POLLSTER: OPPOSITION NEEDS AN "EVERYDAY AGENDA"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 001423

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HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2029
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: POLLSTER: OPPOSITION NEEDS AN "EVERYDAY AGENDA"

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Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBIN D. MEYER,
FOR REASON 1.4(D)


1. (C) Summary: Pollster Alfredo Keller predicted to
Polcouns on October 23 that the opposition would achieve a
tactical alliance in advance of the 2010 legislative
elections, but warned about its continued lack of an
effective message. Keller suggested that Chavista
abstentionism at the polls could defeat Chavez's United
Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV),and contended that
Chavez could find a way to postpone or cancel elections,
such as by having the Supreme Court (TSJ) declare the new
electoral law unconstitutional, if he thought he would lose
at the polls. Keller emphasized that Chavez had empowered
the poor majority of Venezuelans, thereby "changing
Venezuelan politics for good." The opposition could not
afford to ignore this poor majority and needed to develop an
"everyday agenda" to address their concerns. He suggested
the opposition develop a message of "renovating" Venezuela.
End Summary.

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THE METHOD: FOCUS GROUPS, POLLS, BUT NO GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
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2. (C) Keller's analysis was based on polling results and
focus groups that included both Chavistas and
opposition-oriented participants. Keller himself openly
identified as a member of the opposition and said his firm
did not have any government contracts and "only works with
democratic groups." Keller has longstanding ties with the
COPEI Party and with Christian Democrat-aligned parties in
Latin America.

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THE OPPOSITION: Tactical Alliance in Search of a Message
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3. (C) Keller predicted that the opposition parties and
their leadership would achieve a tactical alliance, but
not an integrated movement, in advance of the 2010 National
Assembly (AN) elections. He assessed that their biggest
obstacle would be deciding on an effective message, since
the opposition spans the political spectrum. Stressing the
"utilitarian" relationship that Venezuelans have with their
government, dating back to the 1950s when oil revenues began
to be used for social welfare programs, he suggested the
opposition develop a message that responds to the "everyday"
concerns of voters about the need for the government to
address the problems of water, electricity, garbage removal,
and especially crime. He said that the opposition AN
candidates should run on local issues of "good governance,"
using the record of the opposition governors. (Note: In
reference to Mayor of Greater Caracas Antonio Ledezma,
he said that "the poor little guy" was trying hard to
become a national leader, but was too closely identified
with the widely discredited opposition Accion Democratica
(AD) party to ever succeed. End Note.) Rather than simply
attack Chavez, the opposition's message should be one of
"renovation" of Venezuela, i.e., building and improving on
the progress that had been made under Chavez. For example,
the opposition should stress that the Barrio Adentro,
Mercal, and other social "mission" programs were good ideas,
but badly implemented.


4. (C) Describing Venezuelan politics as "idiosyncratic"
rather than "ideological," Keller said that "political
language" -- which includes terms like democracy, freedom,
dictatorship, and human rights -- does not work with
Venezuelan voters, who see it simply as a way for politicians
to try to get elected. Nor are critiques of Chavez's
policies
effective if they are based on "process" arguments rather
than
results, since he characterized Venezuelans as having a
"concrete," as opposed to "abstract," way of thinking.
For example, voters are unlikely to think about the impact
of expropriations or nationalizations on the level of future
investment or productivity, but will be responsive to
arguments about the impact of such actions on today's
shortages.

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CHAVEZ'S VULNERABILITIES: ABSTENTIONISM, NO COATTAILS
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5. (C) According to Keller's latest polling, the opposition
has a majority, with 53 percent of the population. The

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percentage rises to 66 percent if disaffected Chavistas are
included. Keller noted, however, that despite Chavez's
decline
in popularity and criticism of basic services, Chavistas are
unlikely to vote against Chavez himself. The abstention of
this bloc of voters could prove decisive, as it was in the
defeat of the 2007 Constitutional referendum. Keller
assessed
that the current situation in the country made it unlikely
that Chavez would have coattails for his PSUV candidates in
the upcoming elections, and said the opposition should take
advantage of this by not making the election about Chavez;
attacks against Chavez would only mobilize his supporters
to vote.


6. (C) Keller speculated that Chavez would find a way to
postpone or cancel the 2010 elections if he thought the PSUV
would not win a majority of the AN seats. One method would
be for the Supreme Court (TSJ) to declare the new electoral
law unconstitutional -- something the opposition has publicly
alleged since it was first proposed.


7. (C) Although Keller's polls show that an overwhelming
majority of Venezuelans do not want Chavez to continue in
office beyond the expiration of his term in 2012, Keller
noted that the same voters saw no realistic alternative to
Chavez and were concerned about social peace if he were not
reelected. He did not believe that Chavez would relinquish
power in 2012, and advised that the opposition should begin
to lay the basis for 2012 during the AN elections by focusing
on the need for "equilibrium" after 2012.

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CHAVEZ CHANGED POLITICS FOR GOOD
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8. (C) Keller said that Chavez had changed politics for
good
by empowering a previously disenfranchised sector of the
population, who will remain a vocal part of Venezuelan
politics
in the future. As a result, the opposition cannot ignore
this
group. If they do, there will be no social peace. In this
sense, Keller said Chavez was a factor for stability. He
noted that two of Chavez's key slogans -- "this is how to
govern" ("asi, asi se gobierna") and "now, Venezuela is for
everyone" ("ahora, Venezuela es para todos") -- reflect the
wide appeal of his politics of redistribution of national
resources and resentment of the old social and political
order. According to Keller, Chavez has succeeded in
rewriting
history in the minds of many Venezuelans, implanting the idea
that all the good social investment that has taken place is
the result of the Bolivarian "revolution." For example, he
said that many Venezuelans NOW think that Caracas' metro was
built under Chavez, when in fact it was built long before he
took office. Similarly, Keller noted that many Venezuelans
incorrectly believe that Chavez was responsible for
initiating
the policy of free public education, when it has been the
practice since 1963.

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KELLER: BIO NOTE
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9. (C) Keller's father was a Catholic activist in
pre-World
War II Switzerland. When threatened by the Gestapo, he fled
to Holland and then to Venezuela, where he met Keller's
mother,
the daughter of a French businessman living in Venezuela.
Keller is a dual national of Venezuela and Switzerland, and
he
has degrees from French universities. His children live in
Europe -- his son is a medical doctor in London and his
daughter lives in Paris.

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COMMENT
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10. (C) Keller's assessment of the opposition's best
strategy
to win in the 2010 AN elections -- by focusing on day-to-day
concerns and by presenting a platform that builds on, rather
than criticizes, Chavez' social programs for the poor -- has

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been echoed by other political observers.
DUDDY