GBRV STRATEGY ON COLOMBIA-DCA DISPUTE BECOMING

id: 234175 date: 11/10/2009 20:46 refid: 09CARACAS1444 origin: Embassy Caracas classification: SECRET destination: 09CARACAS1144|09CARACAS1207|09CARACAS1430|09CARACAS1443 header: VZCZCXRO4996 OO RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC DE RUEHCV #1444/01 3142046 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 102046Z NOV 09 FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3970 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS IMMEDIATE RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE -------------- header ends -------------- S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 001444 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2029 TAGS: PREL PINS MARR MCAP MOPS VE SUBJECT: GBRV STRATEGY ON COLOMBIA-DCA DISPUTE BECOMING CLEARER REF: A. CARACAS 1443 ¶B. CARACAS 1430 ¶C. CARACAS 1207 ¶D. CARACAS 1144 Classified By: Acting Pol Counselor Rolf Olson, for reason 1.4 (d) ¶1. (SE) Summary: Following President Chavez's November 8 urging that the Venezuelan public "prepare for war" to defend the country against anticipated Colombian-U.S. cross-border aggression (Ref A),the Venezuelan government (GBRV) and its local allies issued a series of supportive and similarly bellicose statements that nonetheless affirmed that Venezuela is the aggrieved party in this dispute. Vice Foreign Minister Francisco Arias Cardenas, the most senior GBRV official to speak publicly on November 9, sought to steer the narrative away from a bilateral showdown between Colombia and Venezuela. He focused instead on the threat posed by "the elephant in the china shop" -- the United States -- and asserted that the quality of future Colombia-Venezuela relations would "hinge on the status of the bases." In response to the Colombian government's (GOC) stated intention of taking the matter to either the U.N. or the OAS, Arias instead demanded that the GOC address fellow members of UNASUR in order to provide "the security guarantees the other members have demanded." The shape of the GBRV strategy on this subject is becoming clearer: portray Venezuela as the victim, cite the U.S. as the ultimate source of conflict, put the onus on Colombia to withdraw its support for the DCA as a way to forestall regional conflict, and attempt to do all this in a forum that would likely be friendlier to GBRV arguments. End Summary. ¶2. (SE) On November 9, the Chavez administration and its local supporters issued statements defending President Chavez's November 8 rhetoric regarding a possible war with Colombia. The President of the Foreign Relations Commission in the National Assembly (AN),Roy Daza, stated that the threat posed by the "North American military bases" in Colombia "obliged" Chavez and all Venezuelans "to take appropriate measures" in response. Fellow AN Deputy Iris Varela affirmed that Colombia had already committed "acts of war" ("ataques de guerra") against Venezuela through support of paramilitary groups along the border. The ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) called on its members to "join the militia" ("convertirse en milicianos") to defend "against a U.S. attack from the occupied bases in Colombia." The Chavez-allied Fatherland For All party (PPT) echoed these sentiments: "We are convinced this Colombia-based strategy is aimed at disrupting and destroying the united advance of our peoples and our governments." (Comment: The statements of the PPT spokesman, Simon Calzadilla, were disappointing since just days earlier he had participated as one of four PPT deputies in a cordial meeting with Embassy Poloffs, in which Poloffs had explained the DCA and what its provisions did and did not contain. Calzadilla had seemed satisfied by this explanation at the time, and in fact had asked: "Why haven't you explained this so well before? This doesn't seem like such a big deal when it is laid out in detail." End Comment.) The country's Communist Party (PCV) struck a similar chord, arguing that "it is the United States that is fostering this war. Such a war would be convenient for the Empire, not for the Colombian or the Venezuelan governments." ¶3. (SE) The GBRV's Foreign Ministry added its voice to the mix by issuing a rebuttal to the GOC's November 8 Presidential statement, blasting it as "immoral" and "hypocritical." Referring to Colombia's March 1, 2008 attack on FARC camps in Ecuador, the statement accused the GOC of committing "the only act of war registered in the recent history of our continent." While ridiculing Colombia for having "ignored the regional bodies responsible for this subject" in previous opportunities, the statement relayed the GBRV's willingness to discuss the issue in an international forum, citing the South American Defense Council (SADC) as one possible venue. ¶4. (SE) Vice Foreign Minister for Latin America Francisco Arias Cardenas has been the most senior GBRV official to speak publicly since President Chavez's November 8 remarks. In separate media interviews on November 9, Arias placed blame initially on President Uribe for having played politics with regional security: "The call to war was made by Uribe in order to win a new term." But Arias also emphasized that the GBRV ultimately assigned blame to the U.S.: "We are neither looking for a war provoked by Venezuela, nor for a war provoked by Colombia or the Colombians." Arias added: "The true provocation and cause of such a war would be" the DCA itself, by virtue of the U.S. presence on the bases. Signing CARACAS 00001444 002 OF 002 the DCA with the U.S. was, Arias added, "like bringing an elephant into a china shop." He asserted that the quality of the Colombia-Venezuela relationship would "hinge" on the issue of the bases. ("La relacion depende de las bases militares.") In response to the GOC's stated intention of taking the matter to multilateral bodies such as the U.N. or the OAS, Arias instead demanded that the Colombian government "should respond to UNASUR in order to provide the security guarantees that the other member countries demand." (Note: Per Refs C and D, Chavez publicly portrayed the August UNASUR deliberations on the DCA issue in Bariloche as a victory, and in mid-September challenged President Obama to meet with UNASUR leaders to explain the DCA. Additionally, GBRV-friendly Ecuador currently holds the rotating Presidency of UNASUR. End Note.) ¶5. (SE) Comment: The GBRV appears to have chosen its strategic path as this issue appears headed for some sort of international hearing. First, reiterate that Venezuela is the aggrieved party in this dispute, and is only preparing itself for a conflict brought on by others. Second, assail the U.S. as the dark force behind Uribe's ill-advised policies, and use the USG's own documents as proof of "the Empire's plans." (Ref B) Third, take advantage of the region's distinct aversion to armed conflict; this involves putting the onus on Colombia to renounce its support for the DCA as the most neighborly action possible, as well as the easiest way to forestall a potential military confrontation. And fourth, if possible, have the public debate on this subject take place in an environment that is more likely to have GBRV allies echoing these arguments, such as UNASUR/SADC. End Comment. DUDDY =======================CABLE ENDS============================