CHAVEZ LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR CONFRONTATION

id: 234042 date: 11/10/2009 11:11 refid: 09CARACAS1443 origin: Embassy Caracas classification: SECRET destination: 09CARACAS1351|09CARACAS1367|09CARACAS1376|09CARACAS1419|09CARACAS1426|09CARACAS1430 header: VZCZCXRO4253 OO RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC DE RUEHCV #1443/01 3141111 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 101111Z NOV 09 FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3968 INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS IMMEDIATE RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE -------------- header ends -------------- S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 001443 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2029 TAGS: PREL PINS MARR MCAP MOPS VZ SUBJECT: CHAVEZ LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR CONFRONTATION WITH COLOMBIA REF: A. CARACAS 1430 ¶B. CARACAS 1426 ¶C. CARACAS 1376 ¶D. CARACAS 1367 ¶E. CARACAS 1351 ¶F. CARACAS 1419 Classified By: Acting Pol Counselor Rolf Olson, for reason 1.4 (d) ¶1. (SE) Summary: On November 8, President Chavez called on Venezuelans to "prepare for war" due to the threat posed by Colombia and the United States. Chavez again hammered the Colombian government for "shamelessly delivering its sovereignty to the U.S." through the recently signed U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). Chavez's comments followed dual announcements on November 5 by Vice President Carrizalez and Foreign Minister Maduro that the Venezuelan government (GBRV) was deploying 15,000 National Guardsmen and ramping up its intelligence-gathering activities in states that border Colombia to "track down and neutralize irregular groups" in the aftermath of several violent incidents. These announcements were made against a backdrop of serious domestic problems for the GBRV. Venezuelans are unhappy about widespread water shortages, increasing power blackouts, and spiraling crime rates. Chavez has a well-established track record of using external threats to shift attention away from the GBRV's shortcomings. No meaningful movement of National Guard troops has been noted since the Carrizalez announcement, and post does not/not believe a full-scale war between Colombia and Venezuela is looming or even conceivable at this point. But as Chavez stares down the bumpy road that leads to the 2010 National Assembly elections, he appears willing to run the risk of a more serious incident on the border than we have so far witnessed. End Summary. ¶2. (U) During his November 8 "Alo, Presidente" television broadcast, President Chavez charged his military leaders to prepare their forces and the Venezuelan public for the possibility of armed conflict with Colombia and/or the United States. Chavez asserted that through its signing of the DCA, "Colombia has delivered its sovereignty to the Empire... the Government of Colombia is no longer in Bogota, it's been transferred to the United States." Concluding that the presence of American soldiers in Colombia would inevitably lead to an attack against Venezuela, Chavez urged: "Let's not lose a single day in our principal mission -- preparing ourselves for war and helping the people prepare themselves for war, because it's the responsibility of all.... Revolutionary students, workers, women: everyone together..." Reinforcing the point that this call to arms was simply a reaction to the nefarious intentions of others, he pondered: "If we lived in a world in which the sovereignty of the people and international law were respected, we could dedicate ourselves to something other than war." Chavez claimed to be paraphrasing President Lula saying that "the only thing he had seen from Obama was the coup in Honduras and the military bases in Colombia." ¶3. (SE) Chavez's comments follow dual announcements on November 5 by GBRV officials of an increased Venezuelan military presence and intelligence-gathering along the border with Colombia. Vice President and Minister of Defense Ramon Carrizalez stated that 15,000 National Guard troops were being deployed in the border states of Zulia, Tachira, Barinas, Apure, and Amazonas "to identify, track down, and neutralize irregular groups that are trying to destabilize our government." While stridently accusing the USG and Colombia of seeking to undermine the Venezuelan government (Ref A),Foreign Minister Nicholas Maduro stated that the GBRV would "increase intelligence efforts" along the border, as well as "continue strengthening our political and military capacity... so that not even one U.S. soldier can set foot in this country." Border tensions have heightened in recent weeks in the aftermath of the killing in Tachira of ten kidnapping victims alleged by the GBRV to be paramilitaries, as well as the November 2 murder of two National Guard officers at a Tachira checkpoint (Refs B and C). However, in the three days since Carrizalez's announcement of the National Guard "deployment," no significant movement of forces has been observed, and a simple redeployment of forces already based in the areas in question may constitute the extent of the mobilization. ¶4. (SE) The recent events near the Colombian border and the GBRV's reactions come at the same time that Chavez's Bolivarian political project faces diminished popular support due to deteriorating public services and a crime problem that the GBRV has been unable to contain. Caracas-wide water CARACAS 00001443 002 OF 002 rationing commenced on November 2, leaving entire neighborhoods without water service for two days each week for the foreseeable future. Diminished capacity to meet electricity demand has led to frequent blackouts across the country (Ref D). On November 8, local daily El Universal reported that according to projections, the number of homicides in Venezuela will grow by 48 percent between 2008 and 2009 -- from 13,129 in 2008 to an estimated 19,400 by the end of 2009. Even among Chavez's traditional political supporters, frustration about the lack of progress on such issues has begun to set in (Ref E). ¶5. (SE) Comment: Coupled with these serious domestic challenges and the recent violence in the border area, Chavez's rhetoric suggests he is willing to run the risk of -- and perhaps even sees opportunity in -- a low-level military incident of some sort with Colombia. Such an incident could have several potential benefits for Chavez: it would help distract domestic and international critics; serve to rally his followers around the flag; facilitate the further militarization and centralization of Venezuelan society; and create a more favorable security environment on the Venezuelan side of the border for friendly Colombian rebels (contact with whom he may still deny). It could even serve as a possible pretext for postponing next year's AN elections, should the political climate remain unfavorable. Finally, he may see value in bloodying Colombia's nose as talk of a possible third Uribe term continues, or of playing the victim of a Colombia-originated incident. Chavez appears to recognize the stiff internal political headwinds he currently confronts, and the announcement last week that the AN elections will take place on September 26 (Ref F) provides him a timeline with which he can map out an electoral strategy that minimizes the fallout from his government's shortcomings. ¶6. (SE) Comment Continued: Post does not/not believe a full-scale war with Colombia is looming or even conceivable at this point. While Chavez is manipulating the DCA issue at least in part to justify certain internal measures, some local observers think that he really believes a U.S.-Colombian move against him is possible -- or even in train. If true, this belief could propel him to take reckless actions both internally and/or abroad. End Comment. DUDDY =======================CABLE ENDS============================