SOUTHERN THAILAND: SKEPTICAL ARMY LEADERSHIP STEPPING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 CHIANG MAI 000171 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM PTER TH MY SUBJECT: SOUTHERN THAILAND: SKEPTICAL ARMY LEADERSHIP STEPPING ABOARD SECRET DIALOGUE PROCESS REF: A. BANGKOK 2844 (Chavalit Stirs the Pot) ¶B. CHIANG MAI 145 (PM Pushes Secret Dialogue) ¶C. BANGKOK 2096 (HDC Dialogue Resumes) ¶D. BANGKOK 2792 (Najib Wades In) CHIANG MAI 00000171 001.2 OF 004 CLASSIFIED BY: Mike Morrow, CG, ConGen, Chiang Mai. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) -------------- Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (S) PM Abhisit appears to be bringing a skeptical Thai military leadership more fully on board with his policy to resume a secret dialogue with insurgents as a means to resolve the long-running ethnic Malay Muslim insurgency in the country's deep south. At an Abhisit-chaired November 2 meeting of the RTG's southern security policy team, Army Commander Anupong joined for the first time and reportedly indicated he would not stand in the way of the talks, though he did not believe they would succeed. Days later the latest round of talks were held in Manila. It produced no movement on various confidence-building measures, and focused mainly on interference by Malaysian security officials who wish to "own" the dialogue for themselves, according to one Thai participant. At a higher level, Malaysian PM Najib's recent comment advocating some form of autonomy for the southernmost provinces is seen by some observers here as an opportunity. Although "autonomy" is a loaded term in the southern Thailand context, the concept of a greater local voice in governance has long been on the table as an essential element for ending the conflict. Local empowerment in the South will be explored in depth at a high-level seminar at Bangkok's Chulalongkorn University on November 30. ¶2. (S) Comment: Having General Anupong apparently on board to be part of the peace process is, despite Anupong's pessimism, an important development. If it holds, it leaves Abhisit less alone in pushing toward a political solution through dialogue -- though the negative reaction across much of the Bangkok political spectrum (including within Abhisit's own Democrat Party) to opposition leader Chavalit's "Pattani City" idea is an indication of the political challenge ahead (Ref A). For now, however, the dialogue is making scant progress on confidence-building measures that must succeed if meaningful progress is to be made toward ending an insurgency that is unlikely to be resolved by force of arms. End Summary and Comment. -------------- -------------- Southern Policy: Bringing the (Skeptical) Army on Board -------------- -------------- ¶3. (S) Consul General met November 12 in Chiang Mai with Mark Tamthai, Director of Payap University's Institute of Religion, Culture and Peace and RTG point-man for secret talks with southern insurgents. Tamthai referred to press accounts of a November 2 meeting of the RTG's southern security policy team, chaired by Prime Minister Abhisit Vejajjiva. He said the media wrongly portrayed the gathering as intended to plot a counter-move to the public proposal by opposition Puea Thai Party leader Chavalit Yongchaiyut to create a separate, autonomous administrative unit for Thailand's three insurgency-plagued southernmost provinces (Ref A). In reality, the meeting was held to prepare the RTG negotiating team for the latest round of talks that took place later that week in Manila. The RTG typically holds such a meeting prior to every round of talks, Tamthai explained. The November 2 meeting was particularly significant, however, for a couple of reasons: -- The group finally met with a full slate of members: PM Abhisit chairing, NSC SYG Tawin Piansri, Army Commander Aunpong Paochinda, Democrat Party deputy leader Kraisak Choonhavan, MFA PermSec Virasak Futrakul, plus Tamthai and NSC Southern team lead Somkiat Boonchu. CHIANG MAI 00000171 002.2 OF 004 -- The 90-minute meeting served not only to reaffirm that pursuit of a reconciliation track was indeed RTG policy, but also to "clear the air" of concerns and doubts about various RTG players' commitment to that approach. Notably, General Anupong, who as recently reported was not at all on board with the dialogue approach (Ref B),indicated that - while he did not believe the talks were useful - he would not stand in the way of the process. (Note: Tamthai's readout and assessment of the meeting tracked precisely with the account the Embassy heard November 6 from Human Rights Watch's Sunai Phasuk, who is very close to multiple members of the southern policy team. End Note). ¶4. (S) During the meeting Anupong was asked whether "not standing in the way" would include "not looking the other way" when extra-legal violent acts were committed by Army and other security-linked personnel. Anupong replied that, when presented with evidence of wrong-doing, he would take appropriate action against the perpetrator(s). He complained, however, that the all-too-frequent charges of extra-legal actions that reached him, sometimes including name-naming and finger-pointing, were rarely accompanied by actionable evidence. -------------- -- Malaysia Wants In: Problems and Opportunities -------------- -- ¶5. (S) The Manila round of talks, held late in the first week of November, was brief and intended mainly to address Malaysian "interference" in the peace process, Tamthai reported. As in the past, the insurgent representatives in the negotiations - most of whom live in exile in Malaysia - continue to complain of harassment by Malaysian Special Branch police officials who wish to "own" the dialogue for themselves (Ref C). The insurgents seek "protection" by the RTG, and suggested Bangkok issue them written documentation authorizing their travel to and from the talks. (Note: HRW's Sunai suggested to us that the RTG has now resumed paying for insurgent travel to the talks, which had occurred under the interim Surayud government in 2007 but was stopped in 2008 under the Samak and Somchai governments, due to the opposition of the then NSC SYG. End Note). The RTG, however, is unwilling to put anything in writing. Through a high-level Foreign Ministry channel, the Thais do inform the Malaysians about each round of talks, but Tamthai doubts this then gets conveyed to other relevant players in the Malaysian bureaucracy, particularly the security authorities. The Manila meeting did not produce a way forward on this. ¶6. (S) Malaysia's desire to be part of the peace process is both a problem and an opportunity for Thailand, Tamthai observed. He said the RTG held the latest round of talks in Manila - instead of Jakarta, the usual venue - specifically to dispel Malaysia's concern that the Indonesian Government is somehow involved. He also commented on Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak's late October remark that some form of autonomy for Thailand's southernmost provinces could serve as a solution to the violence (Ref D). Tamthai said his insurgent contacts of course loved Najib's quote, whereas Democrat Party leaders, the RTG, and particularly the Royal Thai Army were more circumspect (though largely silent, per Ref D). He expects the two Prime Ministers to again discuss the South on the margins of the upcoming APEC Summit, in part to prepare for their recently announced joint visit to southern Thailand in December (a topic that Tamthai said was not discussed during the Abhisit-chaired November 2 meeting on southern security policy). -------------- -------------- Local Empowerment: Political Football or A Way Out? -------------- -------------- CHIANG MAI 00000171 003.2 OF 004 ¶7. (S) Not long after Najib's "autonomy" comments, opposition Puea Thai leader Chavalit stirred the pot with his proposal to create an autonomous "Pattani City" to administer the three southernmost provinces. Tamthai believes Chavalit's engagement could be either very helpful to the peace process, or very harmful. On the one hand, Chavalit's suggestion adds another (and powerful) voice to an idea that has long been discussed in various Thai circles as an essential element in ending the southern insurgency. Tamthai himself is a proponent of empowering local communities in the South, often pointing out that the notion is workable within the framework of the Thai constitution, which provides for a special administrative status that is currently accorded to the cities of Bangkok and Pattaya. He also notes that PM Abhisit has consistently stated his openness to any solution in the South that fits within the constitution. On the other hand, Tamthai is concerned that in the current ultra-charged state of Thai politics, any proposal by an opposition leader is sure to be rendered dead on arrival by the governing side (see Ref A - our sense is that Chavalit's statement was aimed more at domestic political gaming than at resolving the southern conflict). Tamthai is also worried that Chavalit's plan to travel to Malaysia to meet with PM Najib will further enflame the passions of those who oppose the autonomy/local empowerment concept. He hopes Najib will delegate the meeting to a subordinate. ¶8. (SBU) Regarding Tamthai's advocacy of the autonomy/local empowerment concept, he said the matter would be explored in depth at a November 30 seminar at Bangkok's Chulalongkorn University. The three featured speakers at this public event would be Tamthai, Deputy Minister of Interior responsible for the South Thaworn Senneam, and recently retired Armed Forces Supreme Commander Boonsrang Niumpradit. -------------- Key CBMs Still Stalled -------------- ¶9. (S) Tamthai reported scant progress on any of the major or minor confidence-building measures we last discussed in early October (Ref B): -- June 8 mosque attack investigation. Tamthai believes the RTG is sincere in saying it simply cannot find the subject of an arrest warrant in the case (who is widely assumed, Tamthai admitted, to be hidden and protected by a Royal Aide de Camp to the Queen). This makes the RTG look feckless in the eyes of the insurgent negotiators, he rued. (Note: Sunai has shared with us a copy of a "Wanted Dead or Alive" poster that has circulated in the South in recent weeks. The poster has photos and bio details from the national ID cards of six suspects, and is not information the insurgents could have obtained on their own. Sunai suggested the poster was the result of security force personnel frustrated at the lack of progress and wanting to push the issue, sending a signal that some authorities do wish for the perpetrators to be found/punished. End Note). -- Prisoner release. The possible "good faith" release of an elderly Muslim spiritual leader, along with two former insurgent commanders imprisoned with him about 12 years ago, remains mired in a complex legal process. All three cases are under (lengthy) appeal to the Supreme Court, which precludes the possibility of petitioning for a Royal pardon. Tamthai has pitched the idea of dropping the appeals in order to pursue Royal pardons, but representatives of the incarcerated have turned down this option since no one in the RTG is in a position to guarantee that pardons would indeed be granted. (Note: The Democrat Party's Choonhaven told the Embassy in October that he took up the release issue with the Justice Minister at Abhisit's request, but got the same Catch-22 response. End Note). CHIANG MAI 00000171 004.2 OF 004 -- Academic study group/Track II approach. Such a group, to consist of three scholars from each "side" who would serve as a think-tank arm of Tamthai's National Security Council team, is expected to be formed in the not-too-distant future. Tamthai, who will chair the group and select its members, noted two difficulties, however. Firstly, given the consensus that the three ethnic Malay Muslim scholars should be closely linked to and able to speak for the insurgent movement, nearly all credible candidates are living in exile, which would complicate the body's ability to meet. At the same time, any such scholars still living inside Thailand (Tamthai knows several) are at risk of arrest or worse should they become identified with the insurgency. Secondly, some Thai scholars approached by Tamthai have refused to serve if it means having to work with ethnic Malay Muslim academics linked to the armed insurgent groups. -- Joint development project. There has been little movement on this notion of formulating a development project in the South that would marry RTG resources with local community involvement - and be backed by a local cease-fire in the locality of the project activity. Although the King's Royal Project has expressed interest in engaging in the effort, it does not want its involvement to be linked to the broader peace process. To Tamthai and the insurgent negotiators, this condition would defeat the purpose of demonstrating the fruits of the peace process. (Note: the joint development project concept has largely replaced long-standing efforts by Tamthai's team to push a more ambitious pilot cease-fire in Yala province. Tamthai said there is still some consideration of setting up a pilot peace zone, not in Yala but in four districts of Songkhla province that have historical links to Pattani. But since Songkhla is not one of the three southern provinces where the insurgency is focused, Tamthai lacks enthusiasm for the idea as he doubts it would have the public impact of the now-shelved Yala plan. Sunai also lamented that the November 2 group had shifted the locale from Yala to Songkhla for the same reason, and suggested Army opposition was the deciding factor. End Note). ¶10. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Bangkok. MORROW