VENEZUELAN REACTION ON PORTS MUTED, NO CLOSER TO A

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000138 SIPDIS HQ SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD TREASURY FOR MMALLOY COMMERCE FOR 4431/MAC/WH/JLAO E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019 TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL ETRD EWWT EPET VE SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN REACTION ON PORTS MUTED, NO CLOSER TO A USCG VISIT REF: A. 2008 CARACAS 1637 ¶B. 2008 CARACAS 1580 ¶C. 2008 CARACAS 1754 ¶D. 2008 CARACAS 1607 ¶E. CARACAS 86 Classified By: Economic Counselor Darnall Steuart for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1.(C) SUMMARY: The US Coast Guard's imposition of "conditions of entry" met with a muted response on the part of both the Venezuelan government and the private sector. Although scattered incidents and conflicting reports led to concerns of retaliation, the Venezuelan government and port authorities have yet to respond in a concerted manner to the Coast Guard advisory. Shipping continues to move normally. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) recently expressed interest to the Charge' in resuming its talks with the USG on a Coast Guard visit. With Washington concurrence, Post will contact the MFA to discuss how best to move forward on this issue. In sum, however, unless Coast Guard actions result in more than slight delays, or the government of Venezuela chooses to engage on this issue for foreign policy reasons, industry sources believe the conditions of entry will soon be all but forgotten without achieving a Coast Guard visit. -------------- BACKGROUND -------------- 2.(C) In December 2004, the US Coast Guard assessed Venezuelan ports and has since been attempting, without success, to obtain permission to return. On December 1, Emboffs met with the President of the Institute of Aquatic Spaces (INEA) and representatives from the Ministries of Infrastructure (MINFRA) and Foreign Affairs to discuss the US Coast Guard's proposed visit (refs A and B). Venezuelan government officials agreed to allow the Coast Guard assessment and proposed a January meeting to prepare for a February 2009 Coast Guard visit. Post followed up with two diplomatic notes in December proposing a January 12 date for the initial meeting. While MFA told Post on several occasions that the proposed January 12 meeting would be acceptable, an INEA representative told both Econoff and a US Coast Guard officer in December 19 phone conversations that "INEA was awaiting new instructions from the new INEA president" on the Coast Guard visit. There was no official response to the two diplomatic notes. Additionally, the planned Coast Guard attendee to the January 12 meeting did not obtain a visa. 3.(C) The Venezuelan government's failure to follow through on its December 1 promises may in part be due to the December 6 appointment of Diosdado Cabello Rondon, well known for his strident pro-Chavez views, as the new MINFRA minister (ref C). On January 16, the Coast Guard issued a Federal Register notice announcing the imposition of its "conditions of entry" for vessels arriving from Venezuelan ports. From January 20-23, a few short articles appeared in local and international press regarding the Coast Guard action. Since then, the media largely appears to have lost interest. -------------- --- FOREIGN MINISTRY AGREES TO TALK, BUT NOTHING SET -------------- --- 4.(C) On January 26, the Charge' spoke to the Foreign Minister's Chief of Staff Temir Porras. The Charge' reiterated his January 22 statements to the Ministry of Foreign Affair's Director for North American Affairs Yaneth Arrocha regarding his desire to see both sides reach a resolution on this technical issue. Porras agreed that starting a diplomatic dialogue on this issue would be a step toward normalizing relations. Porras added, however, that referring to a possible Coast Guard visit of Venezuelan ports as an "inspection" was part of the problem and we should refer to it as a "visit" instead. (Note: The word "inspection" is neither used in official Coast Guard communications nor in any of the five diplomatic notes Post has sent to the Venezuelan government on the Coast Guard visit. Local and international press reports, on the other CARACAS 00000138 002 OF 003 hand, tend to refer to the visit as an "inspection". End Note.) With Washington concurrence, Post will contact the MFA to discuss how best to proceed. -------------- -------------- GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR UNIMPRESSED BY ADVISORY -------------- -------------- 5.(C) Bernardo Oronoz of logistics company Expotran told Econoff that on January 22, a high-level INEA official told him he had no knowledge of the advisory on Venezuelan ports. Once Oronoz explained the situation, the official said the Coast Guard action would have no impact on Venezuela as the Coast Guard already inspects oil tankers. Oronoz said several shipping companies simply plan to add an additional surcharge to compensate for any Coast Guard action that might delay their ships. 6.(C) On January 28, Econoff met with Juan Andres Hinestrosa, the owner of commodities importer Induservices. Hinestrosa believes the US Coast Guard's Port Security Advisory will have little impact on the shipping industry, saying that the only outcome will be a slight increase in freight costs. He said that many companies are already used to the Coast Guard inspection routine, as they are familiar with the procedures Coast Guard uses with Cuba. Hinestrosa added that ship owners already go out of their way to avoid Venezuelan ports and as far as the private sector is concerned, the advisory pales in comparison with the real issue facing the industry: the general "chaos" of Venezuelan ports (ref D). He noted in passing that it takes twice as long to discharge cargo at Venezuelan ports as it does at Colombian ports. -------------- CONFLICTING REPORTS ON RETALIATION -------------- 7.(C) Hinestrosa noted that while port independence is under attack and rumors are rife that the central government will assume formal control, many Venezuelan ports are currently under state government control and are independent of the central government. Consequently, he said, different ports plan to react to the port advisory in different ways. On January 29, Econoff contacted the port authorities for the ports of Maracaibo, Cabello and La Guaira. The Maracaibo port authority was the only one of the three to indicate that they planned to react indirectly to the Coast Guard notice. Captain Gonzalez Arriet stated that Venezuelan ports operate at security level one. If a vessel tries to enter Lake Maracaibo at a heightened level of security, security level two, the port authority will send a team to inspect that vessel at Las Piedras, a point several nautical miles from the entrance to the lake. Everything else would proceed normally. He said the new inspection was because the port authority considers a vessel declaring level two to be "more dangerous." 8.(C) On January 28, vessel agent Ricardo Romer of the company "Grupo Romer" gave Econoff his version of the port authorities' differing reactions to the Coast Guard action. In La Guaira, the port closest to Caracas, he said new inspection procedures began on January 28 as a result of the Coast Guard notice. According to the new procedures, ships must halt 12 nautical miles from port and wait for a team to inspect each and every ship before docking. Romer added, however, that La Guaira would never be able to implement this policy as it does not have enough staff to carry out its current functions much less new inspections. A day later an official at the La Guaira port authority contradicted Romer's claim saying no new inspections were taking place as a result of the Coast Guard notice. Romer also said there would now be two inspections before the Lake Maracaibo port authority allows ships to dock; one at Las Piedras and one at the mouth of the Lake. The port authority at Lake Maracaibo disputed this claim as per para 7. -------------- COMMENT -------------- 9.(S) While we are still seeking clarity on the reaction to CARACAS 00000138 003 OF 003 the Coast Guard notice, it seems thus far the private sector is relatively unconcerned, and the media mostly uninterested. There are indications that the Venezuelan government may lodge a protest with the International Maritime Organization, but this is unlikely to raise the profile of this issue domestically. Depending on the official speaking, the Venezuelan government is either claiming ignorance or adopting a "wait on Chavez" approach. Given President Chavez' unwavering focus on the February 15 referendum to eliminate presidential term limits, ports are unlikely to catch his interest anytime soon (ref E). Short of drastic USG action such as banning Venezuelan oil shipments from US ports, it is likely that the Coast Guard notice will soon be forgotten. CAULFIELD