BURMA-KNU: KNU SEEKS PRECONDITIONS FOR TALKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000049 SIPDIS NSC FOR PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/9/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM BM TH SUBJECT: BURMA-KNU: KNU SEEKS PRECONDITIONS FOR TALKS REF: A. CHIANG MAI 45 (BURMA-KNU: THAI MEDIATION) ¶B. CHIANG MAI 37 (KNU UNDER INCREASED PRESSURE) ¶C. BANGKOK 888 (AMBASSADOR AND KASIT) ¶D. BANGKOK 815 (KASIT'S VISIT TO BURMA) ¶E. RANGOON 214 (RUMORED MILITARY RESHUFFLING) CHIANG MAI 00000049 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) -------------- Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (C) Despite the Burmese regime's offer reported in Ref A for unconditional talks with the Karen National Union (KNU),which has been waging a conflict against the regime for over 50 years, the KNU placed several conditions on its participation in future talks with the regime during its April 6 meeting with Thai FM Kasit, who has offered to be a facilitator for direct talks between the KNU and the Burmese regime. Though he characterized some of the KNU's requests as unattainable, Kasit agreed to use them as the starting point for a discussion with Burmese PM Thein Sein he expects to have on the margins of the April 10-12 ASEAN Plus Three and East Asian Summits in Pattaya, Thailand. According to the NLDLA (National League for Democracy Liberated Areas),the exile group that claims to speak for Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD (National League for Democracy),the FM also, at its request, agreed to explore possibilities for Thailand to serve as a facilitator for discussions between the NLD and the Burmese regime. ¶2. (C) Comment: The Thai realize that both the KNU and the Burmese regime have preconditions but feel it is in all parties' interests to seek a way to initiate direct talks (ref D). While Kasit's personal intervention and genuine interest in promoting dialogue may give new life to a long-stalled process, it remains to be seen what impact the Thai facilitating role will have on the parties' willingness to reach a deal. End Summary and Comment. -------------- Around the Table -------------- ¶3. (C) On Monday April 6, FM Kasit, accompanied by several ministry officials but not his usual Burma team, met for approximately two hours at a private Bangkok residence with KNU leaders and an NLDLA representative. The KNU's representatives were Vice Chairman David Tharklabaw, General Secretary Szipporah Sein, Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA - the armed wing of the KNU) Commander Gen. Mu Tu, and Military Attache for Foreign Affairs Aung Myint Shwe. At Kasit's request, the NLDLA's Nyo Myint, who arranged for the meeting, also participated in the discussion; Nyo Mint gave us a read-out on April 9. During the discussion, Kasit reportedly noted that PM Abhisit, Army Commander Anupong Paochinda and Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwan were aware of his mediation efforts. -------------- Really Without Preconditions,? -------------- ¶4. (C) According to Nyo Myint, Kasit led off the meeting by encouraging the KNU to be "more realistic" in its expectations, pointing out that the nearly 60-year-old conflict it has waged against the Burmese regime has not achieved any of its aims. He also summarized his visit to Burma and held up the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand as examples of countries that had transitioned to democracy, and had experience that might be relevant to Burma. Kasit added that in his view, Burmese Senior General Than Shwe sees himself as Burma's King, but that those below him espouse different views. Specifically, he suggested that PM Thein Sein and FM Nyan Win are more flexible. (Embassy Rangoon comments that while some observers do believe PM Thein Sein and FM Nyan Win may be more flexible than Than Shwe, most believe they have relatively little influence or decision-making authority within the regime. Furthermore, Embassy Rangoon has been hearing rumors Thein Sein may soon step down as PM (Ref E).) CHIANG MAI 00000049 002.2 OF 003 ¶5. (C) Kasit also emphasized that the regime had claimed to him that it was prepared to enter into talks unconditionally, and asked the KNU if it would place any preconditions on negotiations, according to Nyo Myint. The KNU delegation responded that talks would have to be accompanied by a temporary ceasefire, and by the withdrawal of Burma Army troops from the Thai-Burma border to positions 50 kilometers inside Burma. They even marked up a map of military positions provided by the MFA to reflect the desired troop realignment. ¶6. (C) KNU representatives also said that any peace deal would have to continue to allow the group to be able to levy taxes on mining, logging, and crops. According to Nyo Myint, when Kasit asked how the KNU would handle border trade, the KNU added it to the list of activities it would like to tax. (Note: The KNU currently does not earn revenue from cross-border trade.) Furthermore, the KNU delegation said it would not negotiate with the Burmese regime on Burmese territory, subsequently ruling out Italy, Germany, Sweden and Japan as possible alternate venues. PM Thein Sein or Gen. Thura Shwe Mann would be acceptable interlocutors, according to the KNU. -------------- Kasit's Reaction -------------- ¶7. (C) Kasit observed that the request for Burmese troops to withdraw from the border region was unlikely to be met, but agreed to bring it up with PM Thein Sein, according to Nyo Myint. Kasit offered Thailand as a host country for whatever negotiations take place, to which the KNU agreed. Kasit remarked that he thought the time was right to pursue a peace deal, because Thein Sein told him during his recent visit to Burma that the younger generation of Burma Army soldiers was "tired of fighting." Nyo Mint said Kasit had added that Thein Sein had also expressed interest in negotiations with the Shan State Army South and Karenni National Progressive Party, but said it was unclear whether Thein Sein would ask him to facilitate these talks as well. ¶8. (C) At the request of the NLDLA, Kasit agreed to coordinate with Royal Thai Army Commander Anupong to ensure the security of the KNU during the remainder of this process, and to provide as yet unspecified assistance in helping the KNU establish a liaison office to maintain contact with Kasit. Nyo Mint claimed Kasit also agreed that KNU leaders could return to the Thai side of the border, though warned them sternly not to engage in any cross-border military operations. (Note: As reported Ref B, in February, the RTG ordered KNU leaders to relocate to positions on the Burma side of the border.) -------------- What's Next? -------------- ¶9. (C) Kasit said he expects to have an opportunity to brief Burmese PM Thein Sein on his discussions with the KNU during the ASEAN Plus Three and East Asian Summits April 10-12 in Pattaya, Thailand. More formal discussions could follow once the KNU sends Kasit more concrete, considered thoughts on the way forward, said Nyo Myint. Kasit told Nyo Myint he hoped to fly to Rangoon in the first half of April to present the KNU's views, but Nyo Myint told us that he had cautioned Kasit that the KNU would need more time to consider its stance. -------------- A Second Track? -------------- ¶10. (C) Also at the request of the NLD-LA, Kasit agreed to explore possibilities for Thailand to serve as a go-between for the NLD and the Burmese regime, Nyo Myint claimed. Nyo Myint added that he had asked the NLD Central Executive Committee to constructively critique Burma's new constitution and offer alternative language for provisions it did not find acceptable. According to Nyo Myint, the NLD took the request on board, and he plans to share its views with Kasit, who he claims has agreed in principle to convey the NLD's concerns to the Burmese regime. CHIANG MAI 00000049 003.2 OF 003 ¶11. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassies Bangkok and Rangoon. MORROW