MILITARY REFORMS CONSOLIDATE CHAVEZ AUTHORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 001563 SIPDIS AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/16 TAGS: MCAP PGOV CO VE SUBJECT: MILITARY REFORMS CONSOLIDATE CHAVEZ AUTHORITY REF: 08 CARACAS 1231 CLASSIFIED BY: Robin Meyer, Political Counselor, State, POL; REASON: 1.4(A),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: The October 5 approval by the National Assembly (AN) of 45 changes to the year-old Organic Law of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces and a revision of the Law on Conscription and Enlistment surprised military watchers and NGOs. The new reforms increase the presidency's control over the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (FANB) and militia by weakening military hierarchies; create a "Combatant Corps" in the reorganized national militia, and create a duty of military service for all Venezuelans between ages 18 - 60. The changes illustrate Chavez's distrust of the traditional military hierarchy and his tactic of creating parallel structures to undermine traditional institutions' independence. Although militarily ineffective, the National Militia further militarizes Venezuelan society, and keeps his followers on alert. Media pundits concentrated on issues such as the deletion of "National" from the names of the service components and Article 60 which authorized foreign nationals command of certain Venezuelan military units. Small Changes, Big Impacts in Armed Forces Law ¶2. (SBU) On October 5, the AN approved a "partial reform" to the 14 month old Organic Law of the National Armed Forces. The law was finally published in the Official Gazette ("Gaceta Oficial") on October 22. Absent from the AN's legislative agenda published in March 2009, and approved in only five days, the reform of 45 articles took military observers and constitutionalists by surprise. ¶3. (C) Military Districts: Previously, the president could only declare military districts to carry out a "specific mission" to ameliorate a "special circumstance," e.g., natural disaster or civil insurrection. Under the new law there no longer needs to be a "specific mission" to declare a military district, nor do these districts expire upon the elimination of the "special circumstances" that justified their creation. Dr. Gerardo BriceC1o, a strategic analyst at the University of Monteavila, told POLOFF that this ability can be used to neutralize governors or mayors that oppose the central government. ¶4. (C) No Longer "National": Another reform is the deletion of "national" in the names of the Army, Navy and Air Force, but leaving the moniker "Bolivarian" from the 2008 reform. Constitutionalist Hermann Escarra told the local press that with a "Bolivarian" orientation instead of a "National" view, Chavez could deploy Venezuelan forces to other "Bolivarian" states in ALBA. Conversely, non-Venezuelans from ALBA countries could serve in the "Bolivarian Army." BriceC1o sees the change as stylistic, and pointed out that readiness and logistics are what keep Chavez from sending Venezuelan troops anywhere. Overhauling the National Militia ¶5. (C) The new Armed Forces law also returns the Reserves to the four service components and moves the "Combatant Corps" and Territorial Militia to the reconfigured National Militia. As part of the National Militia in the 2008 reform, the Reserves were operationally and logistically dependent on the President. BriceC1o said that under the 2009 reform, the cost to train, organize and equip reserve units would come out of each service component's budget, thereby reducing the resources available, and thus weakening, the active duty components. Rocio San Miguel, Director of the military watchdog "Citizen's Control," asserted to the local press that returning Reservists had been "indoctrinated" to Chavismo and would act as spies against the service components. CARACAS 00001563 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Intended to "complement" the Armed Forces, the National Militia operationally reports to the President via the Strategic Operational Command. The militias' duties remain unchanged and in addition to national defense, include assisting the community councils ("consejos communales") to carry out public policies, train and advise the defense committee of the community councils, as well as process and disseminate the community councils' information to the public and private sectors "regarding plans, programs and projects for the development of the nation." BriceC1o expressed concern that the militia could be mobilized for "Plan Republica," the week-long operation of securing voting sites and maintaining order at the polls during national elections. "If the militia is outside wearing red berets and t-shirts, the political message couldn't be clearer. ¶7. (C) The Combatant Corps" established under the new Armed Forces law as part of the reconfigured National Militia, are to be composed of citizen-soldiers organized into units based around the public or private workplace. Their role is to support the FANB and assist in the integral defense of the nation by "assuring the integrity and operability of their workplace." Local papers described the four simple steps for forming a Combatant Corps at the workplace: adoption of a resolution by the "maximum authority" of the workplace, submission of a list of volunteers to the National Militia's General Command, report by the approved Combatant Corps to the nearest militia unit for training and credentialing. ¶8. (C) Retired General Gonzalo Garcia Ordonez told POLOFF that joining a unit of the National Militia would become a prerequisite for any government position. According to BriceC1o, the Combatant Corps are "just another means of pressure, Chavez already has shock troops," referring to the armed political gangs that disrupt opposition events. Other military watchers quoted in the media pointed out that Article 60 authorized foreigners, understood to mean Cubans, to command militia units. (Note: Article 60 was unchanged in this new law. Foreigners, who had "completed studies" at a FANB institute were already eligible for command of any militia unit. End Note.) Not So Selective Service ¶9. (C) The new Law on Enlistment and Conscription requires Venezuelans of "military age" to register for military service and makes it a "duty" for Venezuelan aged 18 - 60 to complete military service. Annual recruitment and replacement needs will dictate the number of people processed each year. However the law includes "incentives" to serve in the active duty or militia ranks. Public and private entities that use fire arms, such as police and private security, can only employ people who have completed military service. Those who enlist are guaranteed permanent benefits from GBRV social missions, dental care, and life insurance. There are also penalties: those who cannot produce proof of military service are ineligible for both public and private universities; cannot receive a license to drive, fly or operate a ship; are not allowed to hold national, state or municipal jobs, and cannot receive state scholarships. DUDDY