They said that they are willing to travel to Bangkok, if need be, to do so at their own expense, and to use violence against person or property, if that is what red shirt leaders request of them. (Note: This group explained that cell phone text messaging and radio announcements are the primary means of communication to mobilize red shirt members, which is consistent with what redshirt organizers in Chiang Mai told us, per ref b.) -------------- -------------- Chiang Rai Corn Farmers Demonstrate Ability to Mobilize -------------- -------------- ¶7. (SBU) A recent example of how current economic hardships can impact political mobilization in the upper north was the protest by Chiang Rai corn farmers who blockaded the main routes into and out of the city on December 16 and 17. The previous government under former PMs Samak and Somchai instituted price guarantees for corn farmers, a Thaksin-era legacy. The policy allowed for the RTG to purchase up to 500,000 tons of corn at the guaranteed price of 15 cents per pound, six cents per pound higher than the market price. ¶8. (SBU) With such a significant difference between the government and market prices, suppliers quickly maxed out the 500,000 ton cap and were unwilling to re-enter the current market of low prices resulting from the global economic downturn. Instead, under the leadership of the red shirt movement, the farmers mobilized to block access into and out of Chiang Rai city. Although the price guarantee was a policy initiated by a Thaksin-backed government, red shirt leaders managed to associate the lack of an expanded volume of corn purchased by the government at the guaranteed price with the newly forming Democrat Party-led government, shifting any blame from former PMs Samak and Somchai to current PM Abhisit. The result was a two-day protest that illustrates how economic complaints can quickly mobilize Thaksin-loyalists in the upper north. -------------- -------------- Yet Thaksin's Upper North Base Could Falter If . . . -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Although the climate in the upper north is ripe for pro-Thaksin mobilization, there is no guarantee that voters will always turn to him (or his political partners) for economic salvation. Voter fatigue over political infighting and local government loyalty to PM Abhisit are two ways that the upper north Thaksin base could wane this year. -- The Wait-and-See Mentality -- ¶10. (C) Although most upper north voters are Thaksin-supporters, most are tired of political fighting and want to see a government that is stable and effective. One kamnan, a local government district official who covers multiple villages, said that voters in his Chiang Rai constituency are satisfied enough with the new government and at least want to see it have the chance to govern. He said that as long as villagers are poor, they will hope for Thaksin to return and fix their economic problems; however, he said that with many voters being disappointed with the performance of the previous Samak- and Somchai-led governments, this loyalty to Thaksin may be dwindling. ¶11. (SBU) A group of female villagers in Chiang Rai said that although they hope that Thaksin returns to clear his name, they have a "wait-and-see" approach to the new government because they are tired of the political fighting in Thailand. They said that while they appreciate Thaksin's populist policies such as low-cost health care and the Village Fund, they would only be angry if the new government removed the programs rather than let them be. The women said that they hope for Thaksin's return not to save them from their economic problems, but to clear his name as a "hometown boy" who does not deserve the embarrassment he has faced. CHIANG MAI 00000004 003.2 OF 003 ¶12. (C) In a suburban village of Chiang Mai, the Village Head said that while economic conditions have worsened locally, villagers want for nothing. She said that the only villagers not working are day laborers who believe that current low wages make working not worth their time. The Deputy Mayor of this village's municipality said that incomes are falling in the area, but unemployment has not risen much yet. He expects that it will not be until April that villagers will see the impact of the economic crisis at the grassroots level. The village head said that villagers are aware of the current red-yellow polarization in Thailand but prefer to identify themselves as neutral. She said that her village also has a "wait-and-see" attitude about PM Abhisit and his new government. ¶13. (SBU) In Sankamphaeng, located near Chiang Mai city, village leaders said that if economic conditions worsen this year, villagers will shift focus away from politics towards earning money for their families. They said much will depend on the new government's ability to handle the economic crisis, which they are prepared to observe. -- Local Government Loyalties -- ¶14. (C) In addition to this benefit-of-the-doubt attitude toward the new government by many villagers, local government loyalty to the new national government under PM Abhisit may also weaken Thaksin's upper north base. The President of the Kamnan and Village Head Association of the 17 northern provinces claimed all members who are local government leaders are on board with the new government and ready to let it lead, especially because of the poor performance of former PM Samak. ¶15. (C) The Association President, who is also a kamnan in Chiang Rai, explained that there have been Qent changes to tQ rules for kamnans and village heads, which may allow local leaders to shift loyalty away from constituents. Currently, voters choose village heads by election; and village heads select a kamnan. Whereas previously both terms were for five years with no limit to the number of terms, under new regulations the village head and kamnan terms are for life until mandatory retirement at 60 years of age. The result could be a range of local government leaders who have no motivation to represent their constituencies given that they are no longer required to run for re-election. ¶16. (U) This cable is the first in a two-part series covering the impact of the economic crisis on politics in the upper and lower north of Thailand. This cable was coordinated with Embassy Bangkok. MORROW