SICHUAN QUAKE RECOVERY UPDATE: RAPID RECONSTRUCTION

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 CHENGDU 000090 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/CM BANGKOK ALSO FOR USAID E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SOCI ECON PGOV CH SUBJECT: SICHUAN QUAKE RECOVERY UPDATE: RAPID RECONSTRUCTION COMPROMISING QUALITY AND TRANSPARENCY? REF: CHENGDU 011 CHENGDU 00000090 001.2 OF 004 ¶1. (U) This cable contains sensitive but unclassified information - not for distribution on the Internet. ¶2. (SBU) Summary: Spurred by the central government's goal of moving displaced quake victims into permanent housing by the end of 2009, reconstruction in the earthquake zone has significantly picked up pace since the beginning of the year. According to official statistics, close to 99 percent of home rebuilding in the rural areas is now underway. However, rural families are struggling to pay the costs of reconstruction in the face of low government subsidies and limited credit access; many are delaying completion of their new homes or compromising on building material quality. With official energies apparently focused on housing and infrastructure reconstruction, there is little evidence of strategic planning to address long-term livelihood recovery. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and volunteer groups continue to operate widely, and are filling some gaps, but face an increasingly "managed" operating environment. Obtaining good information on reconstruction projects, particularly the bidding and procurement processes, remains difficult, raising questions regarding transparency. End summary. A recent boom in home reconstruction as deadlines loom -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Reconstruction in the earthquake zone has significantly picked up pace since the beginning of the year. During recent travel in the Dujiangyan, Pengzhou, Mianzhu and Beichuan areas, Congenoff observed extensive infrastructure and housing reconstruction underway along all routes. The shift is notably dramatic in Zundao, a town of around 20,000 under Mianzhu, where reconstruction efforts had barely begun just a few months ago (reftel). During a recent visit, Congenoff found the town transformed into a giant construction zone, with the majority of residents engaged in home rebuilding, whether building themselves or supervising construction. Piles of bricks and reinforcement bar (rebar) lined the roads, and every visible housing plot was in one or another state of construction. A small number of residents were putting finishing touches on houses they said they began just three months ago. Most were somewhere between laying the foundation and building the walls. Similar scenes are to be found throughout the quake zone. ¶4. (U) During a press conference in early May, Sichuan officials emphasized that all rural residents must move into permanent housing by the end of September, three months ahead of the central government deadline. For urban residents the deadline is May 2010. In Zundao, the town government broadcasts announcements four times a day, reminding residents of the September deadline and urging them to build their houses and move out of the temporary shelters as quickly as possible. Rural residents also face a June deadline to at least have their new foundation in place to qualify for government housing reconstruction subsidies. Nearly 99% of rural rebuilding underway; one trillion RMB reconstruction funding gap -------------- -------------- ¶5. (U) During the above reference press conference, Sichuan officials announced that building was underway for 1,248,000 rural houses, representing 98.8 percent of the total, and that repair and reinforcement of an additional 2,213,000 was already completed. Among rural residents, over 45,000 rural households with total population of about 160,000 cannot rebuild in situ as their land was destroyed; most of this group will move to new housing developments. For urban residents, according to official statistics, about half of the repair and reinforcement is complete. (719,000 homes) and rebuilding has started on about 44 percent (138,000). (Note: the total number of damaged CHENGDU 00000090 002.2 OF 004 or destroyed rural homes, at an estimated 3,476,000 stands at twice the urban number; the total number of rural homes needing to be completely rebuilt, at about 1,263,000, is four times greater than in urban areas.) ¶6. (U) The provincial government estimates it needs 1.7 trillion RMB (US$274 billion) for quake reconstruction. Vice Governor Huang Xiaoxiang in mid-May told local media that combining provincial government revenues, central government support, donations and other sources Sichuan to date has 330 billion RMB (US$53 billion). He said the province hopes to close the funding gap with a combination of support from other provinces, international aid, and credit. The National Development and Reform Commission in a report issued May 21 noted that spending for quake rebuilding comprises a quarter of the 4 billion RMB (US$586 billion) national stimulus plan. The Sichuan Statistics Bureau recently reported that disaster reconstruction has boosted the province's fixed asset investment by 78.9 percent year-on-year for the period of January-April, while transportation-related investment increased by 131 percent for the same period. Time pressure and poverty may be compromising homebuilding quality -------------- -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Rural families are struggling to pay the costs of rebuilding under current time pressures. Quake zone residents we spoke to in several locations consistently estimated their total rebuild costs at about 100,000 RMB (US$14,706). The government subsidies are set at 16,000 to 21,000 RMB (US$2,353 to 3,088) per household depending on family size. Local governments are supposed to assist with ensuring that bank loans are easily available for rebuilding costs, but actual access varies across the quake zone. In recent conversations residents report that loan ceilings remain low, in the range of 20,000-30,000 RMB (US$2,941-US$4,412) or that they have difficulty obtaining any line of credit as they are unable to meet bank requirements for collateral and proof of repayment ability. Those that do have the option to borrow still expressed reluctance to take on the debt, noting their limited ability to repay it. ¶8. (SBU) Many rural residents told us they will delay completion of their homes or compromise on the quality of building materials. A group of locals in Sangzao town in Mianzhu expounded on the various rebar specifications, emphasizing that most people could not afford the 25 millimeter bars necessary to withstand a strong quake, and so were proceeding to build with cheaper materials and hoping that the next quake of similar magnitude would not occur in the coming decades. On the way out of Sangzao, Congenoff observed an apparently completed home that seemed to reflect these cost impediments, with a brick first floor, but the second level built using materials from the temporary pre-fabricated shelters. (Note: While last year's 8.0 quake stands out in its severity, quakes in the range from 6.0 to 7.9 have occurred regularly over the past century; the barely noted August 2008 Panzhihua quake, clocking in at a mere 6.1, reportedly cause the collapse of 10,000 homes.) ¶9. (SBU) Local officials in Beichuan, whose county town was completely destroyed and will be rebuilt about 20 kilometers away from its original location, also were equivocal in their enthusiasm for increasingly constricted official deadlines for reconstruction. When asked whether the State Council's declaration that "the goal for a three-year reconstruction should be realized within two years" was realistic for the building of New Beichuan one official noted that the government "must have a scientific reason" for shortening the timeframe, even if the local officials did not understand it. Other officials acknowledged that while they expect New Beichuan's "basic infrastructure" to be done in two years, true completion of the new town will require another decade. CHENGDU 00000090 003.2 OF 004 Long-term livelihoods: an outstanding question -------------- - ¶10. (SBU) With official focus on rebuilding, there is little evidence of strategic planning for long-term recovery of livelihoods. For now, the business of reconstruction appears to be occupying much of the population, as well as providing construction jobs to skilled workers from around the country. However, our observations within the quake zone point to potential future problems. In Pengzhou, the damaged local cement factory in one town will be rebuilt too far away to employ the local workers who were previously employed there. Near old Beichuan, the county seat that was completely destroyed and will be left as a memorial, Consulate staff recently encountered residents demonstrating against the plans for the New Beichuan. Their complaint was that their new homes would not include any land, thus depriving them of main source of previous livelihoods. This will likely be an issue for many of the 160,000 rural residents whose land is too damaged for rebuilding and will instead be moved to new housing developments. A number of recovery-funded projects, such as state owned enterprise (SOE) expansions, new factories, and several "industrial zones" promise sources of future employment, but many rural quake area residents lack the skills to take advantage of such opportunities. NGOs can help, but reach limited and operational environment complex -------------- -------------- ¶11. (SBU) A large number of international and domestic NGOs continue to operate throughout the quake zone, playing an important role in filling some of the gaps in the official response such as livelihood recovery. Both Sichuan Academy of Social Sciences and local NGO contacts note the extent to which NGOs encountered a more open operating environment in the months following the quake, when around 200 organizations quickly arrived in the area. However, a May 6 article in Guangzhou-based periodical, Nanfengchuang, highlights the complexity of the operational landscape for NGOs, with relations with local officials usually the key determinant of whether they can continue their work or not. Over time, increased focus on maintaining social stability has meant a gradual increase of government efforts to manage NGOs and volunteer groups. In a notice issued last month the Mianzhu City Communist Youth League called for strengthened "management" of volunteer groups, noting the risk of volunteers "doing things that affect social stability." (Some local volunteers have reportedly, for example, provided lists of student victims of school collapses to Beijing artist and blogger Ai Weiwei.) In mid-May local media reported on a new provincial government program to provide financial support to NGO projects in the quake zone, emphasizing the need for applicants to have legally registered and identifying the project categories eligible for support. ¶12. (SBU) While larger organizations with savvy government relations and a willingness to stay away from sensitive issues have been able to expand their post-quake work, smaller NGOs that want to maintain more autonomy may find themselves increasingly squeezed out. A domestic NGO that provided social services in a small township for most of the last year, with local government support, quickly found its fortunes reversed in the weeks leading up to the May 12 anniversary. After resisting a new registration requirement, the organization's head told us, they found their phone and internet lines cut off and an increasingly unwelcoming reception among local officials. They ultimately decided to close down their operations. Quake procurement raises transparency questions -------------- -- CHENGDU 00000090 004.2 OF 004 ¶13. (SBU) Obtaining detailed and comprehensive information on reconstruction projects remains difficult. Although publicly available information includes some project lists and overall statistics on the numbers, types and value of projects, little specific detail is provided. The Sichuan Development and Reform Commission's website has a list of the provinces 500 "key projects" for 2009, 82 of which are designated as quake reconstruction projects. However, the project descriptions are fairly skeletal, with no information on bidding and procurement processes. When asked how procurement for projects under their purview is being handled, Beichuan officials recently told us only that all bidding is being managed "according to the law". They added that bid invitations are basically going to domestic companies, noting that the process is too "complicated" and timeline too tight to open to international bidders. ¶14. (SBU) Most of the assistance being provided by other provinces, under the recovery partnering program mandated by the State Council in June 2008, is coming in the form of large projects carried out by the assisting provinces. Discussing their partnership with Shandong, Beichuan officials readily acknowledged the immediate post-quake relief support from Shandong, and cited the large reconstruction projects to which Shandong has committed. Seventeen municipalities in Shandong are each supporting one or two towns in Beichuan, for a total of twenty; all are supporting the building of New Beichuan. However, a Beichuan Development and Reform Commission official told us that they do not have clear or detailed information on project specifications or planning from Shandong. Although each of the Shandong municipalities committed to Beichuan have set up offices in the Beichuan areas they are supporting, the project bidding process is run out of the working office in Shandong set up to coordinate the Beichuan assistance. Not surprisingly, Shandong companies apparently expect to get the vast majority of the new business. Similar arrangements appear to hold true for the other provincial partnerships. A researcher at the Sichuan Economic Development Research Institution recently told us he expects the assisting provincial governments to recoup a significant portion of their reconstruction contributions via increased tax revenue from home province companies' quake-related projects. ¶15. (SBU) Comment: Government at all levels appear to be given credit on the ground for the initial rapid reaction to the earthquake and subsequent quick deployment of resources for reconstruction. However, as reconstruction moves forward, in the hurry to meet mandated deadlines, the current approach could very well lead to further shoddy construction and increased corruption. Moreover, despite the scale of current efforts, they will likely continue to fall short of the vast needs of the quake area population. BOUGHNER