FRAUD SUMMARY - CHENGDU (APRIL TO SEPTEMBER 2009)

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 CHENGDU 000223 SIPDIS DEPT FOR CA/FPP DHS FOR CIS/FDNS DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC CH SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - CHENGDU (APRIL TO SEPTEMBER 2009) REF: 08 STATE 74840 CHENGDU 00000223 001.2 OF 004 LOCAL CONDITIONS ¶1. The Chengdu consular district covers Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou Provinces, the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR),and the Chongqing Municipality. The majority of the Consulate's NIV applicants hail from Chengdu, Chongqing and Kunming, followed by Guiyang and smaller cities and towns throughout the region. Post sees relatively few applicants from the TAR. ¶2. The social and economic conditions in the Chengdu consular district mirror those found in the Mission's other four consular districts. Chengdu City tends to present the most qualified applicants, while Yunnan, Chongqing, Guizhou, and the rural areas in Sichuan Province outside of the capital tend to have a higher percentage of fraudulent cases. A large portion of the cases from the TAR are refused for a lack of strong ties rather than suspected or confirmed fraud. NIV FRAUD ¶3. Post's Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) conducted 252 investigations during the reporting period and confirmed fraud in 28 NIV cases. Even when fraud was not confirmed, however, many of the FPU's investigations remained inconclusive, indicating the possibility of fraud. In over 40 NIV cases, either the applicant's employment or purpose of travel could not be confirmed. ¶4. The majority of the confirmed fraudulent cases involved supposed business travelers applying to travel to the U.S. on a B1/B2 visa and who presented fraudulent work credentials or fake invitation letters from U.S. inviters. Out-of-district applicants did not contribute greatly to the FPU workload, primarily because these applicants already tend to have a relatively high refusal rate. Fujianese Fake Passport Cases ¶5. Post continues to encounter applicants who claim to be from Chengdu's consular district, but in fact, have falsified their place of issue and place of birth on their PRC-issued passport in order to conceal their Fujianese identity. The majority of these altered passports also contain fake Australian and Schengen/EU visas used to claim prior international travel. Since early 2009, an additional eleven cases fitting this fraud 
pattern have been discovered in Chengdu, bringing the total number of fake Fujianese passport cases to 43. ¶6. Previously, these applicants tended to apply in groups of three and claimed to be participants in a trade fair, usually as managers of a furniture manufacturer. More recently, however, they have been applying as individuals, usually as purported business travelers going for technical training. As before, the applicants presented a package of well-prepared fraudulent documents, some of which included employment letters from real companies in China. In one case, an applicant claimed to be an artist and brought with him an elaborate art portfolio, including a high-quality hardbound picture book of his work. ¶7. In the most recent cases detected in Chengdu, vigilant line officers identified suspect passports during fingerprinting or interviews, after which the FPU immediately alerted the local Public Security Bureau (PSB). Once the PSB confirmed the passports were indeed fraudulent, the FPM notified the RSO, who then coordinated with the PSB to have the applicant detained CHENGDU 00000223 002.2 OF 004 outside of the consulate. Chengdu's FPM and RSO continue to work with police investigators from the Sichuan and Fuzhou (Fujian) Public Security Bureaus to share information about these cases. Employment-based Fraud ¶8. H1B and L1 fraud continues to be a serious concern in Chengdu's consular district. The FPU has confirmed some type of fraud in at least twelve H1B and L1-A cases that it has investigated during the reporting period. Blanket L applicants do not present the same level of concern and generally tend to be legitimate intra-company transferees. ¶9. During the course of their interviews, many L1-A applicants fail to adequately describe their business plans or are unable to demonstrate that they have the requisite experience in a managerial or executive capacity to qualify for their visas. Because fraud in this category is a growing concern, Chengdu's FPU now routinely conducts fraud investigations for these cases, and when possible, site visits to the beneficiaries' companies. IV FRAUD ¶10. Chengdu does not process immigrant visa applications. DIVERSITY VISA FRAUD ¶11. Chengdu does not process diversity visa applications. ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD ¶12. Post has had one significant case of suspected ACS fraud during the reporting period involving an Amcit child whose Chinese-citizen mother submitted a passport renewal application on her behalf. The mother also presented a death certificate for the girl's father, along with pictures of their purported trip to Europe. The interviewing officer noticed the travel stamps in girl's U.S. passport did not match the photos, at which point the mother admitted that she had presented doctored photos. ¶13. The case was referred to the FPU, which discovered that the name on the father's death certificate did not match the name on the original at the issuing hospital. Likewise, the photo on the mother's national ID card did not match the photo on the original ID registry maintained by the local government. When the adjudicating officer requested another interview, the mother came alone, claiming her daughter was too sick to attend. The case remains open and a letter has been sent to the mother requesting that she come in for another interview. She must also bring her daughter and all of the documents she used to apply for her daughter's U.S. passport. Based on FAM guidance, she has 90 days in which to respond before post must deny the passport renewal application. ADOPTION FRAUD ¶14. Post is not aware of any fraud or special concerns in this area. CHENGDU 00000223 003.2 OF 004 USE OF DNA TESTING ¶15. Post is not aware of any fraud or special concerns in this area. All DNA tests are conducted in accordance with FAM guidance. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS ¶16. Post receives occasional requests from DHS for materials relating to asylum claims filed by individuals issued visas in Chengdu. Travel letter applications are also closely scrutinized for possible fraud. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS ¶17. Post currently has no pending investigations. ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST TRAVEL ¶18. High-quality fraudulent documents produced by document vendors and visa brokers continue to be a problem. These include fraudulent EU, Canadian, and Australian visas; employment, bank, and housing documents; and U.S. invitation letters. The fake passport cases from Fujianese applicants masquerading as locals continue to raise concerns about smuggling rings in the Chengdu consular district. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES ¶19. Post continues to have good relations with the local Public Security and Entry and Exit Bureaus. Cooperation and information sharing has helped facilitate the detention and arrest of visa applicants using fraudulent or altered PRC passports. Post has been allocated a new A-RSO/I position which will further help the FPU work closely with local Public Security and Entry and Exit Bureaus throughout Chengdu's consular district. COOPERATION WITH THIRD-COUNTRY GOVERNMENTS ¶20. The FPU does regular outreach to other foreign consulates in Chengdu's consular district, whereby information about fraud patterns and FPU and other consular best practices is shared. During the reporting period, the FPU met with counterparts at the British, Canadian, German and Japanese consulates. STAFFING AND TRAINING ¶21. Chengdu's Fraud Prevention Unit consists of one part-time Fraud Prevention Manager and one full time FSN Investigator. The Unit's Manager is Walter Andonov and the Fraud Prevention Investigator (FPI) is Song Qi. Consular Assistant Yu Jun serves as the back-up FPI. The incoming FPM Aaron Rupert will assume his FPU duties in mid-December 2009. CHENGDU 00000223 004.2 OF 004 ¶22. Chengdu's FPM also serves as the section's Deputy Consular Chief. Chengdu's FPI spends approximately 20 percent of her time assisting other FSNs in the section with routine visa and ACS work. Post has been allocated a new A-RSO/I position that is expected to be staffed in calendar year 2010. The A-RSO/I will play an important role in liaising with local law enforcement and border control agencies, and with other foreign consulates in Chengdu's consular district. ¶23. Chengdu's FPM trains all new line officers in post-specific fraud prevention techniques. The FPM developed an updated Unit SOP and sends out fraud notices and updates on an ad hoc basis. The FPU has also developed a fraud library, made up of sample fraudulent and authentic local and U.S. documents. This library will be used as part of regular training sessions, during which officers will be able to more formally discuss the fraud patterns they see on the interviewing line. ¶24. The FPM, in coordination with Chengdu's Post Language Officer, designed an 8-lesson, consular-specific Sichuan dialect course which began in September and is being funded by the Post Language Program. The course is taught by native speakers and is focused on consular officers' specific needs for use on the visa interviewing line. The FPM believes that being able to recognize and understand the local dialect will serve Chengdu's consular officers as an effective fraud detection tool. BROWN