THE DENIAL DILEMMA: OPPOSITION CLAIMS "VICTORY" IN REFERENDUM LOSS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000240 SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER) E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2028 TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE SUBJECT: THE DENIAL DILEMMA: OPPOSITION CLAIMS "VICTORY" IN REFERENDUM LOSS Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR FRANCISCO FERNANDEZ, FOR REASON 1.4(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: The political opposition's reaction to President Chavez's successful February 15 constitutional referendum has largely been one of denial -- lamenting the government's electoral advantages while spinning the outcome as somewhat of a victory for the opposition. Opposition parties have advised their followers to view the unprecedented number of "No" votes as a sign that they are gaining electoral ground, and to blame Chavez for "stealing" the election. A minority of more thoughtful opposition activists are focusing less on Chavez's use of state resources for electoral campaigns and more on the opposition's need to reach out to Chavez's political base with a viable and appealing alternative vision. February referendum voting patterns suggest that the opposition actually lost some ground in areas where they polled well in the November 2008 state and local elections. Opposition leaders' rationalizing, while helpful to morale, inhibit the opposition from thinking realistically about how to expand their electoral base to mount a future challenge against the emboldened pro-Chavez electoral machine. End Summary. -------------- OPPOSITION BLAMES EVERYONE BUT THEMSELVES -------------- ¶2. (C) At a post-election democracy forum February 19, opposition activist and former Christian Democrat (COPEI) presidential candidate (1988) Eduardo "El Tigre" Fernandez laid out a ten-point assessment of February 15 lauding opposition "wins" and decried unfair play by the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (GBRV). He pointed out that the "No" had won in most big urban centers -- including Zulia, Miranda, and Tachira States -- as well as in greater Caracas, and argued that GBRV electoral campaign abuses prior to the actual balloting were "unprecedented." Fernandez contended that the opposition needs to create a democratic alternative to Chavismo that appeals to more Venezuelans, but offered only vague suggestions on how to accomplish such an objective. ¶3. (C) In the same forum, Maria Corina Machado, President of the SUMATE electoral NGO, called for "reflection" among the opposition and insisted that voters and even election day workers and witnesses had been subject to "high levels of intimidation" by the GBRV. She advocated for greater education among election workers to avoid election day fraud -- in the future. Machado also warned that polls were unreliable and self-fulfilling, suggesting that the polls indicating growing support for "Yes" immediately prior to the vote had convinced "No" voters to stay home. ¶4. (C) UNT party activist Yenny Freitas sent a mass email February 18 to opposition supporters, advising them that the "No" had sent a clear message to Chavez and that "we are narrowing the gap between Chavismo and the opposition." She compared the 4.2 million votes opposition unity candidate Manuel Rosales obtained in the 2006 presidential election to the 5.2 million the "No" received on February 15, concluding that the opposition has grown in strength -- under "unequal and atypical" campaign conditions. Freitas added that the 32 percent abstention rate was relatively low, showing widespread participation, and that Chavez is defeatable in 2012 and "he knows it." She noted that the opposition would wield a significant check against Chavez's power if they can win a majority of seats in the 2010 National Assembly elections, advising that curbing abstention was crucial to achieving this. -------------- OPPOSITION NEEDS A RENOVATION -------------- ¶5. (C) More thoughtful members of the opposition acknowledge the need for rethinking opposition strategies. Baruta Mayor and Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT) Secretary General Gerardo Blyde told the Charge February 20 that the opposition needs to offer more than "anti-Chavismo" to voters. He noted that in his mayoral campaign he won slight majorities in Baruta's barrios by campaigning over the course of 70 days and offering both programs and affection. Blyde said his municipality has a program conceding titles and small home improvement credits to longtime residents of municipal lands. He said Baruta is also putting in sewers, street lights, and small parks in traditionally neglected neighborhoods. He said opposition governors and mayors need to demonstrate over the next four years that they can offer a better quality of life, especially to Venezuela's poor. ¶6. (C) UNT youth activist Jaqueline Nunez told Poloff February 19 that she was not surprised by the referendum outcome but that she was hopeful it would put pressure on the opposition to "renovate" itself. She complained that within the opposition, the party old-guard leadership enforced strict party discipline and was reluctant to allow the younger members to climb the ranks. Nunez also pointed out that the party leadership frequently suggested strategy discussions, but would always find a reason to postpone the meetings until it was too late. She opined that it was hypocritical for the opposition parties -- including her own -- to criticize Chavez for violating the alternation of power clause in the constitution when they effectively do the same. ¶7. (C) Democratic Action (AD) Secretary General Henry Ramos warned in his February 20 press conference that the opposition should not perceive February 15 as any sort of success, pointing out that the number of voters who favored Chavismo grew by more than those who supported the "No." He admonished that the opposition should not view the referendum as "a glorious triumph that does not exist" and instead should analyze the results "without distortions or lies." He added that the opposition "shouldn't kill the messenger" for his statements, which go against what most of the "No" bloc have argued. Ramos pointed out that the opposition had triumphed before under similar electoral campaign abuses by the GBRV. Ramos also said his party would not support "unsuccessful presidential candidates," a clear shot at Maracaibo Mayor and former 2006 consensus opposition candidate Manuel Rosales. -------------- OPPOSITION LOSING GROUND? -------------- ¶8. (C) Poll numbers from the National Electoral Council (CNE) website indicate that the opposition lost ground in some regions where they triumphed in the November 2008 state and local elections. Of the five states where opposition governors won in November, all but Tachira State saw either a relative increase in support for Chavismo or a decrease in the percentage of votes for the opposition compared to 2008. In Nueva Esparta State -- traditionally a bastion of opposition strength -- opposition governor Morel Rodriguez swept the November elections with 57.64 to PSUV candidate William Farinas' 41.69, but the "No" vote narrowly won with 50.76 percent compared to 49.23 percent who voted "Yes." The "Yes" triumphed in affluent Carabobo State and Caracas voted by 52.44 and 51.97 percent respectively, despite both regions voting strongly in favor of opposition gubernatorial candidates in November. The "No" vote carried eight states in the November 2007 referendum, but only five in the 2009 referendum. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Although the opposition was able to turn out an unprecedented number of "No" votes on February 15, the parties appear to be neglecting the fact that Chavez's support grew even more. Such thinking suggests that the old guard party leadership is out of touch with the electoral reality, while some of the younger opposition party members -- and certainly the student activists -- are more apt to discuss the opposition's weaknesses, particularly its lack of appeal among poor Venezuelans. Nevertheless, the opposition remains a viable political force, and this seeming generational gap could give rise to a new slate of civil society groups-cum-parties to replace the discredited old faces in the opposition. The parties' continuing focus on Chavez "stealing" the election is unlikely to gain any traction among the broad Venezuelan electorate, and only serves to distract them from the daunting task of beginning to prepare for local and National Assembly elections in 2009 and 2010, respectively. End Comment. CAULFIELD