CNE RECTOR WARNS ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS COULD COME AS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 001134 SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER) E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2029 TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE SUBJECT: CNE RECTOR WARNS ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS COULD COME AS EARLY AS NEXT SPRING REF: CARACAS 01111 CARACAS 00001134 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBIN D. MEYER, FOR REASON 1.4(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Vicente Diaz, one of the five rectors of the National Electoral Council (CNE),met with Poloffs August 20 and speculated that President Chavez may call for National Assembly (AN) elections as early as March 2010. Diaz, who is the only rector not beholden to Chavez, suggested that this timing would take advantage of the opposition's poor organization and misguided focus -- effectively emulating the timing strategy that helped Chavez win his February 2009 constitutional referendum. Diaz also warned that under the recently passed Organic Law of Electoral Processes (LOPE) (Reftel),the CNE is already positioned to begin exploiting its new discretionary powers to the benefit of Chavez's United Socialist Party of Venezuelan (PSUV) after its return from summer vacation in mid-September. End Summary. -------------- AN ELECTIONS NEXT SPRING? -------------- ¶2. (C) Vicente Diaz, the only political independent of the five CNE rectors, warmly received Poloffs August 20 in his office at the CNE. He theorized that Chavez could call for AN elections as early as March 2010, although they are not constitutionally mandated until that August. Diaz opined that Chavez recognizes that legislative elections are crucially important for maintaining his control over state institutions since the AN oversees the selection and appointments of the reigns of power, including the Attorney General, the CNE rectors, and Supreme Court magistrates. ¶3. (C) Diaz noted that the opposition has spent the months since the February 2009 constitutional referendum arguing over the method for submitting AN candidates, rather than working out a comprehensive list of unity candidates who could actually win in each of their respective districts. He speculated that Chavez might hope that convoking and holding an election soon and with little advance notice would capitalize on the opposition's disorganization, leaving them once again unable to mount a coordinated electoral effort -- a strategy, according to Diaz, that worked for Chavez in February. This timing would also take advantage of the fact that many (opposition) Venezuelans are loathe to curtail their annual December and January vacations to return to the campaign trail, a point that Chavez successfully exploited in the run-up to the February referendum. -------------- IMPLEMENTING LOPE -------------- ¶4. (C) Diaz said that after the CNE returns from vacation on September 15, it would begin creating a "pre-design" of new electoral districts using its new authorities granted under the LOPE to Gerrymander. He expects that a CNE commission will be tasked with the specific goal of shifting district boundaries for the 22 districts where the PSUV has shown either precarious or little electoral success. Under the LOPE, the CNE will also have full discretion in regulating how campaigns can be run. In theory, electoral campaigns should fall under Diaz's authorities as rector, but he predicted that the other CNE rectors will vote to create a new, Chavista-headed commission to oversee campaigns. Since the LOPE requires that the CNE approve and review all campaign publicity, Diaz assessed that this stipulation is simply a thinly-veiled censorship tool. He also warned that the LOPE does not discuss electoral observation missions, which suggests that the CNE could choose not to permit international missions until a day or two prior to balloting -- if at all -- to shield them from an accurate assessment of the pre-electoral playing field. -------------- CNE INTERNAL DYNAMICS -------------- ¶5. (C) Diaz said that the other four Chavista rectors frequently compete for control, reflecting a broader dynamic of power struggles within Chavismo. He noted that he often acts as a mediating "bridge" between them, since he can deliver messages as a non-threatening observer. (Note: Other electoral contacts have told us that there is a CARACAS 00001134 002.2 OF 002 divisive power struggle between the rectors and staff who answer to Minister of Public Works Diosdado Cabello, and those who are beholden to Libertador municipality Mayor Jorge Rodriguez; both men are close to Chavez. End Note.) Nevertheless, Diaz said that his Chavista coworkers may be friendly to him privately but will not, for example, go out to lunch with him, lest they be accused as being "infiltrated" by the opposition. When asked if any of the rectors would consider a private meeting with Emboffs, Diaz categorically rejected the idea. He noted that his term of office does not expire until 2013, but two of the other rectors' terms are up at the end of October. They can either be re-elected or replaced, depending on the whims of the executive. ¶6. (C) Diaz speculated that he has kept his job because "it serves Chavez," drawing a parallel between his role and that of opposition-oriented Globovision media outlet, which Chavez has frequently threatened but thus far not closed. He acknowledged, however, that he toes the line in not adopting too visible a role as a Chavez opponent, commenting that "there's a red line and if I cross it, they will remove me." Diaz said that he prefers to be selective about which government actions he considers egregious enough to publicly denounce. (Note: The political opposition, in the past, has commented that they often use Diaz as a guide, for example, waiting for his public stance on specific election controversies before taking their own position. End Note.) As a result of his decision to often remain silent on what he considers less flagrant abuses, Diaz quipped that he felt he had been attacked more by the opposition than by the GBRV. He added that while he believed the central government means him no physical harm, he worries that radical Chavista militants see him as a threat and a target and could act on this misconception. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) Diaz echoed what other political observers have noted, that the opposition is taking a mistaken approach in spending months arguing over philosophical process issues rather than focusing their efforts on systematically selecting unity candidates for AN elections who will be able to win in their districts, regardless of their individual opposition party affiliation. It would be a savvy move for Chavez to hold elections early next year while the opposition is unprepared, but it is also risky -- if he fails to retain a dominant PSUV majority, then he would face a more hostile legislature for the remainder of his term that is less likely to rubber-stamp his legislative initiatives. Other observers have predicted that Chavez will find a reason to delay AN elections to coincide with presidential elections in 2012, and will try to once again reframe the vote as a plebiscite on Chavismo. Whatever the timing, the passage of LOPE grants the Chavista-dominated CNE the discretion to maneuver the electoral playing field and the balloting process to Chavez's greatest advantage. End Comment. DUDDY