THAI INTELLIGENCE KEEPS WARY EYE ON BURMA BORDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000167 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, INL, IO, PRM PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/6/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SNAR PINR PREF BM SUBJECT: THAI INTELLIGENCE KEEPS WARY EYE ON BURMA BORDER REF: A. RANGOON 704 (A HEART-TO-HEART WITH THE WA) ¶B. CHIANG MAI 130 (SHAN STATE UPDATE) CHIANG MAI 00000167 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Mike Morrow, CG, ConGen, Chiang Mai. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) -------------- Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (C) Thai intelligence service "Burma Watchers" in northern Thailand do not believe conflict is imminent between the Burma Army and United Wa State Army (UWSA). In their view, the Wa's military and economic strength, the degree of support the Wa enjoy from China, and the regime's hope that it can "handle" the Wa by exploiting reported differences among Wa leaders, mitigate against near-term action by the Burma Army. Nonetheless, Thai analysts report contingency planning by the Wa in the form of setting up temporary reception centers on the Thai border for Wa who could be displaced by fighting. The Thais downplayed the possibility of Burma Army "hot pursuit" incursions into Thai territory in the event of conflict with the Wa (or Shan),but nonetheless have deployed troops to the border area to discourage and/or block any such attempt. ¶2. (C) Comment: Northern Thailand's lengthy border with Burma has long been a flashpoint for fallout from clashes between the Burma Army and various armed ethnic groups. The fallout includes refugees, narcotics and other illicit goods, cross-border violence among rival ethnic groups, and - in the not too distant past - skirmishes between Burmese and Thai troops. Thai intel's assessment that the Wa are probably too tough for the regime to want to take on at this time tracks with other views in the region, but likely gives Thai policymakers only a thin comfort level as they contemplate cross-border scenarios. End Summary and Comment. -------------- -------------- Thai Intel: Imminent Burma Army Conflict with Wa Unlikely -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Consul General discussed Thai-Burma border issues November 3 and 5 with the heads of the National Intelligence Agency's Northern Intelligence Coordination Center (NIA/NICC) and Chiang Mai province's Internal Security Operations Center (ISOC). Both offices keep a close watch on northern Thailand's lengthy border with Burma, where tensions and clashes between the Burma Army and various armed ethnic groups occasionally spill over to the Thai side and/or generate significant refugee flows. ¶4. (C) Our contacts in both meetings downplayed the possibility of imminent conflict between the Burma Army and United Wa State Army (this tracks with Ref A reporting from Embassy Rangoon). Nonetheless, they believe the Burma Army's August action against the Kokang was intended to send a message of intimidation to the Wa and other ethnic groups in Eastern Burma who have resisted the regime's proposal to join a Border Guard Force under the control of the Burma Army. And the main target of this message are the Wa, whom the NIA see as the most formidable fighting force among the ethnic groups, with about 30,000 active-duty troops. ¶5. (C) In the NIA's assessment, several factors mitigate against near-term Burma Army action against the Wa: -- the high military cost of taking on the well-armed and well-organized Wa; CHIANG MAI 00000167 002.2 OF 003 -- the potential for economic disruption, given the Wa's substantial economic interests throughout Burma; -- the Burmese Government's doubts that the Chinese would support a move against the Wa, given China's historical sympathy toward the Wa's Burma Communist Party roots; and -- the regime's hope that it can "handle" the Wa by reaching out to "softliners" within the political leadership and driving a wedge between them and hard-core anti-regime Wa leaders. The NIA characterized Wa "softliners" as those with the greatest economic stake in avoiding confrontation with the regime, in order to protect their investment in the sizeable network of businesses the Wa control in Rangoon and around the country. The NIA asserted that this group includes Wa narco-traffickers - who generate much of the funding the Wa have invested in Burma - and specifically named UWSA Commander Pao Yu Hsiang as well as Wei Hseu Kang. Wa "hardliners," on the other hand, are far more uncompromising in their attitude toward the regime. The NIA identified recently deceased United Wa State Party leader Chao Nyi Lai (aka Kyaut Nyi Lai) as part of that group. -------------- But Wa Are Ready Nonetheless -------------- ¶6. (C) While believing imminent conflict between the Wa and Burma Army is unlikely, the NIA reported indications that the Wa are preparing for a fight should it come to that. The Wa are mobilizing their civilians to be moved quickly out of potential fighting areas, and are setting up two temporary reception centers for those who could be displaced. Both are adjacent to the Thai border, near crossing points at Chiang Mai's Chiang Dao and Faang districts - presumably for ease of movement into Thailand should the need arise. ¶7. (C) The NIA also reported that the UWSA has 105mm howitzers obtained from China, but provided no details on the number or condition of the pieces, or how they were obtained. -------------- Shan State Army Also a Target -------------- ¶8. (C) The Shan State Army-South (SSAS) is also a potential target for the Burma Army, the NIA and ISOC reported. However, because a major regime attack on the SSA-S could compel it and its erstwhile enemy, the UWSA, to find common cause over mutual opposition to the Border Defense Force proposal, the NIA believes the regime would put off action against the SSA-S unless and until it can come to terms with the Wa. -------------- -------------- Burma Army Hot Pursuit into Thailand? -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) We asked whether, should new fighting break out inside Burma, the RTG had contingency plans in the event the Burma Army were to try to move through Thai territory in "hot pursuit" of CHIANG MAI 00000167 003.2 OF 003 Wa or Shan forces. While not ruling out such an attempt - particularly if moving into Thai territory would provide more favorable ground from which to attack the Wa or Shan - the NIA considered such an incursion unlikely, because: -- the Royal Thai Army (RTA) has deployed forces to the border area to discourage and/or block any such attempt (this tracks with a mid-September report to us by the RTA's Fifth Special Forces commander); and -- the RTA successfully prevented the Burma Army from such hot pursuit during fighting in 1998-2000. -------------- Thais Consider Refugee Scenarios -------------- ¶10. (C) The NIA acknowledged the potential for Wa and/or Shan refugees to flee into Thailand in the event of new fighting with the Burma Army. Likely entry points would be Chiang Mai's Chiang Dao and Faang border crossings (across from where the Wa are reportedly setting up contingency reception centers),as well as Chiang Rai province's Mae Fah Luang district. The NIA was aware of no detailed RTG plans to handle a potential influx in these areas, and surmised that the government would initially respond as it had when several thousand ethnic Karen fled into Tak province last June: by providing temporary shelter in existing schools and temples. ¶11. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Rangoon. MORROW