PDVSA AND VENEZUELA: TWO DESTINIES INTERTWINED IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 CARACAS 000564 SIPDIS ENERGY FOR CDAY AND ALOCKWOOD, DOE/EIA FOR MCLINE HQ SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD TREASURY FOR RJARPE NSC FOR RKING USDOC FOR 4332 MAC/ITA/WH/JLAO E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2019 TAGS: ECON EPET EFIN PGOV VE SUBJECT: PDVSA AND VENEZUELA: TWO DESTINIES INTERTWINED IN A FINANCIAL CRISIS Classified By: Economic Counselor Darnall Steuart for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The cash flow crisis at PDVSA (Petroleos de Venezuela, the state oil company) is straining Venezuela's oil sector and overall economy. Since the December 2002-February 2003 oil sector strike, PDVSA has put itself at the service of President Chavez's Bolivarian revolution, funding everything from domestic social programs to Chavez's geopolitical endeavors. Until summer 2008, rising oil prices covered PDVSA's production problems and compensated for faltering investment in the sector, creating the illusion that PDVSA could do it all. A period of lower oil prices has shattered this illusion, throwing PDVSA into what to all appearances is a severe cash flow crisis. To date, PDVSA has dealt with this crisis most visibly by squeezing service companies, allowing their accounts receivable to pile up to a reported USD 3 billion. While many service companies, taking a long-term view, have accepted this situation, many are cutting back their operations and some are considering pulling out. To avoid an accelerating decline in production and a deeper financial crisis, PDVSA will need to rapidly shift resources to deal with these urgent operational issues, be it through reaching credible deals with service companies or taking over their operations. Given the interconnectedness between PDVSA on the one hand and Venezuela's economy and Chavez's political project on the other, whatever choices the GBRV makes on behalf of PDVSA will have significant economic and political repercussions. End summary. -------------- PDTodo: PDVSA Funds and Runs the Revolution -------------- ¶2. (C) PDVSA could be a profitable company, even given current oil prices, if it were focused on its core mission and Venezuela's macroeconomic environment were reasonable. Instead, PDVSA has become, as a local play on words has it, PDTodo (i.e., Petroleos de Todo, or "everything") to President Chavez's Bolivarian revolution. After Chavez consolidated control over the company in the wake of the 2002/2003 strike, PDVSA's mission has expanded rapidly. In addition to its core oil activities, PDVSA funds various off-balance sheet activities critical to Chavez's political project, including social "missions", the National Development Fund (Fonden),and election campaigns. Reliable numbers are hard to come by, but through the first nine months of 2008, for example, PDVSA claimed USD 2 billion in social spending and USD 11 billion in transfers to Fonden (half of which were a legally required windfall profits "contribution"). An oilfield services executive recently told us she believed PDVSA contributed USD 14 billion to Chavez's election campaigns in 2008 and 2009. (Note: This estimate seems much too high to us, but it gets the point across. End note.) PDVSA not only funds, but also runs, some of the social missions, most notably PDVAL, a food production and distribution subsidiary of PDVSA. ¶3. (C) PDVSA has supported the Bolivarian revolution in other important ways. PDVSA sells a significant percentage of its hard currency revenues to the Venezuelan Central Bank (BCV) at the fixed official exchange rate. These sales have allowed the government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (GBRV) to maintain an increasingly overvalued fixed official rate, financing cheap imports and helping to create a temporary economic boom. Such sales are not good for PDVSA, however, as thanks to inflation the purchasing power of the bolivar, Venezuela's currency, has declined over 100 percent since the official rate was last adjusted in 2005. PDVSA also bears the financial costs of the GBRV's domestic gasoline policy, subsidizing growing consumption of the world's cheapest gasoline. Outside of Venezuela, PDVSA finances President Chavez's geopolitical strategy. It supplies Cuba with essentially free oil and runs Petrocaribe, a program that sells member countries oil at a heavily discounted price. A growing part of PDVSA's production services GBRV debt to China, the result of a cash-for-future-oil deal negotiated between the two governments. (Note: Industry experts believe Venezuelan CARACAS 00000564 002 OF 005 shipments to China are discounted as much as USD 20 per barrel to cover transportation costs. End note.) ¶4. (C) As one would expect, given the enormous mission creep PDVSA has undergone in the last five years, its core business has suffered. Overall production has been gradually falling. Venezuela's crude production dropped from 2.6 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2002 (pre-strike) to 2.3 million b/d in 2008 (DOE/EIA figures). While the exact amount PDVSA has invested since 2003 is unclear, it is doubtful it has been enough to offset natural decline. Furthermore, we and most local sector experts believe PDVSA, in the fields it directly manages, has postponed regular maintenance and sought to maximize current production at the expense of medium and long-term field productivity. ¶5. (C) From the standpoint of cash flow, the trends discussed above have a clear implication. With production gradually declining, a greater percentage of production being diverted to uses that generate no or little cash, and higher costs due to social spending, the potential clearly exists for severe cash flow problems. What allowed PDVSA to avoid these problems through summer 2008 was rising oil prices, which rose from USD 30 per barrel (OPEC's basket) at the beginning of 2003 to peak at USD 130 per barrel in July 2008. This increase provided record earnings for PDVSA that offset the other trends (such as production decreases and increased domestic consumption),although there were some troubling signs like large debt issuances without a notable increase in investment and intermittent cash flow problems as early as ¶2007. -------------- Enter Falling Oil Prices -------------- ¶6. (C) Given the dramatic fall in oil prices after July 2008, something had to give. Again, reliable numbers are hard to come by, but we are sure that in 2009 PDVSA has reduced foreign currency sales to the BCV and reduced or stopped its support to Fonden. (Note: Some of the dollars it might otherwise have sold to the BCV it has sold on the parallel market, thus potentially obtaining almost three times the amount of local currency it would have obtained from the BCV. We do not know how PDVSA is accounting for these operations, however, and suspect various kickbacks reduce PDVSA's take. End note.) We do not know if PDVSA has reduced its spending on missions, though as noted above we would not be surprised if PDVSA funded most of President Chavez's November 2008 and February 2009 election campaigns. We suspect PDVSA has reduced shipments to Petrocaribe countries (except Cuba),and we doubt local consumption of gasoline has fallen. PDVSA announced its 2009 investment budget was slashed 40 percent (from USD 24 to 14 billion), and, in some cases, salary payments to PDVSA's workers have been delayed. -------------- Service Companies Bear the Brunt... -------------- ¶7. (C) The area where there has been the most visible give, however, has been payments to service companies and dividend payments to PDVSA's strategic partners and mixed company affiliates. The majority of service companies report that PDVSA stopped paying its bills in August 2008, a month after the Venezuelan basket peaked. According to PDVSA's third-quarter 2008 financial statement, as of September 2008 PDVSA and its affiliates (including Citgo) owed about USD 8 billion in accounts receivable. A respected local paper recently reported financial executives as saying PDVSA owed at least USD 3 billion to service companies for Venezuelan operations. Based on what service companies have told us, we expect the figure is somewhat higher. Last fall, PDVSA took an aggressive "shut up or I'll take you over" strategy in dealing with companies' insistence on payments. By the start of 2009, PDVSA grew quiet on its outstanding payments problem (perhaps shifting high-level attention to the February 15 constitutional referendum) and was not engaging companies. CARACAS 00000564 003 OF 005 ¶8. (C) Following the referendum, President Chavez and Minister of Energy and Mines Ramirez committed to paying pending receivables to service companies. In some cases, PDVSA took over salary payments to service company contractors. Larger service companies that appear to be "playing by the rules" have received some payments from PDVSA representing 5 percent of total due. This strategy of putting accommodating service companies on what some analysts describe as "life support" pushed the story off the front pages of the newspaper, for the time being at least. Those that have not played by the new, informal rules (i.e., stopped performing on contracts ) ENSCO, for example) have not received any payments. PDVSA's current response to companies that suspend contractual performance includes accusations that the companies are violating Venezuelan law and the claim that delaying work is considered a matter of national security, thus insinuating that company officials might be arrested. -------------- ...And React Differently -------------- ¶9. (C) Service companies have reacted differently to PDVSA's squeeze. Within the Petroleum Chamber of Commerce or "Camera Petrolera" (composed primarily of local companies),one faction, encouraged by a recent offer from PDVSA of bonds in lieu of cash, reportedly wants to keep negotiating, while another faction wants to adopt more adversarial tactics. As for international service companies, Schlumberger, Halliburton, and Wood Group and Williams represent three different approaches. Satisfied with its payment prospects, Schlumberger is maintaining the scale of its operations. While Halliburton is reducing its operations and laying off some employees, it is (at least for now) taking the long view, calculating that maintaining its position in a critical market is more important than taking confrontational action to remedy its current collection difficulties. ¶10. (C) Wood Group and Williams, on the other hand, have filed default notices with PDVSA, understanding that PDVSA may choose to take over their operations. How these two sagas play out is of key significance for Venezuelan production. Williams' operations support more than 40 percent of eastern Venezuelan production, and Wood Group's operations support more than 50 percent of western Venezuelan production. Neither company believes PDVSA has the human, technical, or financial capital to maintain the critical infrastructure their operations currently support. -------------- The Danger of a Vicious Cycle... -------------- ¶11. (C) As its debts to service companies and strategic partners mount, PDVSA risks creating a vicious cycle whereby the gradual decline in production accelerates, thus reducing revenue more quickly, thus making it even harder for PDVSA to meet its obligations, thus causing more service companies to pull out and production decline to accelerate further. This situation would obviously have grave financial consequences for PDVSA and the GBRV. We therefore expect PDVSA, and possibly the GBRV, will be forced to shift resources either to support a credible deal with companies like Wood Group and Williams or to take over their operations. -------------- ...And the Costs of Stopping It -------------- ¶12. (C) Where would such resources come from? As noted above, given the interconnectedness between PDVSA on the one hand and Venezuela's economy and President Chavez's political project on the other, there are significant repercussions to any course of action. Some possible options, and the associated consequences, are discussed below: -- Raise dollars or bolivars through PDVSA bond issuances. PDVSA is clearly considering this option. Press reports and contacts suggest PDVSA is planning to issue USD 2.5 billion CARACAS 00000564 004 OF 005 worth of zero-coupon dollar-denominated bonds maturing in two or three years and registered in New York or Venezuela (in which case they would not be tradable internationally). The bonds would likely be payable in bolivars, allowing PDVSA to exploit the parallel exchange market (i.e., receiving more bolivars per dollar in debt than the official exchange rate would allow) and providing the added benefit (from the GBRV's perspective) of halting the recent spike in the parallel rate. This mechanism would give PDVSA a quick infusion of bolivars, certainly enough to cancel an important amount of its debt to service companies. It is not a sustainable solution in the medium term, however, as it would not change the underlying dynamic of PDVSA's cash flow problems and as the price of the debt would fall the more debt PDVSA issued. (Nor would it resolve the dollar payments mandated in some service company contracts.) -- Nationalize/expropriate service companies. This measure, while extreme, has the advantage from PDVSA's perspective of canceling the companies' accounts receivable from PDVSA, as the companies would become part of PDVSA. Although the companies would seek compensation through negotiations and potentially international arbitration, the process could take years (medium to long term). As noted above, however, a short to medium-term problem with this option is that PDVSA probably lacks the capacity to maintain the critical infrastructure supported by many service companies. (Note: PDVSA is already involved in a number of nationalizations and expropriations. Most significantly, international arbitration cases with Exxon Mobil and Conoco Phillips are expected to open formally by late 2009. Service companies such as ENSCO, whose assets were seized in January 2009, continue negotiations with PDVSA and have not yet filed for arbitration. The GBRV also nationalized international cement and steel companies in 2008. Negotiations and/or international arbitration proceedings are ongoing in these cases. End note.) -- Negotiate additional future oil sales contracts. If PDVSA were to negotiate these contracts and receive the cash up front (rather than the GBRV),the underlying benefits and disadvantages are similar to those of bond issuances. -- Sell fewer dollars to the BCV and more on the parallel market. Selling a dollar at the current parallel rate would give PDVSA three times more bolivars than it would obtain selling the same dollar to the BCV at the official rate. Similar to the bond issuance option mentioned above, PDVSA would receive a greater flow of bolivars while helping the GBRV control the parallel rate. However, the GBRV depends on PDVSA's sales to the BCV to subsidize cheap imports of food and other essential products. If PDVSA's sales to the BCV dropped precipitously, food costs could skyrocket, causing a political liability for Chavez. (Alternatively, the BCV could draw down its reserves, a process which is not sustainable in the medium term.) This option also presents problems in terms of accounting and corruption. -- Move money from Fonden and other off-balance sheet funds to PDVSA. This is a potentially viable short-term option. As with the bond issuance option, it is not sustainable in the medium term given that funds in Fonden and other funds are limited. It would also reduce Chavez's emergency savings and slush funds. -- Cut investment further. As already noted, PDVSA has already announced a cut in its 2009 investment budget. While this and potential further cuts may free up cash, they risk an accelerating decline in production in the medium term for reasons mentioned above. -- Raise gasoline prices. President Chavez and the Minister of Finance have strongly hinted a price increase is in the offing to offset Venezuela's USD 5.5 billion annual subsidy (GBRV figure). However the current price is so low and the issue so politically sensitive that the political cost would be extremely high for any increase that would generate a significant amount of revenue. Although Venezuelans enjoy the world's lowest gas prices at the pump, they believe low gas prices are virtually a birthright. An increase in gas CARACAS 00000564 005 OF 005 prices in 1989 helped spur major rioting in Caracas. -- Cut funding to missions and cut non-essential PDVSA staff. This step would reduce PDVSA's costs, freeing up resources for its core mission. While it would be less visible politically than an increase in gasoline prices, it would, combined with high inflation, create a double blow to Chavez's political base. -- Reduce oil shipments to Petrocaribe and Cuba. This step would allow PDVSA to export more oil for the full international price, but it would cost Chavez a key source of international influence. -- Barter commodities (e.g., crude, coal, coke, and other solid products produced during the upgrading process) in exchange for services. There is some evidence PDVSA is already undertaking such transactions on a small scale. They appear to be primarily a mechanism for resolving payments issues at a lower level (i.e., without the service company having to wait for a check cut by PDVSA's financial department) and do not change the overall cash flow equation. -------------- When and How Does it End? -------------- ¶13. (C) If history is any guide, President Chavez will seek to buy time, choosing options with lower immediate political costs, even if they are not sustainable in the medium term, in the hopes oil prices will rise again. The problem is that these choices generate high medium-term liabilities, and the medium term is getting shorter and shorter. The squeeze put by PDVSA on the service companies is a perfect example of this conundrum. In the short term (from August 2008 to the present),it freed PDVSA resources for Chavez's political purposes as oil prices declined. The medium term has now arrived, and PDVSA, or the GBRV, will have to pay dearly in one way or another to contain the damage from the reaction of companies like ENSCO, Wood Group, and Williams. Whatever option the GBRV and PDVSA choose will generate another set of costly medium term liabilities. ¶14. (C) Unless oil prices rise significantly, we are increasingly certain that the game will be up, from an economic standpoint, by early to mid 2010, as no one will be willing to continue to finance PDVSA and a vicious cycle will be inevitable. The economic repercussions could put in jeopardy President Chavez's ability to win a fair election in 2012 if the opposition were able to unite behind a strong, consensus candidate. By that time, however, he may have consolidated enough political control to assure another electoral victory. ¶15. (SBU) For more background on topics mentioned above, please see the following cables: payments to service companies - CARACAS 136, CARACAS 214, CARACAS 239, CARACAS 288, CARACAS 362, CARACAS 428, CARACAS 440, CARACAS 541, CARACAS 545, CARACAS 548; mission creep in PDVSA - 2008 CARACAS 473; PDVSA's financial situation - CARACAS 282, 2008 CARACAS 276, 2007 CARACAS 2346; the gasoline subsidy - CARACAS 354; Venezuela's economy - CARACAS 87; Petrocaribe - 2008 CARACAS 976; the parallel market and PDVSA dollar sales - CARACAS 137, CARACAS 406, 2008 CARACAS 376; off-balance sheet funds - 2008 CARACAS 1554; nationalizations inside and outside the oil sector - 2007 CARACAS 1281, 2007 CARACAS 2013, 2008 CARACAS 1690. CAULFIELD