Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09CASABLANCA90
2009-05-11 18:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Casablanca
Cable title:  

ISLAMISTS CALL FOR DIALOGUE WITH SALAFIST

Tags:  PTER PINS KISL PHUM MO 
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OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHCL #0090/01 1311812
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111812Z MAY 09
FM AMCONSUL CASABLANCA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8385
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CASABLANCA 000090 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT, NEA/MAG AND INL/AAE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2019
TAGS: PTER PINS KISL PHUM MO
SUBJECT: ISLAMISTS CALL FOR DIALOGUE WITH SALAFIST
PRISONERS IN MOROCCO

REF: A. 08 RABAT 398

B. 07 RABAT 517

C. 08 RABAT 400

Classified By: Consul General Millard for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CASABLANCA 000090 SIPDIS STATE FOR S/CT, NEA/MAG AND INL/AAE E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2019 TAGS: PTER PINS KISL PHUM MO SUBJECT: ISLAMISTS CALL FOR DIALOGUE WITH SALAFIST PRISONERS IN MOROCCO REF: A. 08 RABAT 398 ¶B. 07 RABAT 517 ¶C. 08 RABAT 400 Classified By: Consul General Millard for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In the aftermath of the 2003 Casablanca suicide bombings the government of Morocco (GOM) detained and prosecuted thousands of suspected Islamic extremists. The creation of a concentrated Salafist population in the prisons has presented the GOM with new challenges including the bolstering of extremist networks and increased potential for the radicalization of formerly non- violent prisoners. A recent conference hosted by an Islamist human rights organization called for the GOM to engage in a dialogue with the Salafists (militant Sunni-extremists) to issue pardons for those who renounce violence. Royal pardons for Salafists ceased in 2007 after a released prisoner blew himself up in a suicide attack. While many Moroccan experts are skeptical the GOM will engage in a substantive dialogue or grant pardons to Salafist prisoners, we believe there have been quiet direct contacts in the prisons for years. Post believes the GOM needs to ensure that the prisons are not a place that encourages terrorist planning and recruiting and to this end has requested assistance from a number of USG programs, including Section 1207 and Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) funds. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) The Forum of Dignity for Human Rights (Al Karama) an Islamist association hosted a one-day conference at the end of April that brought together religious experts and academics from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, and Morocco to discuss the Arab state's approach to reconciliation and dialogue with imprisoned Salafist radicals. The conference was organized by Mustapha Ramid, parliamentary caucus leader of the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD),and financed by the Dutch branch of the Pax Christi International organization. The GOM was represented by two officials from the Ministry of Justice who observed but did not participate in the proceedings. -------------- Calls for Reconciliation: -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Throughout the day-long conference, former detainees and panelists called upon the GOM to engage in a dialogue with the Jihadist pr
isoners and to learn from the examples of reconciliation in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Mustafa Ramid, who has served as the defense lawyer for high-profile imprisoned Salafist Sheikhs, argued that the GOM has unjustly imprisoned hundreds of innocents in its zeal to stop a small violent minority. Ramid divided the estimated 1,300 Salafist prisoners sentenced after the May 2003 bombings in Casablanca into three groups. The first group is by far the smallest and consists of Jihadists that believe in violence as means to achieve their goals. This minority are the ones responsible for the bombings and attempted attacks in Morocco. The second group doesn't believe in democracy or the legitimacy of the Moroccan government for ideological reasons but is opposed to enforcing their will through violence. This group, Ramid argued, consists of Salafist ideologues which whom the government should actively engage in a dialogue. Finally, there are the majority of people who are not interested in politics and do not believe in violence and have unjustly been caught in the GOM's security sweeps. According to Ramid, these are simple, conservative, and religious people. They grow their beards long, wear traditional dress, and strictly follow the edicts of Islam. They are often not well-educated and not predisposed to modern life. ¶4. (C) In a later conversation with poloff, Abdelali Hattimi, the vice-president of Al Karama, elaborated on Ramid's point by arguing that the overwhelming majority of Islamist prisoners belong to the third category and do not deserve the heavy sentences they received. He also implied that the second group, which he said consists of Salafist theologians such as Abdelwahab Rafiki (aka Abu Hafs),Hassan Kettani CASABLANCA 00000090 002 OF 003 (aka Abu Osama) are not a danger and have been unjustly imprisoned for their ideas. (NOTE: Kettani and Rafiki (ref A) are firebrand Salafist ideologues who stirred up youth in their respective towns and whose followers allegedly participated in the May 2003 suicide bombings in Casablanca. They were both arrested prior to the Casablanca bombings and subsequently sentenced to 20 and 30 years in prison respectively. END NOTE) -------------- To Pardon or Not to Pardn: -------------- ¶5. (C) Royal padons, which are given out to commemorate notableevents and religious holidays, substitute for a arole system in Morocco. Reports indicate that aproximately 315 Salafists were pardoned in 2005 nd at least another 55 in 2006 (Ref B). The parons came to a halt when Abdelffah Raidi, a prisoer pardoned in the 2005 amnesty, blew himself upin March of 2007 at an internet cafe in a poor ditrict of Casablanca. The GOM does not publish te names of those pardoned but Annassir, the non-overnmental organization assisting the families f Islamist prisoners, claimed there have been nopardons of extremists or Salafists in the last tw years. ¶6. (C) The leadership of Al Karama met ast summer with Ahmed Herzenni, the President ofMorocco's Advisory Council on Human Rights (CCDH to discuss the possibility of additional pardon. According to Hattimi, Herzenni said he had recived more than 170 letters from Islamist prisones proclaiming their innocence, asking for a pardn, and affirming their support for the King. Hezenni reportedly urged Al Karama to take the cas to the public to pressure the government to resue the pardons. -------------- Reconcliation Unlikely: -------------- ¶7. SBU) During the conference Mohammed Darif, an exert on Moroccan Islamic movements, affirmed the nlikelihood of a rapprochement between the government and the Islamists. Darif argued that the coditions for a dialogue between the Salafist detanees and the Moroccan state, following the modelof Egypt or Saudi Arabia, do not exist at presen. He claimed that since the Salafist prisoners belong to small cells and don't speak with a unifid voice the GOM is unlikely to engage with them. He also noted there does not seem to be the incination either from the government or the prisonrs to compromise their position. The press has reported, and Hattimi confirmed, that officials frm the MOI have met with the Salafist leaders thogh these discussions appear to have focused on cnditions in prison rather than reconciliation. . (C) Sheikhs such as Abu Hafs, Kettani, Mohammed El Fizazi, and others have led protests and hunger strikes throughout the years to win concessions, which have allowed the Salifists to pray and liv together with relative autonomy in the prisons.(Ref C) A hunger strike in September of 2007 that began in Sale spread to other prisons in the contry and involved more than 400 prisoners before it was resolved in favor of the prisoners. The Moroccan press has published calls by the Salafists for dialogue with the government. However, despite a public letter published in 2007 in which Abu Hafs recanted the use of violence, none of the Sheikhs has been willing to publicly ask for a pardon from the King. This is unacceptable to them, according to Hattimi, since they view this as a concession of wrongdoing. -------------- The Widow of Al Qaida: -------------- ¶9. (SBU) During the discussion period of the forum, a woman dressed in a niqab publicly excoriated the Moroccan and U.S. government for their crimes against Islam and her family. At the end of the day, she approached poloff and asked him to open an investigation into the killing of her husband and CASABLANCA 00000090 003 OF 003 son "by the CIA" and asked that the bodies be returned to Morocco. Poloff replied that he was not aware of what she was referring to and asked for the names of her child and husband. Poloff later learned that the woman was Fatiha Hassani, popularly known in the media as the "widow of Al Qaida" and who recently appeared on the cover of a weekly Moroccan magazine MarocHebdo. Her husband was Karim El Mejatti, a Moroccan member of Al Qaida who was believed to have been responsible in part for the Casablanca bombings in 2003 and the Madrid bombings in 2004. Mejatti was killed in Saudi Arabia by security forces in 2005 along with his son Adam. Hassani and her other son Elias were allegedly taken into custody by the Saudis and held in detention for three months in 2003 before being transferred to Morocco and held for an additional nine months. A Moroccan newspaper erroneously reported the encounter with poloff as Hassani petitioning the new U.S. Ambassador about her case. ¶10. (C) COMMENT: Mostly from press accounts, we know the GOM has maintained a dialogue with prisoners for years, including with intellectual architects such as Abu Hafs and Kettani. There have been periodic rumors that a deal might be cut to permit their release and such accommodations are a key element of the Moroccan way of government. Following the ultimately failed breakout last year of Salafist prisoners (all were killed or recaptured, the last one returned from Algeria,) the prison regime was toughened significantly, under a former Hassan II- era national police chief. That no deal has so far emerged suggests the two Salafist Sheikhs be unrepentant and may continue to pose a very real threat by privately providing the justification and inspiration for violent jihad, at the same time as they are publicly claiming they have reformed. ¶11. (C) Comment continued: It is unclear what Ramid and others who are part of the legal Islamic political movement are seeking by downplaying the danger of the Salafist Sheikhs. Ultimately, however, the GOM needs to ensure the prisons are not a place that encourages terrorist networking, planning, and even recruiting. Indeed Embassy Rabat has requested prison-related assistance from a number of programs, including under Section 1207 and the Middle East Partnership Initiative, to support and expand such an effort. Engaging the progenitors of violent jihad in the hopes of persuading them of the error of their ways, while of uncertain prospect, is a part of effort in which the Moroccans are particularly experienced. ¶12. (C) This message was coordinated with Embassy Rabat. MILLARD

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